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This thesis is concerned with algorithms for generating 
generalisations-from experience. These algorithms are viewed as 
examples of the general concept of a hypothesis discovery system 
which, in its turn, is placed in a framework in which it is seen as 
one component in a multi-stage process which includes stages of 
hypothesis criticism or justification, data gathering and analysis 
and prediction. Formal and informal criteria, which should be 
satisfied by the discovered hypotheses are given. In particular, 
they should explain experience and be simple. The formal work uses 
the first-order predicate calculus. 
These criteria are applied to the case of hypotheses which are 
generalisations from experience. A formal definition of generalisation 
from experience, relative to a body of knowledge is developed and 
several syntactical simplicity measures are defined. This work uses 
many concepts taken from resolution theory (Robinson, 1965). We 
develop a set of formal criteria that must be satisfied by any hypothesis 
generated by an algorithm for producing generalisation from experience. 
The mathematics of generalisation is developed. In particular, 
in the case when there is no body of knowledge, it is shown that there is 
always a least general generalisation of any two clauses, in the 
generalisation ordering. (In resolution theory, a clause is an 
abbreviation for a disjunction of literals.) This least general 
generalisation is effectively obtainable. 
Some lattices induced by the generalisation ordering, in the case 
where there is no body of knowledge, are investigated. 
The formal set of criteria is investigated. It is shown that for 
a certain simplicity measure, and under the assumption that there is no 
body of knowledge, there always exist hypotheses which satisfy them. 
Generally, however, there is no algorithm which, given the sentences 
describing experience, will produce as output a hypothesis satisfying 
the formal criteria. These results persist for a wide range of other 
simplicity measures. However several useful cases for which algorithms 
are available are described, as are some general properties of the set of 
hypotheses which satisfy the criteria. 
Some connections with philosophy are discussed. It is shown that, 
with sufficiently large experience, in some cases, any hypothesis which 
satisfies the formal criteria is acceptable in the sense of Hintikka and 
Hilpinen (1966). The role of simplicity is further discussed. Some 
practical difficulties which arise because of Goodman's (1965) "grue" 
paradox of confirmation theory are presented. 
A variant of the formal criteria suggested by the work of Meltzer 
(1970) is discussed. This allows an effective method to be developed 
when this was not possible before. However, the possibility is 
countenanced that inconsistent hypotheses might be proposed by the 
discovery algorithm. 
The positive results on the existence of hypotheses satisfying the 
iv 
formal criteria are extended to include some simple types of knowledge. 
It is shown that they cannot be extended much further without changing 
the underlying simplicity ordering. 
A program which implements one of the decidable cases is described. 
It is used to find definitions in the game of noughts and crosses and in 
family relationships. 
An abstract study is made of the progression of hypothesis discovery 
methods through time. 
Some possible and some impossible behaviours of such methods are 
demonstrated. This work is an extension of that of Gold (1967) and 
Feldman (1970). The results are applied to the case of machines that 
discover generalisations. They are found to be markedly sensitive to 
the underlying simplicity ordering employed. 
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Chapter 1 Hypothesis discovery 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with forming hypotheses by generalisation. 
We hope to expose a more interesting structure than would be expected 
from contemplation of the traditional recipe for generalisation which is 
the simple replacement of constants by variables. Thus we are 
committed from the start to a study of generalisation of sentences in the 
predicate calculus. First-order predicate calculus will be quite 
sufficient although some other formalismswill be mentioned. We assume, 
therefore, that the reader is acquainted with some standard formulation 
of first-order predicate calculus, such as that of Schoenfield (1967). 
Some examination of generalisation processes in the predicate 
calculus may be found in Meltzer (19704) He constructed a program to 
find general laws of group theory from particular examples. Some other 
work in the domain of predicate calculus has been done by Popplestone 
(1970), although this was not concerned with generalisation alone, but 
contained other rules for generating hypotheses, a heuristic search 
through the hypothesis space and a mechanism for generating "test" 
experiments to decide between competing hypotheses. 
The largest single body of work in A.I. research on hypothesis 
formation has been on guessing grammars. A method for guessing finite- 
state grammars was devised by Chomsky and Miller (1957) and generalised 
to context-free grammars by Solomonoff. The adequacy of Solomonoff's (1964+) 
m2- 
method has been challenged by Shamir and Bar-Hillel (Shamir, 1962). 
The first heuristic program for guessing finite-state grammars 
seems to be that of Feldman (1967). 
Theoretically, we find contributions by Gold (1967), Feldman (1970), 
Feldman, Gips, Horning and Reder (1969) and Horning (1969). 
Gold showed what kind of behaviour could theoretically be expected 
from grammar-guessing machines. Feldman (1970) continued these studies. 
In Feldman, Gips and Horning we find both theoretical results which are 
less general but stronger than those in Gold, and descriptions of a 
practical program for inferring pivot grammars, which form a subclass 
of the context-free grammars and which properly contain the finite-state 
grammars. Horning, too, conducts both a theoretical and practical 
investigation, based on Bayesian ideas. 
His program has the special distinction of being, in one sense, 
theoretically optimal. Seemingly, however, it has less practical 
ability than the other, heuristic, programs. 
Closely related work on guessing finite-state machines can be 
found in Perryman (1970) and Feldman and Biermann (1970). Taking this 
work together with that of the grammar guessers, we may conclude that 
only a little need yet be done to obtain a theoretically and practically 
good algorithm for guessing a finite-state grammar from a set of 
examples and a set of non-examples. Matters remain unsatisfactory, 
however, in the case of context-free grammars. 
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Amarel (1962, 1971) is concerned with guessing programs of a rather 
simple type with no looping, from samples of input-output pairs. He 
seems not to have programmed his method. Hewitt (1968) tries to guess 
programs with, possibly, recursion, but using as data traces of the 
program he is trying to guess. This method seems not to have been 
programmed. 
Given descriptions of both examples and non-examples of a class of 
pictures, Winston (1970) attempts to generate a general description of 
the entire class. One interesting feature of his program is that new 
examples or non-examples may be taken into account by alteration of the 
current general description. The program is unique of its kind and 
seems quite successful. 
This leads into the field of pattern recognition where we may, for 
example, regard the perceptron convergence theorem (Nilsson 1965, 
Minsky and Papert, 1969) as demonstrating the successful operation of a 
hypothesis-guessing machine. 
Standing on its own is the work of Buchanan, Sutherland and 
Feigenbaum (1969, 1970) and Feigenbaum, Buchanan and Lederberg (1971) on 
hypothesis-formation in organic chemistry. The programs they developed 
form the most impressive hypotheses of any, although there are 
correspondingly strong assumptions. 
We should mention also some work in psychology, in,essentially, a 
very restricted portion of the first-order predicate calculus. This 
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concerns concept-learning. Notable books are those of Bruner, Goodnow 
and Austin (1956) and Hunt, Marin and Stone (1966). 
Work on the related subject of analogy has been done by Evans (1968), 
Kling (1971) and Becker (1970). Evans was in fact, largely concerned 
with generalisation, although his work concerned analogy questions in 
I.Q. tests. The solutions generated by his program were in almost 
total agreement with those of the proposers of the tests. Kling was 
interested in the use of analogy to help in proving theorems analogous 
to already proven ones. Kling has programmed his method. Becker 
proposed his notions of analogy as an essential component in a model of 
"intermediate level cognition". He has not programmed his method. 
Of course one could go on for ever quoting work on hypothesis 
discovery. However the above gives a good indication of what has been 
done in the way of actually proposing and implementing algorithms. 
While we will both propose and implement discovery algorithms, we 
will be mainly concerned with a theoretical analysis of the relation of 
generalisation and its use. It is hoped that this will provide some 
useful notation and techniques for further development of algorithms. 
The analysis sets up criteria derived from the philosophy of science. 
The possibility of doing this was explicitly stated by Buchanan (1966), 
to whom we owe some considerable debt. The hypothesis formation problem 
is seen as a stage in a continuing process of theory formation and 
criticism, data gathering, prediction and so on. Criteria that a 
hypothesis formation method should satisfy can then be set up. This 
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forms the main part of this chapter. The criteria depend on what notion 
of explanation of the given data is employed. In chapter 2 we develop 
a definition of generalisation and so specialise the criteria that they 
result in a tractable formal problem of finding a machine which will 
produce hypotheses satisfying the criteria. In fact, a "nicest" such 
hypothesis will be required. 
In chapter 3 the abstract theory of the generalisation relationship 
is developed and employed to examine the formal problem in chapter k and 
to provide several illustrations and other applications in chapter 5. 
Finally, in order to partially correct the distorted emphasis on a 
single, idealised stage of hypothesis formation, we give in chapter 6 a 
generalisation of Feldman's theory of hypothesis identification in the 
limit, (Feldman, 1970). 
The work started with a suggestion by R.J. Popplestone (private 
communication) that, just as the unification algorithm was fundamental 
to deduction, so might a converse be of use in induction. Unification 
is a basic idea in the theory of resolution given by Robinson (1965). 
We refer to his work for a complete description of the notation used in 
that theory. 
For our immediate purposes, it is only important to note that a 
literal is an atomic formula or the negation of one and that a clause 
is a set of literals and it abbreviates the disjunction of its members 
(taken in some standard order). The letters L, M and N are used to 
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stand for literals. The letters C, D and E are used to stand for 
clauses. 
A literal is a unification of two literals iff it is an instance 
of each. A literal is a most general unification of two literals iff 
any other unification of them is an instance of it. 
Similarly, a literal is a generalisation of two literals iff each 
of them is an instance of it. A literal is a least general generalisation 
of two literals iff it is an instance of any other generalisation of 
them. 
For example, a most general unification of P(x,x) and 
P(f(y),f(g(z))) is P(f(g(z)),f(g(z))). A least general generalisation 
of them is P(x,y). 
The existence of least general generalisations was soon shown. 
In fact they are easier to obtain than unifications. A necessary and 
sufficient condition that two literals have a least general generalisation 
is just that they have the same predicate letter and sign. However this 
is not enough even to generate simple universal laws of the form: 
Vxe (x) -> Q(x)). To do this it is necessary to consider generalisations 
of clauses. Let us say, again for the moment, that a clause C is more 
general than a clause D if C subsumes D - that is if there is a 
substitution a- such that CC' C D. (In resolution theory, 
substitutions are functions which operate on expressions; they are 
denoted by Greek letters.) One can then define the least general 
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generalisation of two clauses. The key theorem is that any two clauses 
have a least general generalisation. 
It is interesting to note that the similarity between deduction 
and induction breaks down here. What is useful is not a concept of 
unification of two clauses, but the deduction principle called 
resolution. 
We then envisaged crude algorithms which would build up from 
clauses abbreviating implications between ground literals the set of 
least general generalisations and pick some subset as the proposed 
hypothesis. (A ground literal is one that contains no occurrences of 
variables.) Such a subset would have to be consistent with the data, 
but this does not rule out enough combinations and it is necessary to 
impose a condition that only the "nicest" (according, say, to some 
measure of simplicity) combination be picked. 
Encountering Buchanan's work (1966) we realised that a hypothesis 
formation (or suggestion or discovery) method should be placed within a 
philosophical framework so that, for example, the suggested method could 
be criticised as not meeting various criteria found in the literature. 
Thus we arrive in almost the reverse order at the beginning of the 
development of this thesis. The main technical addition 
to the concept of a least general generalisation is that of generalisation 
relative to a body of knowledge. This enables, for example, a robot 
to form generalisations about its sensory experience, given in terms of 
light patterns on a retinal grid, in the more abstract language of 
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objects such as bananas, faces, spectacles and so on. 
2. Criteria for hypothesis formation 
We begin with some general arguments that induction may be useful 
in A.I. robot research and, if so, such criteria as may be provided by 
the philosophy of science should be accepted. Of course hypothesis 
formation, being one might say the intellectual activity par excellence 
requires no justification for its study for its own sake. As, 
however, we believe that integrated robot systems are of some 
importance in A.I.,arguments relating such systems with inductive ones 
should be considered. 
One can easily see in general terms how inductive abilities 
would be of help to a robot, i.e. an artificial rational man. Such 
an ideal entity should be a scientist - and so, a non-deductive reasoner 
of some kind, depending on one's philosophy of science. Again, a 
robot should have common sense and be able to talk a common-sensical 
language, such as English. It is a very defensible thesis that both 
English and common-sense involve a naive science. Both learning and 
using this naive science will therefore involve the robot in some naive 
non-deductive reasoning. 
There is, even in present robots, an implicit form of inductive 
ability. For example, all present robots base their plans of action on 
rather brief glimpses of the world, since picture processing using 
available techniques is slow. This reflects an inductive expectation 
that the world will not change too much between looks. It is however 
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quite unclear what inductive assumptions are definitely already built-in, 
let alone which ones ought to be. 
A robot should have the explicit ability to learn predicates 
ostensively. Several presentations of a lamp standard before the 
robot's eye should result in his forming a general idea of lamp standards, 
(Barrow and Popplestone, 1971, Winston, 1970). He should also be able 
to perform inductions from activities or events and learn causal 
connections (Hayes, 1971). 
Fancifully, by learning plausible beliefs about the effects of 
actions, but being prepared, if necessary to look or account for 
exceptions, it may be possible to ameliorate what McCarthy calls the 
"frame" problem (McCarthy and Hayes 1969, Hayes, 1971). 
Most of the above examples show that some kind of non-demonstrative 
reasoning is required. It has not been shown that the most suitable form 
is that of hypothesis formation. Such a demonstration would require a 
much fuller specification of the robot's mental life than has been given. 
We do not have an integrated sketch of his ontology and epistemology 
and theory of perception and the structure of his knowledge and his 
methods of plan formation and his motivations and his physical being and 
so on. 
Nonetheless, hypothesis formation is a leading candidate; 
analogical reasoning is the only other contender so far. It seems, 
therefore, worthwhile to develop hypothesis formation itself as much as 
possible. 
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We are concerned then with the automatic formation of hypotheses. 
At the most grandiose level, one would want a machine which could try 
to solve the problems of contemporary physics. At the lowest, one 
would wish to be able to (non-deductively) infer 'All crows are black' 
from 'That crow is black' and 'This crow is black'. In order to make 
quite clear the low level at which present general programs operate 
(without, however, any intention of denigrating the constructers of 
these systems) here are some examples: 
a) Feldman, Gips, Horning and Reder (1969) have studied the 
induction of grammars (mainly context-free) from finite sets of samples 
of legal strings, and, perhaps, a set of illegal strings. 
On being told that AABB, AB, AAABBB} is a set of examples, a 
program of theirs, GRIN2, produced the following grammar: 
X := AY 
Y XB/B. 
On being told that C, ACB, AACBB, AAACBBB} was a further set of 
examples another program GRIN2A, produced the following grammar: 
X AY/C 
Y : = XB/B . 
b) Meltzer (1970) has looked at the problem of determining the 
axioms for a class of interpretations, given a finite number of facts 
about each of a finite class of structures. 
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He fed in a representation of the following facts about the cyclic 
groups of orders 2 and 4, whose domains are e,a, and { e,b,c,di 
respectively. 
e.e = a; a.e = a; (a.a).e = a.(a.e); (e.a)a = e; e.a / e; 
a.a a; b.c = c.b; (b.b) b = c; (b.b).e / c; (b.c).c / b. 
The program generalised these representations, and obtained a 
representation of the following induced axioms. 
x.e = x; 
(x.x).y = w implies x.(x.y) = w; 
(y.a).a = y; 
x.y = y.x; 
b.(b.b) = y. 
At their best, these and similar general programs such as our own 
are only slightly more magnificent. There are much more specific 
programs which generate more impressive hypotheses, of which a prime 
example is the Heuristic Dendral program of Buchanan, Sutherland and 
Feigenbaum (1969, 1970). This program's ability is almost entirely due 
to the availability of a large amount of chemical knowledge (although 
this knowledge was by no means there for the taking). 
We will not attempt any general theory of theory generation. 
That is possible, in general, is to set up an outline which any 
generation method must fill in. This outline is derived from the 
philosophy of science. Apart from any use to which we actually put 
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this work, we are convinced that much can be gained from its study. 
It provides discussion of the justification and criticism of hypotheses; 
of problems of explanation and the nature of simplicity. One can find 
categorizations of different types of hypotheses and various qualities 
of hypotheses. There are accounts of the actual and ideal progress of 
science, and accounts of the dynamics of theory construction. There is 
the problem of the nature of scientific language and its relation to the 
world; it is important to know the 'behind the scenes' assumptions made 
automatically when one chooses to use a particular theoretical language. 
However, philosophy does not deal directly with our main concern, 
which is the generation of hypotheses. Indeed the philosophers 
generally delegate this problem to the psychologists. We therefore 
avoid a great deal of philosophical discussion since, for the most part, 
we have only extricated a schema of philosophical questions, rather than 
answers. So we expect that most of the current philosophical approaches 
could be so adapted as to fit in with our schema. This is not to say 
that we regard the different approaches as being essentially the same. 
The fact is that our schema is largely incomplete and typically (especially° 
as regards the problem of justification of hypotheses) leaves unanswered 
just those questions at which the bones of contention arise. Neither 
have we succeeded in altogether avoiding philosophical commitment. We 
have tended to raise questions and problems in a way which is rather more 
acceptable to the Carnapians than the Popperians. Sometimes we use 
terminology in a way that is unacceptable to either. For example we 
discuss the problem of justification. A Carnapian would prefer the 
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problem of confirmation, saying that no absolute justification is 
possible, in general. A Popperian would also dislike the problem of 
justification. He would say that the problem is how to decide between 
competing hypotheses. There is a problem of criticism. A Popperian 
might say that there is no problem of justification but perhaps one of 
corroboration. Nonetheless the debate does hinge on the existence 
and the importance of the problem of justification and the other 
related ones. We will therefore use the word justification to 
introduce this whole nexus of problems. 
To rephrase our concerns, we are looking for a language to 
uniformly describe the various attempts made in A.I. to construct 
programs for hypothesis formation. It is believed that this will 
lead to a general theory in time to come, and that in the immediate 
future, when one wishes to program a method of theory construction, one 
will have available an interesting set of non-trivial questions about 
one's method. 
Hypothesis formation is regarded as a process containing stages 
of theory construction, theory criticism, data gathering and data 
analysis. There will also be some supervisory mechanism to decide the 
order of these stages. As mentioned above we do not know and will not 
consider, how this fits into the general mental character of an ideal 
rational man. In fact, for the most part, we will only consider a 
simplified snapshot of the process, consisting of a stage of theory 
construction followed by one of theory criticism. The stage of theory 
c-riticism will be dealt with, on the whole, by reference to various 
possible philosophical positions. 
There is no virtue in our omissions; they are blanks which should 
be filled. It will surely happen that when the process is considered 
as a whole many missing parameters will be discovered. The analysis 
should therefore be considered entirely provisional. 
Suppose then that our robot is about to formulate and then 
criticise a theory after some stages of data gathering and analysis. 
The robot will possess knowledge and beliefs and pragmatic attitudes to 
these elements of knowledge and belief. Let us-call all this k. He 
will have before him some body of phenomena, f, together with the relevant 
circumstances of their occurrence, e, for which it is required to find 
some kind of explanatory hypothesis,h. Generally f will be a set of 
phenomena, If ilji=1,nj and e will be a set of relevant attendant 
circumstances i ei Ii=1,nj given by a function Er, that is ei = Ev(fi). 
How the ei are selected depends on an implicit stage of data gathering. 
The more naive this stage is, the more irrelevant information ei will 
contain. The lack of any theory of good data gathering is certainly 
one of the most important omissions. 
In general, there will be many explanatory hypotheses and so it 
will be necessary to choose the nicest. We expect that there will be 
some measure, - , of niceness. By h -3 h', we mean that h is at 
least as nice as 1i; -4 will be transitive and reflexive. This 
niceness ordering will be defined relative to f and e and, perhaps, k. 
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Perhaps the most famous example is provided by Newton's theory of 
gravitation. Here f and e were both large and varied. Among the 
phenomena was the fact that an apple fell on Newton's head. The 
relevant circumstances were Newton's situation relative to the apple 
at the start of its flight and the apple's position in the earth's 
gravitational field. 
The hypothesis h consisted of Newton's theory of gravitation. 
The knowledge, k, consisted of the axioms of Euclidean geometry and 
some axioms for time together with the interpretation of both of these 
via some theory of measurement. Of course, Newton himself did not 
formulate matters in these terms. 
The coincidence of Newton's head with the apple is explained in 
two stages. First h and k together with the statement regarding the 
apple's position in the Earth's gravitational field imply that the apple 
will fall. This and the fact that Newton's head was directly below the 
apple imply that the apple will strike him on the head. 
Putting the two stages together, we see that h and k together with 
the relevant circumstances imply that the apple will hit Newton's head. 
Notice that h and k are necessary in this implication. The relevant 
circumstances alone do not imply the coincidence of apple and head. 
Notice also that h and k and the relevant circumstances and the 
coincidence are,taken together, logically consistent. 
The great beauty of Newton's theory is its success in explaining, 
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with simple means, practically every mechanical and gravitational 
phenomenon known at that time, together with its successful prediction 
of many more. Perhaps the most spectacular prediction was the 
existence of Uranus. Indeed the theory possesses nearly every virtue 
described in the list of virtues given at the end of this chapter. 
It is, therefore, not too easy to describe 4 formally. 
In order to be able to formulate and criticise a theory, our 
robot should therefore possess answers to the following four questions: 
HI Is h justified given f, e and k? 
H2 ' Is there a means of telling when h is justified, given f, e and k? 
H3 Does h provide a good explanation in that it is very nice 
(perhaps maximally) with respect to -$ amongst those hypotheses 
which explain f, given e and k? 
H1+ Is there a means of finding such a maximally nice h? 
Answers to H1, H2 and H3 will enable the stage of criticism to be 
performed. An answer to HIS. is a hypothesis construction method. 
Before further analysis, it is helpful to consider four analogous 
questions which arise in mathematics. 
Suppose we are looking for a theorem Th in some axiomatic theory 
T. We want a Th which provides a best answer to some question, Q, 
about T. Answers are needed for the following questions: 
D1 Does Th follow from T? 
D2 Is there a means of telling when Th follows from T? 
-17- 
D3 Does Th provide a best answer to Q? 
DLL. Is there a way to find a Th that is a best answer to Q? 
Answers to D1, D2 and D3 represent the criticism stage and 
the discovery stage in some process of mathematical activity. It 
may be the case that both hypothesis formation and mathematical 
discovery can be made to form part of some more general process of 
knowledge generation. However it should not be imagined that questions 
HI and D1 will merge; or questions H2 and D2 and so on. This is 
because, for example, answering D1+ may involve formulating hypotheses 
or proceeding by analogy with previous results. Similarly it may be 
necessary to prove theorems to show that h explains f, given e and k. 
The distinction between questions D1 and D3 reflects a distinction 
between truth and interesting appropriateness. When, as here, we do 
suppose that both Th and T are formulated in the first order predicate 
calculus, then the Tarskian semantic notion of logical consequence is 
usually, and justifiably (Kreisel, 1967) taken as a proper formal 
analysis of the informal notion of logical consequence. Such a 
situation does not obtain for higher-order logics or modal logics or, 
certainly, natural language. 
Any complete and consistent system of proof for first-order 
logic gives a correct, but only semi-effective, answer to D2. Note 
that, in general any answer to D2 can be consistent and/or complete 
with respect to D1. Similarly any answer to a can be consistent 
and/or complete with respect to D3. In all cases, consistency and 
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completeness are necessary conditions for the coherence of the entire 
system. 
A further condition of coherence is that the Th discovered as a 
best answer to Dig. should, in fact, follow from T. 
This condition seems, on the whole, rather strong. What would 
be better would be some process which, given a conjectured answer to 
Q, would either prove Th or suggest, perhaps using a constructed counter- 
example, some alteration 'to Q or. Th. 
Answers to D2 and D4 may be, or may not be, efficient. Not much 
work has been done on the efficiency of systems of proof. (Kreisel, 
1970, Kowalski, 1969, 1970)° It seems likely, however, that while 
there can be no most efficient system of proof, existing methods can 
be greatly improved. As regards D3 and D4, the amount of systematic 
work is practically zero, with the well-known exception of that of 
P61ya (1954, 1957, 1968) 
An answer to H2 may be consistent, complete, and/or efficient with 
respect to H1. Similarly, an answer to HI.,may be consistent, complete 
and/or efficient with respect to H3. A global coherence requirement 
is that maximally nice h's, which explain f, given e and k, should be justified 
given e,and ko Although this seems rather strong, as does the analogous 
requirement in the deductive case, nonetheless we shall see in 
Chapter 5 that it will be satisfied in some simple cases, if e is 
sufficiently "large". 
We will outline some of the points made by philosophers about 
HI-HIS., before settling down to giving a more detailed account of H3. 
The distinction made in H1 and H3 between justification and 
niceness reflects the importance of questions about the truth of 
hypotheses. At one time, it was held to be possible to discover in 
a fixed, finite number of steps, important general truths about the 
world. Mill was about the latest philosopher who halfway believed 
this. Once it was demonstrated that there was in general no way to 
determine the truth of general statements, opinion divided,, roughly, 
in two. The Carnapians describe a logical confirmation function, 
c(h,e'), (Carnap, 1952). This quantity, c(h,e'), has been variously 
interpreted as the logical probability of h given e', or the betting 
odds that a rational man would accept on h's being true, given e'. 
The hypothesis, h, and the evidence for its being true, e',are both 
framed in first-order logic. Carnap, and this is a quite general 
opinion, holds that a science can be stated as a first-order axiomatic 
theory (Carnap, 1967). In our case we would take e' to be e and f 
and all the true observations contained in k. In any practical 
situation this would be a hopeless task and only the relevant parts 
of k would be considered. Probably this would include hypotheses 
not known to be true and to which only a degree of belief had been 
assigned. A predicate, Ac(h,e'), can be described, in terms of e', 
which specifies, in terms of a high, a posteriori confirmation, when 
h should be accepted given e', (Hintikka and Hilpinen, 1966). For 
a monadic language the confirmation function c is calculable, but for 
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a general first-order language, there is not even a semi-effective way 
to calculate it (Hintikka, 1965, Kemeny, 1953, Putnam, 1956). If we 
require the strong global coherence condition to hold, it is 
unimportant that any efficient methods be sought. Nothing is known 
anyway about efficient methods in general. For the monadic case, 
there is a close relation with the problem of efficiently finding 
switching circuits (Quine, 1955). 
Popper (1959) is less concerned with formal analysis. He notes 
that general theories can be falsified and makes this his central 
plank. For justification he would substitute the requirement that h 
survive in competition with other hypotheses an extended attempt to 
falsify it. Only strongly falsifiable and simple hypotheses should 
be chosen for consideration. 
Carnap has little to say on HL, and Popper specifically excludes 
this from his consideration, as being in the psychological domain. 
We turn now to looking at H3 in some detail. As this is not 
concerned with questions of truth, less has been said. An account of 
how general laws explain singular statements has been given by Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1948) and has been subject to criticism by, among others, 
Eberle, Kaplan and Montague (1961). Niceness is or is partly 
determined by simplicity. Popper has argued that the degree of 
falsifiability of a statement correlates strongly with its simplicity. 
Goodman (1961) rejects this. He also develops (1959) an account of 
the simplicity of the predicate basis of a theory. 
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We shall present a picture using a variant of Hempel and 
Oppenheims' explication of explanation and let the niceneos be 
specified by a parameter. Values of this parameter corresponding, 
roughly, to different philosophical positions will be used and 
investigated at different places throughout the rest of the thesis. 
The first important assumption is that h and k will be sets of 
first-order statements, framed in a theoretical and observational 
language. This over-simplifies the structure of the robot's belief- 
system k. In particular, all of k is now accepted as being true. 
This completely ignores the problem of how to deal with large 
collections of statements to which varying degrees of belief are 
assigned. Nor does Popper escape a similar dilemma. When k has 
been falsified, which part of it should be replaced? 
The hypothesis, h, will in addition be restricted to be a member 
of , the hypothesis space. 
The set of phenomena needing to be explained, f, is a set' 
f = fili=1,n} of first-order singular sentences. 
e = jeile=1,ni is also a set of first-order singular sentences. 
We will symbolise the relationship between each ei and f 
i 
by =>. 
We might regard => as a modal connective and say that the set of 
statements, ei => fili=1,n} in a certain modal logic represent the 
relation between the phenomena and their antecedents. 
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The interpretation of ei => fi is, roughly, that ei is a 
description of circumstances or preconditions which resulted in f 
i 
's 
being true. While it may be a good idea to actually use a modal 
logic, we could not find any suitable one, and decided to deal with 
and use _-> informally on the meta-level of our present discussion. 
Here is a list of some indications of possible interpretations of 
e. = >f . . i i 
1) Actions: fi is the result of an action, or series of actions, 
described by ei in circumstances also described by ei. 
2) Direct Cause: ei is the description of a direct cause of fi. 
3) Experiment: ei is the description of how an experiment was set 
up and fi is the description of its result, for example fi may 
be (a description of) a graph (such as one of temperature against 
pressure obtained from some experiment with gases). 
4) Empirical Association: whenever ei is true fi occurs (with 
observed frequency such and such). 
5) Temporal Succession: the event fi followed very soon after 
the event e.. 
6) Essential Property: fi is an essential property of objects 
with the description e For example, having a date inscribed 
is an essential property of pennies, but being in Harry's 
pocket is not. 
7) Definition: e i is the appropriate case of the definition of 
the predicate occurring in fi. 
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In the above, as in many places throughout this discussion, we are 
both using and mentioning the e, and f.. It is hoped that the reader 
will distinguish the different cases. 
These possibilities by no means form an independent or complete 
list. We will adopt 3) as our standard interpretation. With this in 
mind, we restrict ''to be some subset of the set of lawlike sentences, 
that is statements whose prenex form contains only universal quantifiers. 
This is a departure from the standard notion, which, in addition, 
requires that h contain no individual constants. 
We do this because we wish at one extreme to regard a singular 
statement as being a (completely uninteresting) law. Further we want 
the niceness criterion, 'j , to be the factor that strives toward 
generality. Finally, we feel that the simple grammatical notion of 
absence of individual constants does not capture the ideal of 
generality exactly. Many general scientific laws do contain constants 
for example the charge of an electron. 
Next, we specify what it is for h to explain f given k and e. 
The belief system, k, is divided into two parts, Th and Irr. Thus 
k = Th A Irr. The system Th consists of that part considered relevant 
to the set of phenomena at hand, and Irr is the rest, the irrelevant 
beliefs. 
Then, h explains f given k = Th A Irr and e iff: 
El For all i, hh A ei -> f1. 
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E2 For all i, it is not the case that ei 0> f i. 
n 
E3 The sentence k A h A ^ (ei A f.) is consistent. 
E4 The hypothesis h is lawlike. 
Strictly speaking, E3 should be written as 'The set of 
n 
sentences k I) Jh, A (ei A fi) is consistent This, and similar, 
confusions will be perpetrated throughout the thesis. 
Requirement El is certainly the least that h can do if it is to 
explain each f given ei and Th. The second requirement, E2, ensures 
that the phenomena are not trivial, that is that there is something new 
to be explained. Requirement E3 is a minimal requirement if h is to be 
incorporated into the body of beliefs. Whether or not one's beliefs are 
true, they should certainly be consistent with one's observations. 
Requirement Eli- is imposed as a result of the interpretation we adopted 
of =>. Other interpretations would require other conditions. 
By themselves, E1-Erg would not capture some of the r'feel'3 of 
explanation. This should perhaps be inserted in the description of 
the niceness relation, -& . Mario Bunge has compiled a very impressive 
list of possible "niceness" qualities of hypotheses (1961). We will 
give very brief accounts of each of them. This will give yet another 
indication of the sheer size of the problem. 
Syntactical Requirements: 
1) Wellmformedness. For us, this is just the requirement that h 
actually be a wff of the first-order predicate calculus. 
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2) Connectedness. If a hypothesis is thought of as a conjunction 
of postulates, and each predicate symbol occurs in many of these 
postulates, it is well-connected.. 
Semantical Requirements: 
3) Linguistic Exactness. The ambiguity, vagueness and obscurity 
of a hypothesis should be minimal. Such terms as 'hot' or 
'historical necessity' are not welcome. 
) Empirical Interpretability. The hypothesis must make empirical 
predictions. 
5) Representativeness. The theory should deal with actual events 
and processes. Thus theories of action at a distance are 
replaced by field theories, showing exactly how action at a 
distance actually works. 
6) Semantical Simplicity. The world should be constructed simply 
from simple parts. The theory of quarks is an extreme example. 
Epis steolo ical Requirements: 
7) External Consistency. The hypothesis should be consistent with 
the bulk of one's knowledge. 
8) Explanatory Power. The hypothesis should explain many known 
empirical facts and generalisations. 
9) Predictive Power. The hypothesis should entail many unknown 
facts. 
10) Depth. The hypothesis should explain essentials and reach 
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deeply into the structure of reality. 
11) Extensibility. The hypothesis should be extensible in 
order to cover new domains, not previously thought of as 
being relevant to the hypothesis. 
12) Fertility. The hypothesis must have exploratory power. 
13) Originality. 
Methodological Requirementso 
114-) Scrutability. The predicates involved in the hypothesis 
must be open to scrutiny by the general public. That is, 
techniques, tests and evidence must be intersubjective. 
For example, events should not occur through God's will, 
nor should Mrs. Smith's female intuition count as a 
theoretical entity. 
15) Refutability. It must be possible to imagine circumstances 
which could refute the hypothesis. Critical experiments can 
be set up. 
16) Confirmability. The theory must have consequences which agree 
with observation. 
17) Methodological Simplicity. It must be technically possible 
to subject the theory to empirical tests. 
Philosophical Requirements; 
18) Level Parsimony. The hypothesis must be parsimonious in its 
references to sections of reality other than those directly 
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involved. 
19) Meta-Scientific Soundness. The hypothesis must be 
compatible with fertile metascientific principles such as 
the requirement that it be lawlike. 
20) World-View Compatibility. The hypothesis should be in line 
with the general world-view of scientists. One should be 
led to reject crackpot theories, but accept, eventually, 
genuine scientific revolutions. 
It will be seen that some of these requirements are, from our 
systematiser's point of view, no more than hopeful hand-waving. Some 
have been covered, some seem extremely hard to formalise and some 
impossible. 
Let us recapitulate the parameters entering into H3. 
There is a hypothesis space 
There is a set of phenomena and their circumstances ei => fili=l,n., 
with restrictions on the nature of the ei and fi and some interpretation 
of =>. 
There is the knowledge, k = Th A Irr. 
There is the type of explanation through which each ei is 
explained by h(in 14- ) given k and fi(i=1,n). 
There is some notion of niceness, -4 . 
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Once these parameters have been specified one obtains a'method of 
answering H3 given h, and a formal problem: 
"Answer H1 so as to obtain a consistent, complete and efficient 
algorithm for finding an h which answers H3." 
Such an algorithm should cover a large range of possible sets of 
phenomena, and perhaps some range of possible belief systems k. 
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Chapter 2 The generalisation problem 
We will now narrow our objectives and use the framework constructed 
in the previous chapter to formalise the problem of finding 
generalisations from experience. This problem is both the simplest and 
the most common illustration of non-deductive reasoning. Indeed, so 
central is it, that some philosophers even use the word induction to 
mean generalisation. Here is an archetypal piece of generalisation: 
The sun rose yesterday 
The sun rose today 
The sun rises every day 
Here is another: 
This crow is black 
That crow is black 
Every crow is black 
Some more complicated examples can be found in chapters3, 1- and 5. 
To follow the prescription of chapter 1, we must fill in several 
parameters. 
First we must settle the hypothesis space. This has already been 
required to be some subset of the set of universal sentences. We will 
simply require that it is the set of universal sentences. 
Next, we must settle the set of phenomena, and the circumstances of 
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their occurrence, e. => f.Ii=1,n} where e = Ev(f.) (i=1,n) for a 
certain function Ev. Each phenomenon must be an experience. Let us 
say, as seems reasonable, that an experience is a fact experienced in 
certain circumstances, described by another set of facts. This is 
consistent with our decision to use => as indicating an experiment, if 
we regard an experience as an unintentional experiment. So fi is a 
fact and e. 
i 
is a, supposedly finite, conjunction of facts. We assume 
that every fact can be described by a ground literal. This fits in 
well with the view that there are basic observational predicates and 
facts are what are observed. One might make two accusations of 
unnaturalness. First most facts stated in English are stated in a 
positive way, and this is usually possible. Thus consider the verbal 
exchange: 
John: "The tap is on" 
Mary: "No, it's off." 
But here there is a piece of inbuilt knowledge, namely 
Vx (On(x) E " Off(x). We wish to have a theory which includes the 
use of no knowledge, when one would want negations. 
Secondly, it seems a little odd to allow function symbols other 
than constants. They do seem to arise occasionally in English in 
possessive phrases. "John's mother is beautiful" might be rendered as 
Beautiful(Mother(John)). Since they perhaps ought to be allowed in 
everyday use and since they certainly ought to be allowed for 
mathematical facts and are necessary if actions are regarded as 
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functions (usually from situations to situations), we will allow them. 
At any rate the theory can be developed just as well for the general as 
the particular cases. It will, however, make a rather spectacular 
difference later on. If function symbols other than constants are 
allowed, then one version of the generalisation problem is unsolvable, 
while if they are not allowed, it is solvable. 
Thus the phenomena are given by a set of facts, f = fili=1,nJ 
and a function Ev from f to finite conjunctions of facts. So far we 
have adopted the standard interpretation of => as an experiment, which 
justifies the selection of the hypothesis space. In any application 
alternative restrictions may be made on => which may induce other 
possible restrictions on any of the parameters: the hypothesis space, 
the set of possible phenomena, the method of explanation or even, 
perhaps, the niceness criterion. 
We must remark that there are some problems whose solution we 
assume to have taken place. The set f should be a reasonable set for 
generalising from. Ev should choose the (or a superset of the) 
relevant or correct facts which describe where, when and/or why f 
i 
took 
place. Such problems would be faced in formalizing the entire process 
of theory formulation. We do not attempt their formalization here, 
although one might suspect that if Ev(ei) is relevant to fi then every 
term in fi will contain a term occurring in Ev(ei). Perhaps the set 
of atoms in Ev(e.) and f, would form a connected set under the relation 
of having a common subterm. This weak requirement will not be assumed, 
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however. 
We believe that an event is a fact. This allows a widening of 
the range of possible interpretations of =>. We make the notational 
convention that ei is the clause Lf;L is one of the literals 
conjoined to form ei}o 
No conditions are assumed for Th or Irr at the moment. We will 
not say how k ought to be split up into two parts, except that Irr may 
contain an account of the failure of certain experiments. That is, it 
may contain conjunctions of literals of the form e A f where e is a 
conjunction of ground literals explaining some experimental set-up and 
f is a literal which expresses the fact that the expected outcome, f, 
did not occur. Irr will contain such "failures" when we do not wish 
to explain why the failure occurred, nor use the failure to explain 
the successes, but merely wish to find an explanation consistent with the 
failure. 
We will be particularly interested in the case when Th is empty, 
although we will also consider, in less detail, some other cases. 
However, much of the theory can, and will, be formulated in general. 
There are some restrictions that must be placed on Th, Ev and f, 
if the phenomena are to admit any explanations. 
I For every i, e. -> f. must not be deducible from Th. 
n 
2 Th A A1(ei A fi) must be consistent. 
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We must now capture a suitable notion of generalisation in order to 
formalise the intended type of explanation. The word generalisation is 
used in many contexts both formally and informally. It is not clear 
that there is a common intuition behind these uses. For example 
VP(x) and 3f(x) are, respectively called universal and existential 
generalisations of P(a). Yet only the former could qualify as an 
inductive generalisation. 
Generalisation from experience seems to occur in two stages. 
First a relevant part of experience is selected and then generalised by 
universal generalisation, that is, the replacement of constant terms by 
universally quantified variables. To reverse this, an experience is 
explained by a generalisation if it follows logically from an instance 
of it. It is this sense of generalisation for which we shall attempt 
a formal parallel. 
In our case, an experience is typically an experiment described by 
ei => fi for some i. We assert that the process of selecting a relevant 
part of it may be divided up into two parts; one of selection and one 
of rewording. 
In a selection, some of the circumstances are regarded as irrelevant. 
That is, eq => fl is a selection from e. => f. if e' is obtained from e 
1 i 1 1 
by removing some of its conjuncts. 
In a rewording, the experience is redescribed in different terms, 
possibly using Th. This is how knowledge interacts with generalisation. 
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Formally, e! => f! is a rewording of ei => fi if 1-7The' ei and 
f! B fi, e! is a conjunction of ground literals and f! is a 
ground literal. 
Finally, e! => f! is a part of e. => fi if it can be obtained from 
e. => f. by a series of applications of selection and rewording to e. => f 
Notice that in this case, -, f! _ f.. Therefore e! -> f! is true, 
as f 
i 
is. However it may be no longer possible to justify the 
assertion that e! _> f! as some selection may have removed a relevant 
1 1 
part of the circumstances. 
The second stage is the replacement of constants by universally 
quantified variables. We say, therefore, that V(e => f')is a 
generalisation from e. => f. iff for some tT and e! _> f.', which is a 
part of e. => f . , e! Cr = e. and f" ( 3 ' = f ! . ( V(e" => f!) abbreviates 
Vx1o..xn(ei => fr), where x1...xn are all the variables in e => f M,) 
Here, Vp" _> f")is said to be a generalisation of e! => f!. 
To give a good meaning to V(e" => f" would take a longer excursion 
than is practical. One would have to reread => as a counterfactual 
(Goodman, 1965, Tredwell, 1965). For example 'x 4ristotle(x) _> 
Speaksgreek(x))would mean that anyone who was Aristotle could speak 
Greek. 
Let us illustrate the above by an informal example in which => 
means mo more than material implication and therefore causes no trouble. 
Suppose we observe that 'some crow in Stonehaven is black' and that 'some 
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other crow in Dunoon is also black'. We may decide that the place of 
observation is irrelevant and that the essential observations are that 
both crows are black. Now if we know, (from Th) that "craw" is a 
Scottish word meaning "crow" we may reword the observations, so noting 
that two craws were black. From this we conclude by a stage of 
"generalisation of" that all craws are black. We can even, by a final 
rewording see that all crows are black. 
At this point, there occurs an important transition. Rather 
than dealing with assertions of the form e => f (where e is a 
conjunction of ground literals, and f is a ground literal)we consider 
the corresponding clause e I) fj. The above definition of generalisation 
will be mirrored by an analogous one for clauses which will allow a 
mathematical theory to be developed using reasonably well-known ideas. 
This theory makes no use of => and consequently some rough justice is 
dealt to -> in the transition. 
As a matter of fact, we could have continued to use =>. But we 
feel that there would be a mismatch between our informal sign, =>, and 
the increasingly formal nature of the rest of the work. A more formal 
treatment, perhaps using modal logic, would result in a better-knit 
theory. 
The clauses Ci = ei () fij are particularly important. We set 
Hp = Cili=1,nJ. There are some conventions. A clause, C., abbreviates 
a formula which is a disjunction of all its members. A set of clauses, 
H, abbreviates a conjunction of all its members. V C is the universal 
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closure of the formula C abbreviates. VH is the universal closure 
of the formula H abbreviates. 
A clause, C, is a selection from D iff C C D. If D corresponds to 
e! => f! which is a part of some e. => f., and C contains f' this 
i i z i 
corresponds to the above definition of selection. We allow C not to 
contain fi since this will make rather smoother going, formally. it 
will not alter the class of chosen hypotheses since C must then be 
n 
inconsistent with / 'f(ei A fi) and so will not be chosen by any of our 
induction methods. For the same reason the reader will see that 
neither will any rewording or generalisation of C or indeed any clause 
reached by continued application of the generalisation operations to C 
be chosen. 
The clauses C and D are said to be rewordings relative to Th, iff 
F-Th Vx,.....o-xn(C E D) where xI...... xn are the variables in C or 
in. D. This is equivalent to E" C D. 
Th 
Even when C and D are ground, this need not correspond to the 
previous definition of a rewording. This is the only place where real 
injustice is done to =>. However, when Th is empty, 'Th- C D iff 
C = Dhand then the two definitions correspond properly. The reader may 
however verify, at the appropriate points in chapter five that for the 
various types of Th investigated in any detail, the two definitions do 
in fact correspond. 
The clause C is a generalisation of D iff, for some substitution, 
f , C 0° = D. This does not quite correspond to the previous 
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definition. For when D corresponds to e! => f!, which is a part of 
some ei => fi, then it may be that C = e' U C" where C' is not a 
singleton. However the correspondence could be straightened out by 
weakening the demand, implicit in the above definition of a 
"generalisation from", that f"I be a literal. This would seem to be 
harmless. 
There seem to be several possible definitions of "generalisation 
from". A weak one, which seems to be a special case of the corres- 
ponding definition is: 
C is a generalisation from C. relative to Th, iff there are 
clauses E and F and a substitution Cr such that C 6 = E, E G F, F is 
ground and ^Th F = Ci 
We may certainly drop the restriction that F is ground, for 
suppose F has the variables x1...... xn and let A = a()/x1,,,..,a()/xnie 
Then we have C 0,JL = E/A. , E/bl c F14,t , F,A is ground and 
ITh F, = Ci since Ci It. = Ci, (Ci is ground), Therefore this 
definition is a special case of the more general definition: 
C is a generalisation from D relative to Th iff for some E and 6 , 
C a- c E and 'Fh E = D. 
There is a much stronger general definition: C is a generalisation 
from D relative to Th iff there are D.(j=1,m) such that C = D1, D = Dm 
and D. S Dj+1 or Djd' = Dj+1 for some d' or T _-h D. = Dj+1 (for j=1,m-1). 
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This turns out to be equivalent to the weaker definition. We 
show this by intction cn m. Suppose m=-J. Then as C e c C and 
FT 
C = C, the condition is satisfied. Suppose j>1, then by 
induction there is a 6"and an E such that D26 C E and V; E = D. 
Suppose CA = D2 
for some f . Then C,/L- E and so the 
condition is satisfied for C and D. Suppose C S D2, then 
CO' 9 D2M Q E and the condition is satisfied in this case too. 
Suppose, finally, that [- C D2. Then (--Th C a' -25- D2(r and 
so f Th C 6 U E = D26 U E. But since D20 S E, I-Th C c" U E = E. 
Now, as fTh E = D, f-Th Ca- U E = D and we see in this last case 
that the condition is satisfied. 
We are thereby justified in adopting the simpler condition as our 
definition. It is worth introducing some extra symbolism. By 
C<D (Th) (read C generalises D relative to Th), we mean that C and D 
satisfy the above condition. 
We can now forget the notions of selection and rewording and the 
distinction between "generalisation from" and "generalisation of". 
All these notions served only to help establish our notion of relative 
generalisation. 
As an example let us formalise the crows. We can take 
f = Black(crowl), Black(crow2)J, Ev is given by: 
Ev(Black(crowl)) = Crow(crowl) A Place(crowl,Stonehaven) 
Ev(Black(crow2)) = Crow(crow2) A Place(crow2,Dunoon). 
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We may suppose that Th includes the statement-. 
Vx row(x) = Craw(x)) 
Then -+ Craw(x), Black(x)} < -+ Crow(crowl), 
Place(crowl,Stonehaven), Black(crow1) (Th). 
When Th is empty, then hTh C = D iff either C = D or both C 
and D are tautologies. Then C<D (0) iff there is a tt such that 
C T S D or D is a tautology. For if D is a tautology then 
_Th 
C (r U D = D, no matter what Q' is. Let us write C<D (read 
C generalises D) iff there is a d' such that CV !G D. (In the 
literature, this relation is called subsumption.) Therefore C<D is 
not identical to C<D (0). Practically, however, there is no 
difference since assumption 1 (that no fi follows from Ev(fi)) ensures 
that no C. is a tautology. 
Rather than assume that one generalisation can consistently 
explain all the phenomena, we look for a set of generalisations which 
do. That is we expect to find a set, H, of clauses such that for 
every C. there is a C in H so that C<C. (Th).' This allows for the 
possibility that several distinct classes of phenomena have been 
bunched together in f by mistake. We adopt the following notation: 
H1<.H2 ('T) (read H1 generalises H2 relative to Th) iff for every C2 in 
H2 there is a C1 in H1 such that C1<C2 (Th). 
H1<H2 (read as H1 generalises H2) iff for every C2 in H2 there is 
a C1 in H1 such that C1<C2. 
We may now define the notion of explanation which will be used. 
Recall that C. = ei V fi} for i=1,n and that H0 = [C,ji=1,n}. 
VH explains ei => fi Ii=1 ,nj iff 
1) For some C in H, C<C 
1 
, (Th)9 given any i between I and n. 
n 
2) V H A Th A Irr ^ ̂ 1(ei A f.) is consistent. 
We do not need a condition corresponding to of the previous 
chapter, since it has already been assumed. Condition E1 is also 
redundant since we have shown that VH is lawlike. This discussion 
of &!. only applies when => represents an experiment. 
We can write the conditions that VH explains every phenomenon, 
as 
1) H<H0 (mh) 
n 
2) H A Th A Irr A (ei A fi) is consistent. 
Only one thing is now left unspecified, the niceness relation, -4 . 
Several different niceness relations will be considered most of which 
are constructed from quite simple syntactic measures. However most 
attention will be paid to one in particular, gcpg. Others will be 
considered, particularly when we wish to show in chapter 4 that an 
unsolvability result is largely independent of the choice of -g ; some 
philosophical discussion in chapter 5 will also use a different niceness 
relation from -4 cpg. 
In order to 'mix' quasi-orderings,(that is, reflexive and transitive 
binary relations) we define the lexicographic product -- 0-;4 of two 
quasi-orderings -$ and -$', thus 
H1 -g H2 iff either H1 -$ H2 and H2 -A H1 or else H1 --3 H2, 
H2 -3 H1 and H1 -SI H2. 
Thus to decide which is nicer, the lexicographic product, '40-3t 
first consults -9 and if that gives no definite decision, tries .i'. 
We also say that -$o-' is a lexicographic refinement of -4. 
Lemma 1 The lexicographic product -; o.' is itself a quasi-ordering. 
If -9 and -$' are linear, so is The lexicographic product is 
associative and idempotent. 
Proof Reflexivity is obvious. Suppose H1 -1 o-4' H2 and H2 4 m +$' H30 
If H1 -g H2 and Hf2 4 H1 then H1 -1 H3 and H3 -A H1 , since -$ is 
transitive. It follows, in this case, that H1 -4 e H2. Suppose 
H1 j H2, H2-4 H1, H2 -j H3 and H3 71 H2. Then H3 H1 and so here, 
too,H1 H3. The only other case is when H1 - H2, H2 .- H1 , 
H1 ,- H2, H2 - H3, H3 'S H2 and, H2 -.' H3 In this case, as 4' 
is transitive, H1 -$ H3, H3 -e H1 -.y' H3 and therefore H1 -j a -$' H3. 
Suppose -4 and -91 are linear. Suppose that H1 4 0-J` H2 is 
false. Then firstly H1 H2 or H2 -$ H1, and secondly either H1 4 H2 
or H2 -A'E1 or H1 -' H2 Therefore, as -$ is linear H2 1 H1 If 
H1 -A H2 then H2 -fo ...$' H1 If H1 -4 H2 then H1 4' H2 Therefore, 
as -9' is linear, H2 -g I H1. So in this case, too, H2- 0-1 'H1 and 
we see that 0.-3' is linear. 
In proving associativity, the fact that H1 -0, H2 implies the 
falsity of H1-41`42 H2, is useful. Suppose H1 ,+ H2. Then 
H1 _ e) ( -J' o -g") H2 cannot hold, nor can H1 -jp_p //H``2 and so 
neither can H1 ( - o 4') ° -j" H2. Suppose H1 4 $2 and H2 71g H 
1 
Then H1 ^$ o ( H2. Also H1 --$ o -4' H2 holds and 
H2-1 o - ' H does not hold. Therefore H.1 ( --?e--V ) o -3" H2 holds. 
Suppose H1 4 H2 and H2 -a H1 . Then H1 -$ o (..$e - --8") H2 holds 
iff H1 H2 holds. Similarly H1 ---¢ o -9 H2 holds iff 
H1 ..' ' H2 holds and H2 -to -j' H1 holds iff H2 - J ' H1 holds. Therefore 
H1 (4 o 4 ') e .$" holds iff H1 _f? o -J" H2 holds iff H1 -$o (g' o - ") 
H2 holds. In all cases we see that H1 (` 9 o 4 ') o "1" H2 holds iff 
H1 -j e( -J' c "d") H2 holds, which concludes the proof of associativity. 
H1--go - H2 holds iff H1 j H2 and either H2 7t H1 or H1 --$ H2. 
This condition is evidently equivalent to requiring that H1 -& H2, 
which proves idempotency and concludes the proof. 
Here are a few quasi-orderings which give possible measures of 
niceness. 
I Complexity H1 -4c H2 iff 11H111 < I IiH21I(. 
2 Power Let Power(C) = C. e HO I C<Ci (Th)}II, 
Power(H) = C HPower(C), 
H1 p H2 iff Power(H1)>Power(H2). 
This ordering is defined in terms of H0 and so of Ev and f. 
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3 Generality H1 H2 iff H2<H1 (Th), 
4 Literals H1 -$1 H2 iff 11 U 
I I I < ICI U H211. 
5 Literal occurrences H1 Q 72 iff C H II IC I!' I IC I I ° 
1 2 
6 Symbols H1 --$s H2 iff the number of symbols in H1 is less than or 
equal to that in H2o 
7 Symbol occurrences H1 -3so H2 iff the number of symbol occurrences 
in H1 is less than or equal to that in H2. 
As remarked above, we will mostly be interested in --? 
cpg 
which is 
---c 0 -4 o -gg' 
This choice may be partially justified. The niceness criterion is 
(-- o -3p) o --$g and corresponds to preferring the least general of the 
simplest, given by -4 
cp 
= 4c o p, hypotheses. There are three 
conflicting properties guiding the choice of hypotheses current in the 
literature. One would want a hypothesis to be justifiable and the 
less general it is the more it is likely to be justifiable. However 
it is quite clear that the least general hypothesis which explains the 
phenomena is H0, which is even weaker than the statement of the phenomena 
themselves. Another factor is the desire that the hypothesis be as 
general as possible in order to say something interesting. However 
there is no most general hypothesis since one can keep on adding 
irrelevant clauses to H. The first factor would, we suppose, be 
emphasized by Carnapians and the second by Popperians'o But we see that 
the first leads to no interesting hypotheses whatever and the second 
does not seem to lead anywhere. The solution we adopt, as urged by 
Goodman (1961) is to place simplicity, the third factor, in first place. 
So we only debate whether to follow the counsel of safety or strength 
among hypotheses of equal simplicity. We will discuss this in more 
detail in chapter 5 when we have a little more mathematical equipment. 
As can be seen, in choosing 4cpg1 we have decided on the safest 
of the simplest hypotheses. Essentially this is an ad hoc decision. 
We can scarcely decide between Carnap and Popper, and some choice had 
to be made. We chose the Carnapian one, since it allows us to prove 
some theorems to the effect that the hypotheses formed in this way will 
be acceptable to certain Carnapians in a precise technical sense 
(Hintikka and Hilpinen, 1966, Hilpinen, 1968). 
We should now give some justification of the simplicity measure, 
-4cp. This is based on both a loose analogy with a measure for 
propositional formulae and also, simply, mathematical convenience. 
Propositional formulae in conjunctive normal form are often compared 
by preferring first those with fewer conjuncts and of those with the 
same number of conjuncts that one is preferred which has the fewest 
number of literals. This analogy would favour ' o rather than 
0 -J However power has the property thai H1<H2 implies 
H1 .- 
P 
H2, which is not shared by -41,., although for propositional 




have this property. Thus the choice of 
--; 
cp 
is dictated by rather ad hoc factors. A fuller study would try 
the effect of other obvious measures of simplicity in more detail and 
use any relevant philosophical work on simplicity. 
We have now specified or indicated the possible values of every 
parameter and can give the formal problem of finding a nicest 
explanatory generalisation from experience. 
One is given k = Th A Irr, Ev and f subject to the restrictions: 
n 
1 k A A(ei A f.)is consistent. 
2 For no i does e. -> f, follow from Th. 
One is required to find a set of clauses, H, such that 
P1 H<H ' (Th). 
0 n 
P2 dH A Th A Irr A A (ei A fi) is consistent. 
P3 Of all the sets of clauses satisfying P1 and P2, H is minimal 
with respect to "4 . 
We will be particularly interested in the case where -$ is -4 
ePg 
When Th is empty, the problem may be reformulated by replacing Pi by: 
P1 ° H<H0 0 
The next chapter develops the relevant formal properties of relative 
generalisation. In order to make it formally self-contained, several 
definitions are repeated., This chapter has been concerned with giving 
a fairly rational explanation for the choices of the definitions. 
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Chapter 3 The mathematics of generalisation 
1. Preliminaries 
1.1 Notation 
Our notation is that of Robinson (1965), with some additions. A 
word is a literal or a term. The symbols V, V1, W,.... are used as 
meta-linguistic variables ranging over words. The symbol 0 is used as 
a meta-linguistic variable ranging over predicate symbols and function 
symbols. Var(V) is the set of variables occurring in V. Suppose 
that some property can be shown to hold for variables and constants and 
that wherever it holds for terms t1...... t it holds for (t1,...,tn). 
The property can then be seen to hold for all words. This method of 
proof is called induction on words. A translation is a substitution 
of the form, y1/x1,...,yn/xnj where the yi are all distinct. The 
inverse of Z is 
-1 




1 '7w and if Var(V) xili=1,n3, then V = V. The Greek letters 
and are reserved as meta-linguistic variables ranging over 
9 
translations. The translation, t , standardises W and V apart iff W'L 
and V have no common variables. Similarly Z standardises the clauses 
C and D apart iff C L and D have no common variables. 
The words W and V are alphabetic variants iff there is a 
translation Lr. such that W`r = V. Alphabetic variance is an equivalence 
relation. Similarly, C and D are alphabetic variants iff there is a 
translation Z such that CZ = D. Again, this defines an equivalence 
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relation. 
We denote sequences of integers,perhaps empty, by the symbols, 
I,J,...0 . 
The term t is in the Ith place in the word W iff: 
when I = <>, t = W or else 
when I = <i1,..o.,in> (n>O) then W has the form (t1,....,tm) (m>O) 
and i1<m and t is in the <i2,....,in>th place in ti . 
1 
For example, x is in the <>th place in x, the <2>th place in 
g(y,x) and the <3,2>th place in P(a,b,g(y,x)). 
Note that a term t is never in the <>th place in a literal, L. 
1.2 Generalisation 
We say that W< V (read W generalises V ) iff there is a 6- such 
that W C' = V. In the literature on automatic theorem proving, W<V is 
usually read as "V is an instance of W. 
Example P(x,x,f(g(y))) < P(k(a(), k(a()),f(g(x))) 
We can take G-= k(a())/x,.x/yj 
If W<V, there is a unique minimal 60 such that W CS 0 = V. For 
let C° be such that W 6° = V and let 6'0 t/x It/x E 5 and x appears 
in Wi. Then W <$°0 -= V. 
To see that C-0 is minimal suppose W4. - V. Let t/x e 0. 
It follows that x appears in W. A simple induction on words shows that 
for any W1 if W' CT- = W1 and x appears in W1 then x 6'0 = x//K 
Applying this to W, we see that t/x E/pt Hence 6"0 S /k. 
Uniqueness is evident. 
We say that C<D (read C generalises D) iff there is a Cr so that 
CC- G D. In the literature on automatic theorem proving, C<D is usually 
read as "C subsumes D"a If we identify literals, for the moment, with 
their unit sets, < on literals is just the restriction of < on clauses to 
literals. Robinson (1965) shows that subsumption is decidable. It 
follows that generalisation on literals and on words are as well. 
Generalisation on clauses is a quasi-orderings It is reflexive 
as C . c C. It is transitive for suppos e that C c D and D E. 
Then Cc/-k S Dj C E, as required. It follows that generalisation on 
literals is also a quasi-ordering. It is easy to see, then, that 
generalisation on words is a quasi-ordering. 
One can show, much as above, that if C<D, there is a unique finite 
set { 6'" 09 1 , .. ° ° , ('fin} of distinct substitutions such that 
C tSi C D(O<:i<n), and for all different i and j 4 (57, and if 
C"AA £ D then O6 for some i. 
The algorithm for deciding subsumption is easily extended to one 
which will generate this set. 
Example lP(x), P(f())} < P(f())}. We can take G__ f0)/x}. 
We say that H1<H2 (read H1 generalises H2) iff for every D in H2, 
there is a C in H1 such that C<D. 
PLmyle Q(h())j, JP(x), P(f())J, P(x),Q(x)jj < JP(f()J, 
Mg()), Q(g())H 
Evidently, this is a decidable relation. 
1.3 Relative generalisation 
We say that the literal L generalises M relative to Th iff there is 
a (T so that Th LO ` M. This is written as L<M (Th). For the 
terms t and u, relative generalisation is defined by: t<u (Th) iff 
there is a Cr such that Th t 07 = U. When Th is empty, this reduces 
to the previous definition of generalisation between words. For 
L 6° M holds iff L6' = M and j°t 6° = u holds iff t 6- = U. 
For clauses relative generalisation may be defined by: C<D (Th) 
iff there is an E such that }-M1 E - D and CzE. An equivalent 
definition is: C<D (Th) iff there is a 6° so that -,lh C 6° -> D. 
Suppose C<E and ' E D. There is a 6' such that Ca- E. Then 
- C 6` -> E and so Th C 6" -> D. Conversely, suppose -` C (r -> D. 
Then Th C Cr V D a D, and C<C 6 V D. We can, therefore, take 
E = C a° U D. So the definitions are equivalent. When Th is empty and 
D is not a tautology, the definition reduces to the previous definition 
of generalisation between clauses, as was seen in chapter 2. The 
relation of "equivalence, provable from Th" is a congruence for relative 
generalisation. Suppose that h C ® C' and C<D (Th). There is a 
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so that C 6' -'> D and further, `-- C 6 = C'6- 
Consequently '-°Th C'6° -> D and C'<D (Th). Supposeconversely.; 
_Th D = D' and C<D (Th). There is an E so that C<E and 
{ 
E = D. 
Then, --l,.h E = D' and C<D'. 
Relative generalisation is a quasi-ordering. Since F, C E -> C. 
C<C (Th). Suppose C<D<E (Th). There are a', Ik so that 
I-Th C a- -> D and k°Th Deft, -> E. Then, as (C 6- -> D ),M is 
C D/ _t , }- Cal-,t -> D1Gt and Th C trot -> E. So C<Ts (Th). 
It follows that relative generalisation on words is a quasi-ordering. 
Define equivalence, relative to Th, by: C ti D (Th) iff C<D (Th) 
and D<C (Th). Since relative generalisation is a quasi-ordering, 
relative equivalence is an equivalence relation. If t-,Ih D =_ D' , 
then D 'v D' (Th). The converse does not hold, as will be seen. We 
also define equivalence by C v D iff C<D and D<C. As generalisation 
is a quasi-ordering, equivalence is an equivalence relation. If C - D 
then C '' D (0). On the other hand if C --%.,D (0) then either C and D 
are both tautologies or else C ^+ D. The following lemma is well-known 
(Robinson.21965), and so no proof is given. 
Lemma I U 'v W iff they are alphabetic variants. 
We see that P(x) ~ P(y), although it is not the case that 
P(x) = P(y). A characterisation of equivalence of clauses will be 
given later. 
There is an interesting reformulation of the definition of relative 
generalisation. It is shown that C<D (Th) iff D.is.a tautology or 
else can be obtained fromC U Th by means of a special sort of 
derivation. 
A derivation in which binary resolution is the sole deduction rule 
is a C-derivation iff no two descendants of ah occurrence of C at a tip 
are resolved together... (We..assume a knowledge. of some standard 
formulation.of derivation trees, such. as that of Andrews .(1968)). 
Let Th' be the set of Skolemisations of members of Th. We assume 
that none of the Skolem function symbols.. in Th°.occur in C or D. 
Notice that. Th' isa conservative extension of Th.. That is, in this: 
case, if a formula A does not contain any of the Skolem constants in 
Th'then : '- A iff. 
6 
Th,.A. It follows that for any.C and D. 
C<D '(Th) iff C<D (Th °) . 
There is one other useful fact. If A then C<D (Th). if 
C<D (Th U. A)', for any C; D,1 Th and A. We define R(E,D) _ C IC is 
a re.solvent of E and D1 0 
=Lemma 2 If D.1<D (.Th.)...and.D1' F Q, (E,D2) then D2<D (Th U { t Es ). 
Proof' As D. ,F (K (E,D2 ) we can write E as El U E" and D2 as D2 U D2 
and find a.T and a t such that E" a- and D2 are unit sets 
containing complementary literals andD1 = E° U D2 /4A-. 
As D1.<D (Th) there is a ). such that h 11 . .-> 
Now ' E o- A D2 .t -> D' Therefore, l-- E 0.2 A. D2 -> D1. -t 2 
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m> D) and so It follows that h E (TZ -> (D2 
1Z 
t-Th 
V v E} D2 Ak D. As this means that DAD (Th - u ED 
the proof is finished. 
Theorem1 C<D (Th) iff D is a tautology or there is a C-derivation from 
Th' U Cj of a clause D' which subsumes D. 
Proof Sufficiency If D is a tautology then C e- -> D and so 
C<D (Th 
In any C-derivation there are either no occurrences of C on a tip or 
else there is exactly one occurrence. If there are none in the 
derivation given in the hypothesis then 
v 
D and so f " D as Th' 
is a conservative extension of Th and no Skolem function symbol of Th' 
occurs in D. Therefore FTh C 
®> D which implies that C<D (Th). 
Suppose there is exactly one occurrence of C at a tip of the 
derivation given by the hypothesis. There must then be clauses 
Ei(i=19n; n>O) derivable from Th' such that 
D;9 w(En( ce (En_16(E1,C)...).)). 
As D'cD, n successive applications of lemma 2 show that 
C<D (Th' U V Ei (i.-1 9nj) As 6 -Thv E. for all i, we see that 
C<D (Tb') and conclude that C<D (Th). 
Necessity Suppose that C<D (Th). For some 6', °Th C ®> D. 
Let C = Li 1.1=1 9ni . Then "Th Li6" V D for each Li, Let Th' be 
the set of Skolemisations of members of Th. None of the Skolem 
function symbols should occur in C 6° -> D. By the subsumption theorem 
(Lee 1967, Kowalski 1970) for each L. either LiCT V D is a tautology or 
else there is a derivation of a clause D. from Th', which subsumes 
{LiC3° j U D. We may assume, without loss of generality, that the first 
alternative holds for L19..5LL and the second for Lm+19°°9Ln. 
If D is a tautology, we are finished. If m=n then 
C Cr _ J Li Cr I is=1 ,m S D and we are also finished. Finally, suppose 
that m<n. 
Then we may express D as Li cS I i=1 mj U D. 
Evidently there is a clause in 
(Ln a` i, 9 (.... ( Lm+1 Cr 1 ' C CS" ) ...) ) 
which is a subset of L. 6- 1i=1,mi. 
Consequently there is a clause, D', in 
v, En 6' D, ll. ... VQ.( Lm+1 6 I V D), C 0- )...)) 
which is a subset of D V JLi 6'° li=1 ,m = D. 
Since C subsumes C 0S- and P. subsumes Li 6' j U D for m< <n, it 
follows from the contraction theorem (Kowalski, 1970) that there is a 
C-derivation of a clause D" from Di Im<i<ni 1J C } which subsumes D', 
and therefore D. As the D. are derived, in their turn, from Th' we see 
that there is a C-derivation from Th' UCi of a clause D" which subsumes 
D. 
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This concludes the proof. 
One can obtain other versions of theorem I by using any other 
resolution principle for which the subsumption theorem holds. For 
example, one can use M-clash resolution (Kowalski, 1970 
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2. Generalisation theory of literals 
In this section we establish the theory of the relation., <, on 
literals. For technical convenience, the results are often derived for 
words. The corresponding result for literals is then an immediate 
specialization. 
2.1 Least general generalisations of literals 
A least general generalisation of some words is a generalisation which 
is less general than any other such generalisation. For example a least 
general generalisation of the literals Black(crowl), Black(crow2) is 
Black(x). One may, roughly, view this as inducing "Everything is black" 
from "This crow is black" and "That crow is black". The evident 
absurdity of such an induction was one of the reasons for considering 
clauses rather than literals. 
Less trivially, we shall show later that a least general generalisation 
of P(f(a(,g(y)),x,g(y)) and P(h(a(),g(x)),x,g(x)) is P(y,x,g(z)). 
Let K be a set of words. We say that W is a least general 
generalisation of K, abbreviated by W is a l.g.g. of K, iff: 
1 For every V in K, W<V 
2 If for every V in K, W1<V, then W1<W. 
It follows from requirement 2 and lemma 1, that any two least general 
generalisations of K are alphabetic variants. 
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Similarly, one can give a definition relativised to Th. We say 
that W is a least general generalisation of a set of literals, K 
relative to Th (abbreviated by W is a l.g.g. of K relative to Th), iff: 
11 For every M in K, WPM (Th) 
2 If, for every M in K, W1<M (Th), then W1QZ (Th). 
Two words are compatible iff they are both terms or have the same 
predicate letter and sign. 
We can define also the least generalisation as a product in the 
following category. The objects are the words and 6' is a morphism from 
V to W iff V 6" = W and Cr acts as the identity, e , on variables not in 
V. There is at most one morphism from V to W. If 6' is a morphism 
from V to W, and,,,* is one from W to U, then their categorical composition 
is the unique morphism from W to U. It should be noted that the 
categorical composition is not the same as the standard composition of 
substitutions defined in Robinson (1965). For example, if W is x, 
V is f(y), and U is f(g(z)), then 5 is (f(y)/x} and 
/"' 
is g(z)/yJ. 
The categorical composition of 6"' and/ is f(g(z))/xJ, but their standard 
composition is (f(g(z))/x, g(z)/y, 
V is the least generalisation of W1,W2J iff it is a product of W1 
and W2 in the above category. The category will be used mainly for 
expository purposes. 
Theorem I 
Every non-empty, finite set of words has a least general 
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generalisation iff any two words in the set are compatible. 
Let W1, W2 be any two compatible words. The following algorithm 
terminates at stage 3, and the assertion made there is then correct. 
1. Set V. to Wi(i=1,2). Set 0i to e (i=1,2). E is the empty 
substitution. 
2. Try to find terms t1, t2 which have the same place in V1, V2 
respectively and such that t1/t2 and either t1 and t2 begin with 
different function letters or else at least one of them is a variable. 
3. If there are no such t1, t2 then halt. V1 is a least general 
generalisation of W1,W2j and V1-=V2, Vi 0 i=Wi(i=1,2), 
J+. Choose a variable x distinct from any in V1 or V2 and wherever t1 
and t2 occur in the same place in V1 and V2, replace each by x. 
5. Change to i/xj A i(i=1,2). 
6. Go to 2. 
Example. We will use the algorithm to find a least general 
generalisation of P(f(a()9g(y)),x,g(y)), P(h(a(,g(x)),x,g(x))I. 
Initially (at stage 1), 
V1 =P(f(a(),g(y)),x,g(y)) 
V2=P(h(a(),g(x)),x,g(x)), 
and &1= 02 £ . 
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and after stage 5, 
G1=iy/zi, e2='x/z . 
Next, we take t.1=f(a(,g(z)),t2=h(a(),g(z)) and y as the new 






The algorithm then halts at stage 3 with P(y,x,g(z)) as the least 
general generalisation. 
Proof Evidently the compatibility condition is necessary. Let 
W1,oooo,wn be a finite compatible set of words. If n=1, then the 
theorem is trivial. Suppose that the algorithm works and that 
infV,W is the result of applying it to V and W. Then it is easy to 
see that 
info wl,inf W2 
-9 
.... , inf Wn®1,wn 
i ... H 
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is a least general generalisation of the set. Hence we need only show 
that the algorithm works. 
The rest of the proof proceeds as follows. In order to avoid a 
constant repetition of the conditions on t1, t2 given in stage 2, we say 
that t1 an-J. t2 are replaceable in VI and V2 iff they fulfil the conditions 
of stage 2. We also denote by V1, V2 the result of replacing t1 and t2 
in V,,, V2 by x in the way described in stage 4. To show that the 
algorithm halts and that when it does V1=V2, we define a difference 
function by d:i.fference(V1,V2) = number of members of the set T if t12-i2 
are both in the Ith place in V,,., V2 respectively then they are replaceable 
in V1 and V2. Lemma 1.2 below then shows that every time a pair of 
replaceable terms is replaced the difference drops. Consequently by 
lemma 1.1, below it will eventually become zero and when it does, lemma 1.1, 
below shows that we must have V1=V2 and the algorithm will then halt. 
We still have to show that the replacements take us in the correct 
direction. First of all, V!<V. since by lemma 1.3, below Vi t/x = Vi. 
It is also immediate from this that when the algorithm halts, Vi 9 i = W1. 
Now suppose that W is any lower bound of W1,W2 Then a lower bound V 
is a product of W1, W2 if the diagram of figure 1 can always be filled in 




The category is the one defined above. In it there is either one 
or no morphisms between any two objects and hence it is not necessary in 
figure 1 to name the morphisms. Indeed, if a diagram can be filled in at 
all, it can be filled in commutatively and uniquely. 
We show in lemma 1.L below that the diagram on figure 2 can be filled 
in commutatively. 
Thus every time a replacement is made, the V! are greater than any 
lower bound of W1, W2. Consequently when the algorithm halts, we have a 
product. We now give the statements and proofs of the lemmas. 
Figure 2 
Lemma 1.1 If V1 and V2 are distinct compatible words, then there are 
t1, t2 which are replaceable in them. 
Proof By induction on words on V1. If one of V11 V2 is a constant or a 
variable, or if they begin with different function symbols, then V1, V2 
will do for t1, t2 respectively. 
if V1 is O (t ,....,t1) and V2 is (t2 ,....,t2), then for some i, 
ti/ti and by the induction hypothesis, applied to ti, there are u1, u2 
which are replaceable in t1, t2 which have the same place in V1, V2 
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respectively, and so 1 
and u2 are also replaceable in V1, V2. 
Lemma 1.2 If V1, V2 are distinct compatible words, then 
Difference(V' ,V2) < Difference(V1 ,V2). 
Proof By induction on words on V1. If one of V1 or V2 is a variable 
or a constant then t1=V1, t2=V2 and V1'=V2=x, so O=Difference(Vq,V2) < 1 = 
Difference(V1 ,V2). 
If V1 is f(v1 ,....,vn) and V2 is g(u1 ,....,um) where f/g, then if 
ti=Vi(i=1,2), O=Difference(V1',V2) < Difference(V1,V2), by lemma 1.1; 
otherwise 
Difference(V',V2) 1 i=1,min(m,n) Difference(v!,u!) 
< 1 +i=1 
,m (m,n) Difference(vi,ui) 
(by induction hypothesis, since m, nnO) 
= Diff erence(V1,V2). 
In the remaining case where V1 and V2 both have the form 
a similar but less complicated argument applies. 
Lemma 1.3 V! ti/x = V.(i=1,2). 
, ... . , t 
n) 
Proof Since Vi is obtained from V. by replacing some occurrences of t. 
in V. by x, and since x does not occur in Vi, substituting ti for x in 
V! will produce V.(i=1,2). 
Lemma 1 .1+ If V1 , V2 are distinct compatible words and V(3"'i=Vi(i=1 ,2), 
then there are so that V 
1 2 i i 
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Proof It is convenient to denote by fi(u1,u2,t1,t2) the result of 
applying the operation of k to ui (with u1 and u2 standing for VI and 
V2) for i=1,2. 
Let the variables which occur in V be y1,....,ym and suppose that 
yj i=ui(i=1,2; j=I,m) and choose 6'i so that yj 6~i=f i(uj,u2,t1,t2) 
(i=1,2; j=1 ,m). 
By lemma 1 . 3 , Yj 6i=Yj o !1ti/X} (i=1,2; j=1 m). 
We need only show, by induction on words with variables y1...... ym 
applied to W that if W, W1 and W2 are such that W Cr i = Wi(i=1,2) then 
W 6 fi(W1,W2,t1,t2) = Wi, say (i=1,2). 
Suppose W is a constant; then W=W1=W2 and the result is trivial. 
Suppose W is the variable yj. Then u =Wi(i=1,2) and so: 
W (5 = Yj Q' ! = fi(uI,u2,t1,t2) 
= fi(W1,W2,t1,t2) 
= W!(i=1,2). 
Suppose W is O (u1...... un). Then WI has the form 0 (w1,...,wn 
f it 
and so W! is (wi , ...,.wi ), say, where w =fi(w,w,t1 ,t2),(i=1 ,2; 1=1,n). 
(i=1 ,2). 
Therefore, W 6' (u1 C-1, ° ..., U (S` ! ) 
(w1,...-.,w ") (by induction hypothesis) 
= W!. i 
This concludes the induction and the proof. 
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There is a more efficient version of the algorithm given in the 
statement of Theorem 1. This involves fewer passes through WI and W2. 
It is a slight generalisation of the algorithm given by Reynolds (1970). 
11 Set V. to Wi(i=1,2). Set e i to E , the empty substitution 
(i=1 ,2). 
2 Try to find terms t1, t2 which have the same place in V1 and V2 
respectively and such that t1tt2 and either t1 and t2 begin with 
different function letters or else at least one of them is a 
variable. 
3 If there are no such t1, t2 then halt. V1 is a l.g.g. of 
W1,W2J,, V1=V2 and Vi ei =Wi(i=1,2). 
Find a variable x such that . XO i=ti(i=1,2). If there is no 
such variable, let x be a variable distinct from any in V1 or 
V2. 
5 Find an occurrence of t1 in V1 and an occurrence, in the same 
place, of t2 in V2 and replace the occurrence of t1, and the 
occurrence of t2 by one of x. 
6 Change Oi to ti/xi 01 (i=1,2). 
7 Go to 2. 
We shall adopt the convention that inf1W1,W2j is the l.g.g. of W1 and 
'02 Produced by applying some definite version of one of these algorithms 
to W1,W2i. 
2.2 A technical lemma 
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The following lemma is useful in establishing the existence of 
l.g.g.'s of clauses. 
Lemma I Let K = WiJi=1,n be a set of words with a l.g.g. W and let 
,A4. (i=1 ,n) be substitutions such that W 1(4i =W. (i=1 ,n). 
I If t occurs in W, then t is a l.g.g. of It 144iIi=1,nj. 
2 If x, y are variables occurring in W and x /u = y , i i 
then x=y. 
Proof We can assume, without loss of generality, that the 
/111 
are the 
minimal substitutions such that W AAi=Wi. 
1 Evidently, t is a generalisation of t At Ii=1,nj. Let u be i 
any other and suppose that u t,/ "i(i=1,n). Let 
T = y1/x1,....,yr/xm} be a translation such that x1,... ,xm 
are the variable symbols of u, and u t and W have no common 
variables. Let W' be W, but with every occurrence of t 
replaced by one of u 'r . Then 6 i = x1 )- i/y1 ' ' ''xm'A i/ymi V/ U i 
is defined, using the minimality of )1i(i=1,n). From the 
construction of 6-i, W' (ri = Wi(i=1,n). Hence there is a 'v so 
that W')) = W, as W is a l.g.g. of Wili=l,n. Hence 
U (2' )?) = ((t 'r ) V = to So t is a l.g.g. of t/A i ji=1 ,nj . 
2 Suppose that y/x. Let W' = Wy/x}. 
Then W', W are not alphabetic variants, but W<W'. Let 
W = W 
x,Y,Y39 ,Ym [x,Y,Y3 ,,Ym1, where x,Y,Y3,,Ym are 
the variables occurring in W. We have: 
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Wi 
W i Wx,y,y3...... ymlx/u i'Y,,A i'Y3 ,U i1....,ym A 
= W ,U ,....,Y Y 'Yu LY iJ i 3 i i m x v Y ,....,y 
(by hypothesis) 
= W LY,Y,Y ',Y ,( x,y,y3,....,ym 3 m / i 
= W' 
/_ 
(by construction) (i=1,n). 1u i 
This contradicts the fact that W is a least generalisation of 
Wili=1,nj. Hence y=x. 
This completes the proof. 
2.3 Lattice properties of literals 
It is possible to define the dual of the l.g.g. of two words. 
The word, U, is a most general instance (m.g.i.) of V and W iff: 
1 V<U and W<U 
2 If V<U' and W<U' then U<U'. 
Note that, by lemma 1.1, any two m.g.i.'s of V and W are alphabetic 
variants. The relevant theorem here, is the Unification Theorem of 
Robinson (1965)- A version suitable for our present purposes is given 
in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 (Unification Theorem) If V 09 = W 0 for some substitution 
there is a most general unifier, (m.g.u.)IU , with the properties: 
0, 
1 V'0# W ,Lt 
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2 For any 6', if V 6 = W 6' , then there is a .such that 
CF- =,Z. 
Robinson gives an algorithm for calculating the m.g.u. 
In terms of the category described in section 2.1, there is a close 
correlation between the co-product and the m.g.u. 
Lemma 2 Let W Z and V have no variables in common. Then Wt and V 
are unifiable iff W and V have a co-product. If,^ is an m.g.u. of W 
and V, and U is a co-product, then U ti W 2/K . / 
We leave the rather easy proof to the reader. 
In terms of m.g.i.'s, the appropriate remark, again easily proved, 
is: 
Lemma 3 Let W V and V have no variables in common. Then W r and V 
are unifiable iff W and V have an m.g.i. If ',A is an m.g.u. and U an 
m.g.i. of W and V, then W VDU iv U. 
We can now define a lattice following Reynolds (1970). First 
the ordering < on words is extended by adding special top and bottom 
elements, , and A respectively. So we consider the set Words+ _ 
(W 1W is a word} () # , A } . 
More formally, < is defined on Words+ to be: 
(<W,V> IW<V} U ( G #,w> ,W> I4' is a word} U ( <W, l > I'W is a wordh U 
< A ,A >1. 
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For the rest of us the section, we will use, W, W', W0 etc. to 
stand for an arbitrary member of Words+. 
The following facts are then obvious. 
The relation < on Words+ is a quasi-ordering. The extension of 
to Words +, defined by: 
W W' iff W<W' and W'<W, is an equivalence relation. If we 
consider the set of equivalence [W] classes of members of Words+: 
[W] = W ` IjW' ^/ W) 
then the induced ordering, <, on equivalence classes given by [W]<[W'] 
iff W<W' is a well-defined partial ordering. 
In fact it is a lattice. 
Let us define n and U as operations on Words+ by: 
[ ] n [w] = [w] n .1 2 
b If,V and V' have an l.g.g. U then [V] r [V'] = [U], otherwise 
[V] n [V'] = [A-]. 
c [db ] n [w] = [w] n [J] = [w]. 
a [Al U [W] = [W] U [A] = Al. 
b If V and V' have an m.g.i. U then [V] U [V'] _ [U], otherwise 
[v] U [v'] = [A]. 
2.[*] U[W]=[W]u [4]=[W]. 
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Reynolds shows that Words+ is indeed a lattice under the (well- 
defined) operations I1 and V . We will not consider the relativised 
lattice obtained from the relativised generalisation relation. The 
lattice is non-modular since: 
[P(f(x),Y)] < [P(f(x),f(Y))] 
but: 
([P(x,x)] ri [P(f(x),f(Y))]) I.1 [P(f(x),Y)] 
= [P(x,y)] U [P(f(x),Y)] 
= [P(f(x),Y)] 
[P(f(x),f (Y))] 
[P(f(x),f(x))] 11 [P(f(x),f(Y))] 
([P(x,x)] U [P(f(x),Y)]) n [P(f(x),f(Y)], 
contradicting the modular equality. 
Let [W]<[W'] mean [W]<[W'], but [W] / [W']. Then [WI]Ili>0 
is an infinite ascending chain iff Wi<Wi+1(i>0). Infinite descending 
chains are defined similarly. One sees immediately that [P(f(x))], 
[P(f(f(x)))],[P(f(f(f(x))))]..is an infinite strictly ascending chain. 
It follows easily from Reynolds' work that there are no infinite 
strictly descending chains and no infinite strictly ascending chains 
[Wi]l,i>0 such that every Wi contains no function symbols. On the 
other hand, the lattice is complete, that is any subset of Words+ has 
a greatest common instance and a least common generalisation. Later, 
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we will contrast this situation with that of a lattice of 
+. 
equivalence classes of clauses which is even more irregular than Words 
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Generalisation theory of clauses 
The theory of the generalisation relation, <, defined on clauses 
is developed in this section. 
3.1 Elementary properties 
The relation < is a quasi-ordering and /v is an equivalence relation. 
However, two equivalent clauses need not be alphabetic variants. For 
example, let C = P(x),P(f()I and D = P(f()l. 
As neither C nor D are tautologies, this gives an example, with 
Th = 0, where C N D (Th) but C / D. 
We develop a slightly more complicated characterisation of 
equivalence. The clause C is reduced iff D C C, D N C implies that 
C = D. In other words, C is reduced iff it is equivalent to no proper 
subset of itself. 
A clause C is a reduction of a clause D iff it is a reduced subset 
of D which is equivalent to D. 
Lemma I Suppose that C 
/ 
= C. Then 
1) For some integer, n1 , L 4t. no = L for every literal L in C 
and x 
no 
= x for every variable x in C. 
2) The substitution AA maps distinct variables of C to distinct 
variables of C. / 
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Proof, 1 ) Define a mapping jj : C -> C by 11(L) = L/µ . Since 
C/Ak = C, 7X is onto and therefore, as C is finite, 7 is a 
permutation. There is therefore an integer, no-1 such that 
T[ 
no 
= C, the identity permutation. So if L is in C. 
L X41 
no 
= 7jno(L) = ((L) = L. Let x be a variable in C. 
It must occur in some literal, L say, in C. As L /41 no = L, 
it follows that x /AA no = X. (Strictly speaking, this last 
step requires an easy proof by induction on words.) 
2) This is an obvious consequence of 1). 
In order to calculate reductions of clauses, a slight variant of 
the test for subsumption is useful (Robinson, 1965). 
Lemma 2 Let C. D and E be clauses and let 0 = ja1()/x1...... an()/xnI 
where x1,...,xn are all the variables in E and the ai are distinct 
constants. Then there is a 6 such that E cr C C and, for all L in D, 
L6°=LiffE9 <CS . 
Proof Suppose there is a 6 satisfying the conditions. Then 
x. 6' = x., for all i and so SOS = TS, for x. & 6" S = a.() = xo 
= xi6 and if y' xi, for any i, then y S 8 = y O'S. Therefore, 
E d° 0= Ego-SS CS which shows that ES < CS . 
Suppose that E 8 < C S . Then there is a substitution ̂  such 
that E S/(A G C S. As E 8 contains no occurrence of an xi, we may 
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assume, w.l.o.g., that xi Nl = xi for all i. Therefore, if L is in E, 
L /(k = L. Further, as above, S/tt S =alt S . Therefore, 
E1A = E S,( S G C S8 = C 8 As 8 maps distinct variables to 
distinct constants, we see that E/A c C which completes the proof. 
The question of the existence of a substitution satisfying the 
conditions of the lemma can, therefore, be answered by using the standard 
test for subsumption. 
Theorem I If C ^s D and both C and D are reduced, then they are 
alphabetic variants. Every clause has a reduction. The following 
algorithm gives a reduction, E1, of a given clause C. 
1) Set E1 to 0 and E2 to C. 
2) If E2 is empty, stop. 
3) Choose a literal, L, in E2. 
t) If there is a substitution c such that E26" C (E1 U E2) \ L 
and M a- = M for every literal M in E,, then change E2 to 
E2Cr \ E1. Otherwise remove L from E2 and add it to E1. 
5) Go to 2). 
(To implement step 4, one finds a as described in lemma 2 and 
then tests whether E2 S < (E2 \ i4 & . In doing this one can 
increase efficiency by noticing that if E Sd- S (E2 \ LD S then 
L Sts is in E2 8 . Therefore one need only calculate all the 
_730 
minimal substitutions O (j=1,s) such that L 8(r. is in E2 
testing for each, in turn, whether E2 < (F2 
Proof Suppose that C N D and C and D are reduced. There are 
substitutions cS and ,. such that C 9- !9 D and D,A c' C. Therefore 
C tst C c C. As C is reduced, Cc * = C. Therefore, by 
lemma 1, O,M maps distinct variables of C to distinct variables of C. 
Hence 6 maps distinct variables of C to distinct variables of D. 
Now D < C 6 since D ,r t 6 c C a' and theref ore, as C 0 S D and D is 
reduced, C 6` = D. Combining this with the fact that 0 maps 
distinct variables of C to distinct variables of D, we see that C and 
D are alphabetic variants. 
Next we show that any clause, C, has a reduction. Let 
H = D e C I C < Dj. Let C` be a minimal, with respect to 
member of H. We claim that C' is a reduction of C. Certainly 
C' c C and CIA, C. If C' is not reduced, it has a proper subset 
C" which is reduced and is equivalent to C'. But C" must be in H, 
and this contradicts the minimality of C. 
The algorithm always terminates since the number of literals in 
E2 always decreases by at least one every time round the loop. 
Let Ef and E2 be the final values of E1 and E2 respectively. 
We show that E1 c C and C < E1 The first assertion is obvious. 
To prove the second, suppose that E1 and E2 have the values E 
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and E2 at some stage when the execution reaches step I and the values 
E," and E2 immediately after step !. We show that E,1 U E2 < E"1 V E. 
Suppose a suitable 6-exists. Then E2 =E2 C5 \ E l and 
E" = E' = E^ 0_. Therefore, 
(E1 
U E2) 
Ell 6 U E I a- = E' U (E2 a' \ El 
= E," U E. 
If no,suitable 6- exists, El U E2 = E" U E" since 
E," = E U L and E2 = E2 \ LJ for some L. 
It follows easily that at every stage of the execution, 
E1 U E2 < Ef () E2 = Ef. Applying this to the initial values, 0 
and C of E1 and E2 we see that C < Ef as required. 
We show next that Ef is reduced, which will complete the proof. 
The proof is by induction with the hypothesis that there is at any stage 
a clause E which is a reduction of EI V E2 and contains E1. 
This is true initially since E1 = 0 then and we have already shown 
that every clause has a reduction. Suppose El, El, E" and E2 are as 
described above and that E '? El is a reduction of E1 () E. 
Suppose there is a suitable 0 as described in step h. Then 
E 6' ? Ell 6 = EI = E" . Further E 6' c (E l U E) C - = E" U E2 
El u E2 < E < E G Therefore E 6' 1V (E1 U E2) ,. E. There is 
therefore a substitution " such that E Qt. S E. Therefore E a'Lt -u E 
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and as E is reduced, Ec5 E. By lemma 1, 6M maps distinct variables 
of E to distinct variables. So therefore does (T°and so E and E 6' are 
alphabetic variants. Therefore, E ts'°is reduced, equivalent to 
El U E2 and contains E' . 
Suppose there is no such suitable 6`. Suppose also that the 
literal L chosen in step 3 is not in E. Then there is a / such that 
(E1 (J 1z2)# C E C (E,' U R2) \ L As E c (El U E2), 
E/-1 C (E U E2)i,( C E. Therefore, as E is reduced EiA. = E. By 
lemma 1, there is an integer no ? 1 such that M l 
no 
= M for every 
literal M in E. Then / 
no 
is a suitable substitution in stage 4 as, 
if M is in E1 , M /fAl no = M as E1 E and (EI U E2) nO = 
(E1 Bf) no=1 C E 11j4 n®-1 = E C- (E U E2) \ L This 
contradicts the assumption that L is not in E. Therefore L is in E 
and so E1 = E (J LJ C E and furthermore, as E1 E2 = E1 (J E2, E 
is a reduction of E (J E2 which concludes the inductive proof. 
Applying the result to the final stage we see that there is a clause 
R. ? Ef which is a reduction of Ef () Ff Ef Therefore E. C E c Ef 
1 1 2 1 1 
and so E1 is reduced completing the proof. 
Corollary 1 C eV D iff any two reductions of C and D respectively are 
alphabetic variants. 
Proof Obvious from theorem 1. 
It is convenient to develop a characterisata,on of equivalence 
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between sets of clauses at this point. 
This relation is defined by: 
H N' H' iff H < H' and H' < H. 
A set, H, of clauses is reduced iff H' C H and H' '' H implies that 
H' =H. 
A set, H', of clauses is a reduction of a set, H, of clauses iff H' 
is reduced, H' N H and H' 2 H. 
Theorem 2 If H' N H and H' and H are reduced then there is a unique 
bijection 9 a H' -> H such that 6(C) 1' C for every clause, C, in H. 
The following algorithm gives a reduction, H', of a given set of 
clauses H. 
1) Set H' to H. 
2) Stop if every clause in H' is marked. 
3) Choose an unmarked clause, C, in H. 
14-) If H' \ JC} < JCJ then change H' to H' \ JCJ. Otherwise 
mark C. 
5) Go to 2). 
Proof Choose 0 : H' -> H so that G (C) < C for every clause, C, in H'. 
This is possible as H' < H. 
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Similarly one can choose a mapping 0': H -> H' so that 
0'(C) < C for every clause, C, in H. 
Then, if C is in H', ('(&(C)) < O(C) < C. But H' is reduced 
and therefore 9O (C)) = C. Similarly, if C is in H, 
0 ( 9 '(C)) = C. Hence 0 is a bijection with inverse Q'. We see 
too that C = 6 0(C)) <: 9(C) < C. Therefore O(C) ti C. 
If ®'" is another bijection from H' to H such that 0"(C) C 
for any clause C in H' then it must also have Of as an inverse by a 
similar argument to that above. Therefore 6 =". 
Since the number of unmarked literals in H' decreases by one every 
time the execution of the algorithm goes round the loop, the algorithm 
terminates. 
Let Hf be the final value of H'. It is evident that H' H 
and Hf, < H and indeed that H. c H' and Hf, < H' for any value of H'. 
To complete the proof we need only show that H is reduced. 
If it is not we can find a marked clause C in Hf, such that 
Hf, \ C} < H. Let HI be the value of H' just before C was marked. 
Then H' \ CJ 2 Hf, \ CJ, as H Hf,, and Hf, \ CJ < Hf, < H 
Therefore He \ CI < HI < CJ which contradicts the fact that C is 
marked in H. This concludes the proof. 
Corollary 2 H1 A/ H2 iff given two reductions H,1 and H2 of H, and 
H2 respectively there is a bijection, 0 , from H,1 to H2 such that 
®7g_ 
that 6(G) C for any clause C in H1. 
Proof Obvious from theorem 2. 
3.2 Least general generalisations of clauses 
A least general generalisation of some clauses is a generalisation 
which is less general than any other such generalisation. For example, 
a least general generalisation of the clauses =row(crow1), Black(crowl)} 
and {Crow(crow2), Black(crow2)J is Crow(x), Black(x)J. This may be 
viewed as an induction from "This crow is black" and "That crow is black" 
to "All crows are black". This is a much more satisfying phenomenon 
than our induction of "Everything is black" when we were restricted to 
literals. We shall give a rather less trivial example later. 
The operation of taking a least general generalisation followed by 
a reduction of the result will play a major role in algorithms for finding 
nicest explanatory hypotheses. Reductions are taken in order to make 
the output more perspicuous and in order to reduce demands on the internal 
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storage space of the computer being used to implement such algorithms. 
Both these points will be illustrated later in this section. 
Let H be a set of clauses. The clause, C, is a least general 
generalisation (which is abbreviated by l.g.g.) of H iff: 
1 For every D in H, C < D. 
2 If for every D in H, C' < D, then Ct < C. 
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Any two l.g.g's of H are evidently equivalent. 
In an analogous way, we say that C is a least general 
generalisation of H, relative to Th iff: 
I For every D in H, C < D (Th). 
2 If for every D in H, C' < D (Th) then Ct < C (Th). 
One sees that if C and C' are l.g.g.'s of H (relative to Th), 
then they are equivalent (relative to Th). 
By temporarily introducing some auxiliary syntactic concepts, it 
is possible to give a short demonstration of the existence of least 
general generalisations of a finite set of clauses. We consider 
sequences of literals including the null sequence. A literal is 
identified with that one element sequence whose only member is the 
literal. The behaviour of sequences of literals is very similar to 
that of literals. 
n 
L. is defined to be the sequence with n members whose i th 
i=1 
member is L 
i 
. Notice that if n=0, this is the null sequence. We 
extend the meaning of the 7C operator, so that sequences themselves 
may be "multiplied", by: 
n m(i) 7 ( 7T Li ) = L11....L1 m(1)*---L n1 ....L nua(n) 
i=1 j=1 
-do- 
The reader is left to provide proper formal definitions. 
Powers of literals are defined by: 
n 
L = Li, where, for every i, L. = L. n 
Application of a substitution to a sequence is defined by: 
n n 
L _ 7T(Li(5") 
n m 
The sequence 7t Li is a generalisation of IT M. iff for some 
n m j=1 J n m 
(iT L. ) Cr = 71 M.. This is written symbolically as IC Li < M 
j=1 j - j=1 
that if this relationship does hold then n=m. 
We leave the reader to provide a definition of a least general 
generalisation of a set of sequences of literals and to enlarge the 
definition of word, place and occurrence given in 3.1.1 to include and 
apply to sequences of literals. Notice that no word can appear in any 
place other than the <>th'in the null sequence. 
n m 
Two sequences 7r Li and /1 M are compatible iff m=n and for 
every i between 1 and min(n,m) Li and Mi are compatible (that is, 
have the same predicate letter and sign). The next lemma shows how 
to calculate l.g.g's of sequences and when this,is possible. 
Lemma 1 Every non-empty finite set of sequences of literals has a 
least general generalisation iff any two sequences in the set are 
compatible. 
n m 
Let -1Li and T1M. be any two compatible sequences of literals. J- J 
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The algorithm given in theorem 3.2.1.1 may be applied to them. It 
terminates at stage 3, and the assertion made there is then correct. 
Proof We do not give the proof which is directly analogous to that of 
theorem 3.2.1.1. 
Of course one could also use Reynolds' (1970) algorithm, given in, 
section 3,2.1. 
The next lemma relates l.g.g's of certain related sets of sequences. 
n n n 
Lemma 2 Let L. be a l.g..g. of .t 1 . and N. . 
i=1 i i=1 i i=1 i 
n 
-TT 1) If 1% is a permutation of the numbers 1,.,.,n then L i) 
n n 
is a l.g.g. of TN(,) and 7r N 
n 
2) Let ni be positive integers (1<i<n). Li- is a l.g.g. 
n n 
of TV e' and 11 i. i=1 i i=1 i 
n' n' n' 
3) If 1<n'<n then ;1T L. is a l.g.g. of .7T M. and TCN.. i=1 i 1=1 i 1=1 i 







be integers (1<i<n). L is a l.g.g. Of 7TM and .TCN . - - i=1 'A(i) i=1 7(i) 1=1 71(i) 
Proof 1) and 2) are obvious. The proof of 3) is analogous to that of 
lemma 3.2.2.1. Part 4) follows immediately from the other three parts. 
This concludes the necessary supply of lemmas on sequences of 
literals. 
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A set of literals K = Li I i=1,n} is a selection from 
H = Ci 
II 
i=1,n} iff Li is in C. (i=1,n) and any two literals in K are 
compatible. To see the motivation for this definition, suppose that 
< C for every i. Then there are C r. such that E a e C for 
i 1 i i 
every i. Choose a literal L in E, if it is not empty. L Q'i I i=1,n} 
is a selection from H. 
Theorem 1 Every finite set, H, of clauses has a least general 
generalisation which is not 0 iff H has a selection. Let C and D be two 




least one selection. Let n L. be a l.g.g. of M and N.. Then 
i=1 i= i i i 
Li . 
I 
l.g.g. of C and D. 
Proof We demonstrate the last part first. Evidently L. I i=1,n} is 
a generalisation of C and D. Suppose E = Lj I j=1,mj is a generalisation 
of C and D. Then there are substitutions cT and / such that E(T'c C and 
E S D. Therefore L' 6-, L'./,4} is a selection from C and D for any j- J 
j. Consequently we can find a permutation 1 of the numbers 1...... n and 
m n 
integers n. > 0 (i=1,n), such that 7V L! is a generalisation of 1 Vii) 
n n 
and TV Nn(-i) By lemma 2.3, 7r Lni is a l.g.g. of the latter two 
m n 7T * 
sequences. Therefore 11L < 
Lni) 
and so E < Li I i=1,n} which 
- i=1 
proves that L. I i=1,nj is a l.g.g. of C and D. 
Notice that if some combination of sign and predicate letter occurs 
in both C and D then it also occurs in [Li I i=1,ni. Therefore, if a 
finite set, H, of clauses has a selection it has a nonempty least general 
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generalisation obtained by repeatedly taking l.g.g's of pairp of 
clauses in a similar way to that in the proof of theorem 3.2.1.1. 
Suppose H has no selection. Then it cannot have a nonempty 
generalisation. (See the remark after the definition of selection.). 
Therefore its only, and hence its least, generalisation is 0. This 
concludes the proof. 
It follows from lemma 1, theorem I and its proof that one can 
effectively obtain the l.g.g. of a finite nonempty set of clauses. 
Consequently we can find an effective function inf from sets of 
clauses to clauses such that if H J then inf H is a l.g.g., of H and 
(for convenience) if H = J then inf H is some fixed tautology. This 
definition seems to conflict with another definition of inf given ire, 
3.2.1. However, we can define inf so that inf{ { Lij i=1 ,nj = inf Li I i=1 ,n? , 
where the new definition is being used on the left and the old on the 
right of the equation. This follows from the following: 
Corollary 1 A literal L is a l.g.g. of two literals M and N iff LJ is 
a l.g.g. of the .clauses { Mj and { NJ . 
Proof If LJ is a l.g.g. of {MJ and {NJ then it is immediate that L is 
a l.g.g. of M and N. If L is a l.g.g. of 'M and N then { Ml and J NJ have 
a selection and the result follows from the second part of theorem 1. 
Thus identifying literals with the corresponding one element clauses 
would not cause any conflict between the two definitions of l.g.g. This 
is not a trivial result. 
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Here is a less trivial example than the one presented at the 
beginning of this section. 
Suppose that some two-person game is being played on a board with 
two squares, 1() and 2() and that the positions in figure 1 are won 
positions for the first player: 
X 
Position p Position p2() 
Figure 1 
1() is the name of the left hand side square, and 2() of the right 
hand square; p1() and p2() are the names of the positions and 0(), X() 
are the names of the marks 0, X. The use of p, n1, n2 as variables 
is temporary. We describe the fact that these positions are wins by means 
of the following two clauses: 
1. Occ(1(),X(),p1()), Occ(2(),0(),P1()), Win(p'1O) . 
2. Occ(1O,XO,p2O)' Occ(2O,X(,P2O), Win(P2O)o 





7cc(1(),X(),p1()) Occ(1(),X(),p) Occ(n1,XE),p) 
7cc(2(),X(),p2()) Occ(2(),X(),p) Occ(n1,X(),p) 
Occ(2(),0(),p1()) Occ(2(),0(),p) 7cc(2(),0(),p) Occ(n2,0(),p) Occ(n2,x,p) 
Occ(1(),X(),p2()) Occ(1(),X(),p) 6cc(1(),X(),p) Occ(n2,X(),p) 6cc(n2,x,p) 
Occ(2(),O(),p1()) Occ(2(),0(),p) Occ(2(),0(),p) Occ(2(),0(),p)Occ(2(),x,p) 




Each vertical column displays on alternate rows the sequences M1 
and M2 at an instance of stage 2 of the algorithm of theorem 3.2.1.1. 
We find t1 and t2 by searching through M1 and M2 from left to right which 
is top to bottom in the table. As soon as two literals have become the 
same in a column, we do not mention them in subsequent columns. 
Thus the least generalisation is: 
Occ(1O,xO,P),Occ(n1,xO,P)Occ(n2,x,P),Occ(2(),x,P),Win(P) 
We use the algorithm of theorem 3.3.1.1 We can take L=Occ(n1,X(),p) 
and 0 = (1()/n1I. This gives 
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E2 = C 6- = occ(1(),X(),P), Occ(n2,x9-P), Occ(2(),x,P), win(e)} and 
E1=0. 
Next, we can take L=Occ(n2,x,p) and 0-= 2()/n21 and obtain 
E2 = CcT = OGc(1O,XO,P), Occ(2O,x,P), Win(P)j and E1 = fly. 
After this every literal in E2 goes into E1 and eventually, 
E1 = Oc7(1(),X(,p), Occ(2(),x,p), Win(p)j and E2 = f6. 
The algorithm stops at this point.. The final clause says that if 
a position has an X in hole 1 and hole 2 has something in it, then the 
position is,a win, which, given the evidence, is fairly reasonable. 
The main computational weakness in the method for finding a 
reduced least generalisation lies-in that part of the reducing algorithm 
which requires a test for subsumption. For suppose that we are looking 
for the l.g.g. of two clauses each with nine literals in a single predicate 
letter (this can arise in descriptions of tic-tac-toe, say); there will 
be at least eighty-one literals in the raw l.g.g., and we will have to 
try to tell whether or not a clause of eighty-one literals subsumes one 
of eighty. 
It may very well be possible to find an algorithm which alternates 
the processes of finding an l.g.g. and reduction. In this way, in the 
tic-tac-toe example, for instance, sequences of eighty-one literals 
simply might not arise. Unfortunately we have not investigated this 
possibility. 
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.k Lattice properties of clauses 
It is possible to define a lattice of equivalence classes of clauses 
in a way analogous to the construction of the lattice of equivalence 
classes of literals, given in 3.2.3. Once again, we will not consider 
the relativised lattice one could obtain using generalisation relative 
to Th. 
The lattice, although not in general modular, does have a limited 
form of distributivity. 
We also give a representation theorem which shows that the general 
clauses can be reached by a single lattice operation from the ground 
clauses. However it is not possible in general to take sups or infs of 
infinite sets and we give some counter-examples. We also give examples 
of strictly ascending and descending infinite chains of clauses with one 
binary predicate symbol and no function symbols. This is in strong 
constrast with the lattice of equivalence classes of literals where such 
chains (and all strictly descending infinite chains, even with function 
symbols) are impossible. 
The representation theorem in the form of theorem 3.3.1-k- will 
prove a useful tool in later chapters. Section 3.3.2 on the infinitary 
properties of the lattice will be a source of counterexamples for various 
conjectures. The rest of the material is not essential. 
3.3.1 Finitary properties 
Before we are able to define the lattice, we need the dual of 
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the notion of an l.g.g. of two clauses. 
The clause C is a most general instance (m.g.i.) of D and E iff: 
1 D<CandE<C. 
2 For all C', if D < C' and E < C', then C < C'. 
Evidently, any two m.g.i's of D and E are equivalent. 
Lemma 1 Let be a translation such that D and E have no common 
variables. Then D Y V E is an m.g.i. of D and E. 
Proof 1 D < D <DYUE. 
E<D.UE. 
2 Suppose D < C' and E < C'. Then D < D < C' and so, for 
some minimal 6 and , D 6" c C' and E/.( C C'. Since Cr and ^ are 
minimal and D Y and E have no common variables, (r U 
(DS V E)(6U/4 ) = (DY6- V E/) C CI L) C' =CI. 
exists and 
We may now define the lattice. Let 
[C] _ i C' I C' N Ci. 
This set can be made into a lattice by the following definitions. 
1 [C] 1-l [D] = [infC,Dj] 
2 [C] U [D] = [C, U D] where is a translation such that C 
and D have no common variables. 
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,2 [C] < [D] iff C < D. 
One may see from the definition of inf and lemma 1 and the 
properties of A) that this does provide a good definition of a lattice. 
Notice that since mog.i°s and l.g.g's always exist, it is unnecessary 
to add any special elements. There is a natural bottom element, [0], 
for 0 < C for all C. 
There is, in general, no top element. For example suppose 
P. (i>1) is an infinite set of distinct predicate symbols. Then there 
can be no clause C such that Pi(x)j < C for all is Alternatively let 
P be a unary predicate symbol and f a unary function symbol. There can 
be no clause C such that P(fi(x))I < C for all i. However, suppose we 
consider only the equivalence classes of those clauses whose predicate 
symbols come from some fixed finite set whose function symbols are all 
from some fixed finite set and whose terms have depth less than or equal 
to some fixed integer. This set of equivalence classes forms a 
sublattice of the lattice of equivalence classes of clauses as may be 
seen from lemma 1 and the remarks preceding the definition of inf. The 
sublattice has a top element, namely [L I [LJ] is in the sublattice 
and the only variable in L is x}]. 
The lattice is not modular, in general, for if one takes 
[C] = [Q(x),P(f()) ] 
[D] = [I.@(x),P(f()),P(x)l] 
[E] = [@(f())] 
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then C < D but 
([E] n [D]) U [C] 
= (UQ(f())}] 11 [iQ(x),P(f()),P(x)}]) U [c] 




_ [ P(f(),),Q(f())}] n [ Q(x),P(f()),P(x)}] 
[{Q(x),P(f()),Q(f())J] fl D 
([@(fO)] U [ Q(x),P(fO)}]) n D 
_ ([E] u [c]) n [D] 
This contradicts the modular equality. The corresponding non-modular 






However we have: 
Theorem 1 1) If B and C have no common ground terms, then 
[A] fl ([B] U [c]) = ([A] 1'1 [B]) U ([A] n [c]), 
2) If A and B have no common ground terms and A and C have no 
common ground terms then 
[A] L1 ([B] n [c]) = ([A] u [B]) n ([Al LI [C]). 
Proof 1) First of all, it follows from lattice theory that 
[E] = ([A] n [B]) U ([A] Il [c]) < [A] n ([B] L, [C]). 
That is, [E] is a lower bound of [A] and [B] U [C]o We show 
that it is the greatest and hence that equality holds. 
Suppose [D] < [A], [D] < [B] U [C]o We need only show that 
[D] < [E] to prove the theorems 
As [D] < [B] U [C], there is a 6' so that D6° C BY () C where 
standardises B and C apart, and so we can set D = D1 U D2 where 
D1 TS B ? D2c5 C C. Now if D1 and D2 have a common variable x, 
then B 5 and C have a common term x 6' which is impossible - for it 
cannot be ground as B and C have no common ground terms and it cannot 
be general as 5 standardises B and C apart. Hence D1 and D2 have no 
common variable and so: [D] _ [D1] LJ [D2] 
Hence as [D1] < [D] < [A] and [D1] < [B], 
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[D1] < ([A] ii [B]) 
Similarly [D2] < (.[A] (1 EC]) 
Henoe [D] = [D1] U [D2] < ([A] n [B]) U ([A] 11 [C]) = [E] 
which completes the proof. 
2) Applying part I three times, we get 
([A] LI [B]) n ([A] U [C]) _ ([A] 11 [A]) U ([A] J1 [C]) 
IJ([B] n [A]) U ([B] n LC]) 
and 
[A] U ([B] 11 [C]), since 
[A] 11 [A] = [A], [A] Ll (LA] 1-1 [C]) = [A] 
[A] U ([B] n [A]) = [A] 
by the absortive laws o 
Corollary 1 The sublattice containing only the equivalence classes of 
those clauses which do not have any constant symbols is distributive. 
Proof Note that this is a sublattice, since if A N B then A has no 
constant symbols iff B has none and n and U do not introduce constant 
symbols. Distributivity is then immediate from Theorem I as B and C 
have no constant symbols implies that B and C have no ground terms (and 
hence no common ones)- 
We conjecture the following converse of theorem 1: 
If [A] n ([B] U [C]) = ([A] n LB]) U ([A] n [CI) 
for all A, then B and C have no ground terms in common. 
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However to completely "understand" distributivity (or similarly 
for any other lattice properties) it would be best to have a necessary 
and sufficient simple syntactic criterion for A,B,C together for 
satisfaction of the distributive law. 
Representation theorem 
We need some definitions: 
Let x1, x2, ... be all the variable symbols written out as an 
infinite list. 
Let Sn = h( /x1,...,h() / xn, 
Zfn = f(ll())/x1,...,fn(h() ./xnj 
Theorem 2. If C does not contain the unary function symbol f then for 
all n, 
[C] = [C 8 ni fl [C ?n' 
Before proving this, we remark that by choosing n large enough, 
we can express the equivalence class of any clause as the meet of the 
equivalence classes of two ground clauses. This theorem entails 
Reynolds Theorem 8 for literals, as can be seen using corollary 3.3.2.1. 
However in this special case, one can strengthen Theorem 2 to: 
Theorem 3. For every literal L and every n, 
[LJ] = [LJ S nI 11 [LJ Y nI 
We do not give the proof of theorem 3 which is a modification of 
Reynolds' proof of his theorem 8. 
In general, one cannot remove the hypothesis of theorem 2. For if 
C 4P(x1 ) P(f (x1) )7a 
infC 1,C Y1 =-JP(x) P(y)' P(f(h()) , P(f(x))3 
n'jP(x) P(f(h())) P(f(x))} 
t C. 
We need some more definitions and a lemma for the proof of theorem 2. 
Suppose W is a word. Then W' is obtained from W by continued 
application of (*) until this is no longer possible. 
( ) Let n be the largest positive integer such that fn (hO) occurs in W. ' 
Replace every occurrence of fn(h()) in W by xn. 
Suppose G-= t1 / y1 , .....tm/ ymj where the yi occur amongst 
the xi. We define Q"' = t1 / Y,1 tm ym 
Lemma 2.1 Suppose W does not contain f. Then 
(W 'n) = W 
Proof I This is obvious. 
2 By induction on words on W. 
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Proof of theorem 2 
Evidently C is a lower bound of C a and C rn. We show that 
if D< C 8 and D< C 7f' then D< C. 
Since D < C s n 
and C does not contain f and S does not 
introduce f,, D itself does not contain f. 
For some T , .D 6 C C 
n 
. 
Let L be in D. Then for some M in C 
L a- = M Yn 
Hence L 6°4 = (L 6°)' (lemma 2.1.2) 
(M fin) v 
= M (lemma 2.1.1). 
Hence D 6'' C C, which concludes the proof. 
For practical applications another version of the representation 
.. (i,j<1) be a doubly infinite sequence theorem is convenient. Let a iJ 
of distinct constant terms chosen so as to leave at least denumerably 
many constants unused. 
Let -- ...... aij/xj } (j>1). 
Theorem I Suppose C does not contain any of the ai.. If i/i' then 
for all j, [C]=[c -6711 n [c ] 
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Proof Evidently C < C for all i and j. Let W be a word.W" is 
obtained from W by continued application of (**) until this is no 
longer possible. 
(**) Replace an occurrence of a.. by one of x. 
If t1/yl , o o , o,t/ymj then 6°"= 'Y1 , o o o o ,t"m/ym . The rest 
of the proof is exactly analogous to the proof of theorem 2; the role 
of the operation, 4, being played by the operation, ". 
3.3.2 Infinitary properties 
It is shown here that the lattice has no pleasant infinite 
properties. It has strictly ascending and descending chains and is 
incomplete. 
Infinite chains 
We write C < D when C < D but not D < C. 
[Ci 
I 
i > 1j is a strictly ascending chain of clauses. 
iff C.1 < Ci1 (i > 1).. Strictly descending chains are defined 
similarly. 
We could define [C] < [D] when [C] < [D] but not [n] < [C] and say 
that .[Ci] 
I 
i > 1l is a strictly increasing chain of equivalence glasses 
of clauses iff [Ci] < [Ci+1] (i > 1). But since E[Ci] I i > i is 
strictly increasing iff iCL e I i > 1l is, we prefer to deal with clauses 
rather than equivalence classes of clauses. A similar remark holds for 
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descending chains. 
We will give examples of both ascending and descending chains using 
positive clauses with a single binary predicate symbol P and no function 
symbols. 
Such a clause can be pictured as a graph whose nodes are the variable 
symbols appearing in the clause. The graph has an are from x to y if and 
only if P(x,y) is a literal in the clause. 
Thus to {P(x,y), P(y,z), P(z,x)} corresponds the graph: 
Figure 7. 
If C1 a- S C2 then 6' is a homomorphism of the corresponding graphs 
and in fact there is a 1-1 correspondence between such substitutions and 
graph homomorphisms. 
We do not use this correspondence in any formal way, but with its 
help the reader should be able to see the truth of the various theorems. 
Here is an example of a strictly ascending chain. Define 
i > 1 1 by C, =fP(x0,x,)Jand C. = C1-7 U P(xi-vxi)3 where the 
xi are all different. In graph terms, C i is the chain: 
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x0 x1 _ . . . . . . . -3- xi- i 
Figure 
Evidently C. < Ci+1 as C. g Ci+1 . Suppose C1 c Ci-1 
If xk0 = x1, then as P(xk,xk*1) is in Ci, P(xl,xk+16) is in Ci-1 
Hence xk+1 = x1+1 
as P(x1,x1+1.) is the only literal in Ci+1 that 
has xl as its first argument. Thus it follows easily that C' is 
injective - but this contradicts the fact that C. has i variables and 1 
Ci-1 only i-1. Hence no such Cr exists and C. j Ci-1 
This chain is bounded above byiP(x,x)}for CiOr =IP(x,x)Jwhere 
(S =x / x0,...,x /xij. The ascending chain could have been produced 
in a trivial way by using a unary function, one takes the clauses 
iQ(fi(x))1, or we could use an infinite supply of unary predicate symbols 
Qi and take-the chain: 
C1 
I 
i > _1 where C 4Q, (x)) C' 1+1 1 = C! UQi+1 (x)} 
With a little more effort we can produce a strictly descending 
chain. Let [i,n] (i > 0, n > 1) be the equivalence class of i under 
congruence modulo n. Thus [0,2] is the set of even integers. Let 
x[i n] be an infinite supply of variables labelled by the set 
[i,n] I i > 0, n > 1}. 
We define the positive clause D 
n 
in the binary predicate letter 
P. with no function symbols and whose variables are a subset of 
®99' 
x[i,n] 
I i > 0, n > 11 by 
P(x[i.,m]q x[q1]> 
c Dn iff 
m. = 1 = n and j i+1 (mod n). Dn contains n literals. 
In graph terms, Dn is the cycle-. 
x[1 9n] _-_ x[29n] o-x[n1 9n]"x[n,nI 
Fx 
Then we will show that-. 
D2n I n > 11 is a strictly descending chain. 
Let Yn be a substitution such that 
x[1 92n+1 ] n = x[i,2n]. 
Such a n exists as if i = j (mod 2n+1) then i j (mod 2n). 
Then D2n+1 ' = P(x[i92n+1 ] x[i+1 ,2n+1 ] ) "rn I 
0 < i < nj 
_ P(x[i92n], x[1+1,2n] I 0 < i < n 
D2n. 
On the other hand, suppose that 6" is a substitution such that n 
D2n c- c D2n+1 . Let x[1 92n] 6° =. x[ 1,2n+1 ] 
We will show by finite induction that if 
1 < i < 2n then x[1 
2n] c; 
_ 
x[i+1,1 2n+1]. 9 
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This is true for i=1. Suppose that it holds for 1. Then as 
L = P(x[i 
a2n]a x[,+1 a2n]) 
e D2n, it follows that 
L 6"n = P(x[i+1m1a2n+1 
] a 
x [ j a2n+1 ]) say. Hence by the 
definition of D2n+1 a j _ i+l (mod 2n+1) so x[i+1 a2n] 6 n - x[i+1,2 n+1 
Now a L = P(x[2 n 2n] a x[,.2 n]) e D2n, Hence 
L 6'n = P(x[2n+1-1a2n+1 
P. x[,.2 n*1]) E D2n+1 
Hence 2n- 1-1 =_ lm1 (mod 2n+1 ). This is false and it follows 
that no such Q°n exists, Hence., D2n (n > 1) is indeed a strictly 
descending chain of clauses with one binary predicate symbol and no 
function symbols. 
One can show easily that there are only a finite number 
(2n1 
(< 2 1) of inequivalent., under P\/a positive clauses with n unary 
I 
predicate symbols and no function symbols. It follows that there can be 
no strictly descending chain of clauses with unary predicate symbols but 
no function symbols. Hence our result is the best possible as regards 
arities of the predicates involved. 
Incompleteness 
We show next that[ci] 
I 
i o 1} has no supremum and 
[D2j] I j > 1 has no infimum. Thus our lattice is not complete wrt. 
sups or infs. The existence of infinite strictly ascending and 
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descending chains would follow from this by general lattice theory but 
it is better to display actual examples. 
Lemma 1 1) C1 < D2j (19J ? 1) 
2) There is no E such that 
C < E < D2J for all i9 j >10 
Proof 1) Let "6'i. = x[092jk] / x0oo,o9x[i92j] / xi} o 
Then 
CiY i] = JP(x19x1+1) 0 < 1 < i ij 
JP(x[12j,, x[1+192J]) 0 < 1 < ij0 
C D2jo 
2) Suppose there is such an E. Evidently E must be a 
positive clause, with no function symbols, in the single binary predicate 
symbol P. Suppose E has n variable symbols. There is a o- n 
such 
that Cn Cr 
n 
C E. Now Cn has n+1 variable symbols. Hence there are 
< i2) 9 so that xi cy-n 
-- xi C;_ n0 We choose such an i1 9 
1 2 
so as to minimise i2'=i10 
Then El = P(xl,x1+1) C5-n 1 1'1 < 1 < i21 
c E. We show that 
E e ^j D(i2-i00 
Let,bt= x [i1'i2-3 
1 
] /xi 1 6° n g0000gx [i2 /xo 
2 
6- ni gi2=i1 ] 
Then is well-defined and 1--1 for x1 tTn = x12 CS'n (11 <, 12) <_> 1 1 =i1 
and 12=i2 or 11-l2 (by minimality of i2-i1 
) 




] = x[12912-i1 ] 
<-- 
xl1 
Z-n / = xl2 C-n/ . 
Next E°/d, = D(i i ) for E° A- = P(xl C7n x1+1 Cr n /u') i1 < 1 < i2 
2 1 
P(x[l,i2°i.1 ] a x[1+1 ,i.2-'i1 ] ) i i1 < 121 
_. D( i2-i1 )° 
Hence E8 D(. -. Now since D,, i > E° C E < D2j(j>1), 
2 1 2T 1 
there is a y so that 
) * d SD 22mi1 We can show that this is a contradiction in 
2 
exactly the same way we showed that there is no C- such that 
D2n 'n C D2n41 , thus completing the proof ° 
Note that since C. I 1j is a strict chain, all the inequalities 
of the first part of lemma I are actually strict. 
Theorem I I[Ci] a. > 1 has no supremum and [D2j] j > 1 has no 
nflmuum. 
Proof Suppose [E] U[Ci] exists. Then as Ci < D2j, by the first 
part of lemma 1, and since [E] is a supremum, E < D2j. This contradicts 
the second part of lemma 1. One proves that fl[D2j] cannot exist in the 
same way. 
Note that the two trivial examples of strictly increasing infinite 
chains have no upper bound at all. This contrasts with the strictly 
decreasing case where 0 is always a lower bound. {Ci I i > 1j is an 
-1p3- 
example of a strictly increasing infinite chain, which has no supremum but is 
bounded above by F(x,x) 
It is possible by a further extension of the above methods to 
produce a set of equivalence classes of clauses [Ci] I - av «<+ ov 
which has no supremum or infimum and is such that C. < Ci+1 , However. 
we have done enough to show that the lattice does not possess any of the 
usual properties of infinite sets of elements, at least in the general 
case, 
n1o 
Chapter Solvability of the general problem 
We are now in a position to consider questions of the solvability of 
the general problem raised at the end of chapter 2, which we restate: 
Given a notion of niceness °j and f and e, it is required to find 
the sets of clauses, H, satisfying: 
1 ) H < H0 (Th) 
2) VH A irr A Th A (ei A fi) is consistent. 
3) H is minimal with respect to 3 amongst those clauses satisfying 
1) and 2). 
Under the assumption that every finite set of clauses has a l.g.g. 
relative to Th, we can locate the set of solutions when 4 is -? . 
cpg 
Let infTh H be a l.g.g. of H relative to Th. Note that any tautology is 
a l.g.g. of 0 relative to any Th. When Th 0, we require that 
inf0H -- inf H 9 if H does not contain a tautology, where inf is the 
function inf defined in section 3.,5.2 in order that the notation be 
consistent. 
There is a lattice which contains all the possible solutions. 
Let JTh(H) where H is a finite set of clauses be the set of equivalence 
classes of the set infThH' I H' G Hy, where the equivalence relation is 
equivalence relative to Th. The equivalence class of infThHI is denoted 
by [infThH']. I(H) is ordered by: 
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[.inf, HI ] C [infThH2] zff infTHH1 < iofTHH2(Th). 
This is evidently a good definition. 
Th(H) 
is actually a 
lattice with infs given by- 
[ .inf'ThH1 ] fl [ i1 Th H2] . [ i nfTh(HI V H2) ] 
This is a well-defined operation. If H1 C H and H2 C H then 
[anfTh(H1 U H2)] as in JTh(H). Suppose inf H1 infThH1 (Th) and 
infaThH` _v :in.fH2 (Th). Then, 
infkTh(HI t1 H2) 
/___' 
infTb nfThH1 9inf'TbH2 
'' infThj .ixafThH°I , infTbH2} 
/--"infThCHI U H) (Th). 
Therefore 11 is well-defined. 
(Th) 
(Th) 
As infTh(HI LJ H2) < infTf Hi (Th) for i=1,29 n does give a lower 
bound. Suppose inf ThH3 '< i f r1. (Th) for i-I ,2. Then 
-1_nfTbH3 < infTh{ inf"TI 'I ,i.nfT1: H2 1 (Th) 
^V inf'Th(HI lJ H2) (Th). 
Therefore [ arfThH)] E- [inf'TbHI ] 11 [ irlfThH2], and n gives the 
greatest lower bound. As JTh(H) is finite, arbitrary subsets have 
inf"s9 given by, 
nui,Toi ] :i=1 ,.n = [ i nfThHI ] n ( [ a nf'ThH2 inf TbHnu1 ] r1 [i,nf'ThHn_1 ]) ) 
... )A 
-, 06- 
n [ infThH.l ], = i infThH1 ], 
n [I P(X), H ] 
Consequently there is a sup operation defined by: 
[infmH,i ] U [infThH2] 
= / I [i T03] C YTh(H) I [infThH.] C [i.nfTYiH3]j 
for i=1,2}. 
Thus, equipped with n and V , YTh(H) is a finite lattice. 
Example Suppose H {C1,C2,C3i where C1 P(f()),Q(f())I, 
C2 P(g()9Q(g()! 
C3 = JP(h()j. 
Then :infC1,C2} N P(x),Q(X)i.$ 
infC1 ,C3J N infC2,C3 ,vinfC1,C2,C3} _ P(X)I 
The lattice 
YO 
(H) is displayed in figure 1 
infC1 ,C3 n C2,C3},infC1,C2,C3 
i I.P(X), P(x) i i 
Figure 1 
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We can now show that the solutions are located in d Th(HO) when - 
The set of clauses in HO that an arbLtrary clause C explains is 
defined to be: 
Explainset(C) - C' E Ho I C < C' (Th)I. 
Notice that Power(C) = cardinality of Explainset(C). 
We also set Compiexity(H) =- IIHII, the cardinality of H. 
Relative equivalence between sets of clauses is defined by-, 
H rv H' (Th) iff H < H° (Th) and H° <, H (Th). 
A set, H, of clauses is reduced, relative to Th, iff H° C H and 
H° rv H implies that H° = H. 
If H iv H° (Th) and both H and H° are reduced then there is a 
unique bijection ® a H ° v> H such that 9(C o) ~ C' for every C' In 
Ho. Th'7.s may be proved in a way analogous to the corresponding part of 
the proof of the corresponding part of the statement of theorem 3.3.1.2. 
One can easily extend the analogy to the rest of the theorem if relative 
generalisation is a recursive relation. 
Theorem i H is a solution when -j is .?cpg iff it is reduced relative 
to Th and is equivalent, relative to Th, to an H° satisfying- 
1) H° C i.nfTh 





3) `P H' A Th A Irr A J (ei A fi) is consistent. 
4) H' is minimal w.r.t. 4 
cp 
amongst those sets of clauses 
satisfying 1), 2) and 3). 
Further, any HQ satisfying these conditions is a solution. 
Proof Let H be a solution. If it is not reduced relative to Th 
then let H" be reduced and equivalent, relative to Th, to H. Then. 
Complexity(H") < Complexity(H), H" < H0 (Th) and V H" A Th A lrr A e/k 
(ei A f'1) is consistent, since FVH =- VH". This contradicts the 
fact that H is a solution. So H is reduced relative to Th. 
Define H° inr Explainset(C) I C E H. We see that 
H° S ji.nfThHl I H1 S H, Complexity(H') < Complexity(H), Power(H) = Power(H°), 
and H < H$ (Th.), and Hv < 
H0 
(Th). It follows from H < H° (Th) that 
VH' A Th A Irr A A (e. A fo) is consistent. So since H is a 
solution, Complexity(HI) Complexity(H) and HA/ H° (Th). Suppose 
H" satisfies 1), 2) and 3) and H" 
cp 
HQ. Then as H' H, 
cp 
H" .- H. So, as H is a solution and H° - H, HQ --cp H --cp H". 
This establishes condition W for H° and concludes the first part of the 
proof. 
We demonstrate the last part of the theorem next. Suppose that 
H' satisfies conditions 1) to 1F.) . Then it satisfies conditions 1) and 
2) for being a solution. Suppose that H" also satisfies conditions 1) 
and 2) for being a solution and that H" -j 
opg 
H9. We will show that 
He -1 
cpg 
H". Let H"':= infTh Explainset(C) I C e H"i. We see that 
-109- 
H* < H"' (Th), H"' -4 H" and H"' satisfy condition 1). Therefore 
H"' satisfies conditions 1), 2) and 3). Further H"' H". As 
H" -4 
cp9 
H', H" --4cp H' and so H"' -S H. As H' satisfies 
condition 4) it follows that H" --g H"'. But H"' 4 
cpg 
H" 4cpg H'. 
Therefore H' < H"'. 
There is therefore a map 9 o H"' H' such that &(C"') < C"' (Th), 
for any C"' in H"'. If the map is not onto, there is a C' in H' such 
that 8(C"') I C' for any C"' in H"'o Then H' \ C' satisfies 
conditions 1), 2) and 3) which contradicts the fact that H' satisfies 
condition 1. Therefore 8 is onto. Since Complexity(H"') = Complexity(H"), 
as H"' & 
LP 
H' and H' 4 
cp 
H"', L9 must be a bijection. Therefore as 
Power (C"') < Power( ®(C"')) for any C"' in H"' and Power(H') s Power(H"') 
then Power(C"") = Power( 6(C"')) for any C"' in H"'. But as 
& (city) < C" (Th ), Explainset (®(C"')) 2 Explainset(Cl") for any C"' in 
H". Therefore Explainset (®(C"')) = Expla nset (C"') and so 
C"' < in'ThEKplainset( O(C"')) < ©, (C"') (Th), as H' satisfies condition 
1), for any C"' in H"'. Now, as 0 is a bijection, H"' -%.., H' (Th) and 
taking this with H"' -j H" and H' -9 cp H"' we see that H' ---`cpg H" 
which concludes the proof that H' is a solution. 
Suppose next that H' satisfies conditions 1) to k) and that H as 
reduced, relative to Th, and that H '/ H' (Th). Then H' is a solution 
and so is reduced by the above. Therefore by the remark after the 
definition of when a set of clauses is relatively reduced, there is a 
bijection 0 o H' -> H such that O.(C') ~ C' for every C' in H'. 
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Therefore H 4Rcp9 H° and since H satisfies conditions 1) and 2) for 
being a solution as H # H' (Th) it follows that H is a solution, 
concluding the proof. 
crows. 
Let us look at some examples. Here is another appearance of the 
f e 
f°1 - Black(crowi ) 
f2 -- Black(crow2) 
e,1 = Crow(crowl ) 
e2 Crow(crow2) 
Table I 






Now9 C3 infC,,C2S =- Crow(x), Black(x). 
Evidently V C3 A e1 A e2 A f1 A f2 is consistent and so j C3 
is the only solution. We have induced 'All crows are black'. 
Next, we give a less trivial example from Hunt, Marin and Stone (1966). 
We must learn that all bears or large animals are dangerous. Our 
observational data consists of a description of various animals, both 
dangerous and non-dangerous, in terms of the attributes Size, Animality 
and Colour as given in table 2. Again, Tb is empty. 
Now, HO = C,i I 1 < i < 71. The members of jinf H' I H' C HO, H' / 0 
which are consistent with (ei A fi) are, apart from C1 to C7J 
C8 infiCI,C2 
Size(x,s)9 Colour(x,black), Animal(x,bear), Dangerous(x) 
and 
C9 - Izf C3,C6,C..7 
Size(x,large), Colour(x,c), Animal(x,a), Dangerous(x)j. 
The solution is H = iC8,C9,C C5 and includes the following 
version of the generalisation to be learnt-. 
'Anything that has a size and is a black bear is dangerous' and 
'Anything that is a large coloured animal is dangerous'. 
Notice that if we assume that all animals have a colour and all 




fi Dangerous(animall) e1 - Size(ani.mall,small)AColour(animall ,black)A 
Ani.mal(animall,bear) 
f2 Dangerous(animal2) e2 Size(ani.mal2,medium)AColour(animal2,black)A 
Animal(animal2,bear) 
f = Dangerous(animal3) e3 St.:ze(ani.mal3,large)AColour(animal3,brown)A 3 
Animal(animal3,dog) 




f6 Dangerous(animal6) e6 = Size(animal6,large)AColour(animal6,black)/1 
Animal (animal6 hors e) 
f = Dangerous(animal7) e7 = S:i.ze(animall,large)AColour(animal7,brown)4 
An.imal(animal7,horse). 
Table 2 
Note that in fact the solutions have been located in 
infThH1 I H1 .° H0 rather than in Im(Ho). One can reword theorem I 
to find the location in ITh(HO). YTh(Ho) was introduced in order 
to find a well-known mathematical structure in which the solutions could 
be located; it is expected to make any associated computational problems 




Corollas For the case where "'a is '4cpg, every problem has a 
solution. 
Proof We need only show that there is an H° satisfying conditions 1), 
2) and 3) of theorem 1, for as infT.hH, I H1 C H0i is finite, there 
will then be a suitable minimal one., with respect to "-; and this will 
be a solution by theorem 10 
Now H0 C .nfThHI I H1 C H 
0 
j and certainly HO < HO (Th)a It is 
n 
part of the problem conditions that Th A Trr(ei A fi) is consistent. 
n 
Since (ei A fi Ho., it follows that H0 satisfies condition 
which concludes the proof. 
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Now that we know there is always a solution we can try to construct 
an algorithm for finding one. Let us consider the simplest case where 
Th and Irr are empty. Now infTh is calculable and so, therefore, is 
{ in.fT,h H1 I H1 C H01 =- j inf H1 
I! 
H, 9 H0 . For each subset, HI, of 
this set we can check whether H° < H0 (Th), and if we could only check 
the consistency condition, we could then isolate the solutions, using 
theorem 1, since --.9op is certainly decidable. Now, in general, the 
consistency of an arbitrary set of clauses is an undecidable property. 
We might hope, though, to avoid the difficulty since Ho has arisen by 
means of the special process of generalisation. Unfortunately it can 
be shown that undecidability persists. 
Theorem 2 Suppose that -4 is . There is no algorithm which 
cpg 
will, given any f and Ev produce a solution to the resulting 
generalisation problem. (Here both Th and Irr are empty.) 
Proof We will show that if such an algorithm exists then it is possible 
to tell whether or not the universal closure of an arbitrary set of 
clauses is consistent. As this is not possible we shall then have 
demonstrated the non-existence of the algorithm. 
To this end let H be an arbitrary set of clauses. We may assume, 
without loss of generality that no a used in the representation 
theorem, theorem 3.3.1.4, appears in H, that H contains no tautologies 
and that all clauses in H are standardised apart. For if H does not 
have these properties we can effectively find another set of clauses 
which does and whose universal closure is equiconsistent with that of H. 
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With H we will associate an f and an her in such a way that H is 
consistent iff any solution to the resulting generalisation problem has 
a certain decidable property. This will complete the proof. 
Let H -= JD1,...,Dn} and suppose that the predicate symbols 
appearing in H are Pj(j=1,p). If Pj has degree m, associate with it 
a new predicate symbol Qj of degree m+n+2 for j-=.1,p. (Notice that 
n=IIHII) 
It is convenient to temporarily introduce some new syntactic 
notation. If t1, tm+n+2 are terms and L = (+) P.(t11..... tm)' 
for some j, we set 
L[[tm+1...... tm+n+2]] = (±) Qj(t1,...,tm+n+2). 
If L does not begin with some Pj, we set 
L[ [ tm+1 , "''tm+n+2 ] ] = L. 
In the above (+) P. is either P. or P. and (+) is used according to 
the usual conventions. 




]] = [L[[t m+1,....,tm+n+2 ]] I L e C} 
for any clause C and H'[[tm+1,....,tm+n+2]] C[[tm+-1...... tm+n+2]] 
C e H'}, 
for any set, H', of clauses. 
Notice that if H' does not contain any of the Qj then V H1 is 
equiconsistent with V H'[[tm+1...... tm+n+2]]. 
Let x1,x2,y1,y2,u1,u2 be variables not appearing in H and let P be 
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a new n+2-ary predicate symbol. 
We define auxiliary terms tik (i=1 ,n, k=i,n) by tii f(u2) and 
tik=u.1 ifk/iandset 
H:} De[[x1If (y1),.ti19...,tin] I U P(x1,f(y1),ti1,...,tin) 
D1 
c Hi 
We also set 
H- =: [Di[ [f(x2)'y2st11 , ...,tin] ] U P(f(x2),y2,ti1 , ...,tin)' 
DA E Hi. 
Now V (H+ U H-) is equiconsistent with V H. For suppose 
V (H+ U H-) is consistent. Notice that for any i, 
D [[f(x2),£'(:Y1 )sti1,...,tin]] is in R (H+ U H ). Therefore 
Q (H+ U H-) < H[[f(x),...,f(x)]]. So VH[[f(x),...,f'(x)]] is 
consistent and it follows, by a remark above, that VH is. 
Suppose IV H is consistent. Then VH[[x1,f(y1 ),u1,...,un]] is 
also consistent, by the remark made above. As H[[x1,f(y1),u1,...,un]] 
generalises H+ and does not contain any occurrence of the predicate 
symbol P, any extension of a model of H[ [x1 ,f (y1 ),u1 , ...,un] ] to an 
interpretation of H will be a model of H+. If we choose that 
extension which assigns to P the empty predicate, of the appropriate 
degree, then the extension will also be a model of H-. Thus if V H 
is consistent, so is V (H+ V H-). 
We have proved, therefore, that 1V H and V (H+ LI H) are 
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equiconsistent. 
Set Gen1 = inf(D,D'} V 
D DI I 
D / D' and either D and D' are 
9 
both in H+ or else they are both in ICJ. 
The translations, 
D D' 
must be taken so that all the variables 
9 
in Gen1 are new and the clauses in Gen1 are standardised apart. Notice 
that every clause in Gen1 has a single occurrence of the predicate letter 
P. 
Set Gent = _D* I D e Gen1 and D* is D except that the sign of P is 
changed. 
theorem). 
Let 1 = WI, where n' is the first integer such that 
(H+ U H V Gen1 V Gent) $ 
of 
contains no variable symbols (i > 1). 
Notice that any literal has at most one occurrence in this set of 
clauses. 
Define, HO = (H+ V H) br' 1 U (H+ U H) .2 U Gen1 W 3 V Gent Y14-' 
We may now define an f and an Ev with the properties promised at 
the beginning of the proof. 
Let f be the set of literals with predicate letter P appearing in 
H0. 
If L : f, there is, by a remark above on the properties of the Y 1 
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a unique clause, D, in H0 in which L occurs. 
Set Ev(L) = 1i1 A .... A Mk(L) (where {Mk I k=1, k(L) = D\[L). 
Notice that Ho = Ev L U L I' L e f and so H0 has its usual 
meaning. We must now show that we have a genuine problem, 
that is that " (e n f.) is consistent. (1 depends on n = IIHII 
J=1 J J 
and in fact 1 = 
4n21 
and H0 contains no tautologies. 
Suppose that L and are contradictory literals in ^(e A f.). 
1 L2 j=1 J J 
From the properties of the U 1, and the fact that all clauses in 
H+ U Hm V Gent are standardised apart, L1 and L2 must occur in a 
single clause D in HO, and so they cannot begin with the predicate letter 
P. 
Since H contains no tautologies, neither does H+ U H and so D 
is in Gent 7f 3 U Gent Since neither literal has predicate 
symbol P, we may assume, by the construction of Gent, that D is in 
Gent 3. But if D' is in Gen1 then D' generalises some non-tautologous 
clause in H+ U H and so must itself be non-tautologous. As o 3 
substitutes distinct constants for distinct variables D must also be 
non®tautologous, which contradicts the assumption that L1 and L2 are 
contradictory. 
1 
Therefore, A (e. A f.) is consistent. Since P does not occur in 
n j=1 J J 
H, and 
/\ 
e. is consistent, H0 contains no tautologies. 
J= J 
Let Htest 
= H+ U H U Gen1 3 U Gent We are going to 
demonstrate that if Hsoln is a solution to the problem defined by Ev and 
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f then H is consistent iff Hsoln / Htest' As equivalence is decidable 
we will then be able to tell, effectively whether H is consistent, if an 
algorithm for producing a solution is available. This will conclude the 
proof, as we remarked at the beginning. To do this we need two lemmas. 
Lemma 2.1 
v 1 
VH is equiconsistent with V H 
A n (e A f, ). test j =1 j 
1 
Proof Suppose V H is consistent. As I /\ (e A f , ) > HO and 
Gen2 ? 
. 
V Gen2 4- Ho, VH test A 
n (e° A fis equiconsistent J-`1 J J 
with V(H V H) A A (e n f . ). Suppose then that 
1 j_1 J 
V(H+ U H!) /1 A (e /A f is inconsistent. Then j=1 j J 
V(H+ 
V H-) ->-aj 11 f. 
1 
Now we have shown above that A (e. A f,) is consistent. 
1 
J-1 J J 
Therefore C Wf j=1,lj U 1 e is not a tautology. It follows 0 j=1 j 
from the subsumption theorem (Lee, 1967 and Kowalski, 1970) that there is 
a clause C in m n° (PC. (H} V H-), for some n°, which subsumes CO. If C has 
been obtained by resolution from more than one member of H+ U H-, it 
follows from the construction of H+ (J H that every literal in C will 
contain at least three occurrences of the unary function symbol f. Now 
it is impossible that C be 0, for then V(H* U I) would be inconsistent 
and this contradicts the fact that V(H+ U H-) is equiconsistent with 
VH taken together with the assumption thatVH is consistent. Further no 
literal in C0 can contain more than two occurrences of the unary function 
symbol f. Therefore if C has been obtained by resolution from more than 
one member of H+ V 
H-, 
it is impossible for C to generalise CO. This 
contradiction establishes the existence of a D in H+ U H such that C 
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is in Ans(DI). 
Let us assume that 17, is in H Then C will contain a positive 
literal L with predicate letter P containing two occurrences of the 
function letter f, one of which is in the second argument place of L. 
But a positive literal occurring in CO whose predicate letter is P 
must be the negation of a literal occurring in a clause in H 1 (J 
H Zr 2 U Gen, 3 () Gent (Y k. Any such literal occurring in 
H- 'T' U H y V Gen ` 3 has no occurrence of the function 
symbol f in its second argument place. By the construction of Gent, 
any such literal occurring in a clause in Gent 0 k will have exactly 
one occurrence of the function symbol f. Therefore L generalises no 
literal in C0 and so C I CO. This is a contradiction. If D is in 
H the contradiction is established similarly. So we have established 
1 
that V (H+ V H-) A ^ (e A f) and so VH A (e. A f.) j-1 J J test j -I J 
is consistent. 
Suppose V H A (e A f.) is consistent. We see, test J--1 ,j 
successively, that so are V H test, V(H+ U H-) and VH. This 
concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 2.2 Suppose Hsoln is a solution to the problem 
determined by 
Ev and f, and that H soln (HO). Then, Gen7 U Ge nt 
Hsoln c HO U Htest. (We may assume that Htest U H0 
C I (H0).) 
Proof For this lemma we need the easily proved fact that if 
C < D 'j for some i, j and C contains none of the constants aij, for 
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any i > I and j > 1, then C < D. This fact is implicit in the proof 
of the representation theorem, theorem 3.3.3,1.)+. 
Suppose E is in Gent 6 3 but not in Hsoln° Now as Hsoln is a 
solution Hsoln 
< 
HO 1E}. So there is a clause, C, in Hsoln which 
generalises E and, since Hsoln S J (HO), C must generalise some other 
member of H0 and so C does not contain any of the constants aij for any 
i > 1 and j > 1 . 
For some D, D9 in H+, E = infD,D' Z D D, 3. Therefore 
C < infD,D9j t D9Da, using the fact given at the beginning of the 
proof. We can find an f j in f, such that E* e J , 1) [f } and so as 
inf D,D° T DD? is inconsistent with e . /\ f j, so is C and so therefore a 
is Hsoln° This contradiction establishes the fact that Gent 3 
C 
Hsoln' 
Similarly we can show that Gen2 ' F C Hsoln 
Any clause in (HO) which is not in Htest U H0 must generalise 
a member of Gent U Gen2, by application. of one or both of the 
representation theorem and the remark made at the beginning of the proof. 
This clause is inconsistent with the evidence, as was shown above, and so 
cannot be a member of H sole 
. This concludes the proof. 
We may now finish the proof of theorem 2. We have to show that if 
H soln is a solution to the problem 
defined by Ev and f then H is consistent 
iff Hsoln N Htest' By theorem 1, we may assume that Hsoln d(H0). 
We may also assume that Htest U H0 c 9'' (H0) 
®122- 
Suppose that H is consistent, -that Hsoln 
is a solution and that 
H soln -P H test. 
Then by lemma 2.2,, H soln C H test UJ H 0 . 
Therefore Htest < Htest 









such that no clause in H 
solo 
generalises C testo 
Since Gen1 3 U Gen2 C Hsoin bylemma 2.2, Ctest is in H+ U H-. 





Ctest W 2 since Hsoln < HO° 
C1 cannot generalise any clause in HO other than Ctest 
1 
, for 
then it generalises 
Ctest , 
by the remark made at the beginning of the 
proof of lemma 2.2. Therefore C1 




/= C1° Let H 
v soln 
= (Hsoln V Ctest ) \ C1 
1 
Then as Htest < Haoln' soln ^ 
A (eJ /1 fi) is consistent by 
lemma 2.1. Further 
H' < Hsoln < HO, 
H' - Hsoln but 
H 
° This contradicts the fact that H is a solution. soln e soln° sole 
We have shown that if VH is consistent, H soin ,,v H test. 
Suppose 
1 
VH is inconsistent and Hsoln" Htest* Then 1 
VH A A (e A f e) is equi-consistent with VH A (e j A f soln j-1 i test JR' 
which is inconsistent by lemma 2.1 since 'H is. This certainly 
contradicts the fact that Hsoln is a solution which concludes the proof. 
The same result can be obtained for a variety of other -i's if we 
change the construction of f and Ev slightly. 
The construction proceeds as above until Gen1 and Gen2 have been 
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defined. Then one sets: 
m 
HO = V (H+ U H) k U Gent m-w1 U Gent -,- m+2 (m > 2) 
The construction given above corresponds to the case where m=2, 
One may then define fm and Ev 
m 
analogously to the above construction and 
verify that m(E. A fm) is consistent. (Here, 1 4n2 + 2n(m-2).) 
J=1 J J m 
One can then define Htest 
and prove: 
1 V H is equiconsistent with 
VHm A Am(em A fm) test j=-1 J J 
1 
2 If p 
+ 
H is inconsistent, V H A nm(Em A fm) is consistent soln j=1 J J 
and H < HT- then IIH II > m. soln - 0 soln 
The proof of I is analogous to that of lemma 2°1° To see that 
IIHsolnIl > 
m under the assumptions of 2 suppose otherwise and choose a 
clause C in H+ CJ 
H-° 
There are clauses C1,°°.°,Cm in Hsoln such that 
Ck < C 'r k (k=1 ,m) as Hsoln : H0 Since I I'Hsoln I I < M. two of these 
are the same and so there is a Ck in Hsoln such that Ck < C, by the 
representation theorem. Hence Hsoln < H+ L/ H-5, and so 
H < H+ U H V Hm < Hm ° But V Hm A Am (em n fm) is soln -° 0 test test J1 J 1 J 
1(ern fm) inconsistent as VH is, using 1 ° Therefore 1 Hm A A soln j =1 j J 
is also inconsistent which contradicts one of the assumptions of 2, which 
thereforeyshows that IIH solnII > M. 
Recall the definitions of -a 1, -il ° a -4 s, and -4s , given in 
chapter 2. 
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Corollary 2 Let 4 be one of -4 ca ";cp' -4l' "419' --is or Sy. 
There is no algorithm which will, given any f and Ev produce a solution 
to the resulting generalisation problem, although such a solution exists. 
Proof Suppose H is a set of clauses as described at the beginning of 
the proof of theorem 2. We need merely show an effective way, given an 
algorithm which always produces a solution, of deciding whether V H is 
consistent. 
Suppose -3 is 1co There is always a solution, given m, to the 
problem defined by Evm and fm, since the complexities of any solution 
must lie between zero and IIHOIii as H- satisfies conditions I and 2 for 
being a solution. Choose m > IIHtest111. Find a solution, Hsoln, to 
the problem defined by Evm and fm. if V H is inconsistent then 
I it soln III > m by 2 above. If V H is consistent, so is VHtest A 
i (e , A f) and as Htest e HO' I I1Hso1n1I I < I IHtest l I < me =1 j 
Therefore V H is consistent iff I IHso1.n I I < m, which concludes 
the proof for 
The proofs for -"3 l' --l' ' s and 1, are all similar to the 
above. In each case if MH is consistent, H m test provides an upper 
bound for the measure being used. If-H is inconsistent one obtains 
a lower bound, which increases to infinity, with m, on the measure of 
a solution. As one sees that there must be a solution in each case, 
one can tell in each case whether VH is consistent. 
When -S is .yp we see that there is always a solution to the 
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problem defined by Evm and fm, For HT- satisfies conditions 1 and 2 
for being a solution. Hence the complexity of any solution must be 
less than or equal to IIHOII and so the power must be less than or 
equal to IIH0mI1!2. These bounds show that a solution exists. if 
there is an algorithm for producing a solution then the same algorithm 
will produce a solution when -'g is -40, for -4cp minimal implies 
that '-' 
c 
is minimal. Together with the result for --fc , this implies 
the result for - cp. This concludes the proof. 
This technique will establish the result for any reasonable way of 
combining integer-valued complexity measures. When the result has been 
established for some then it follows at once for any lexicographic 
refinement of -1 which always allows solutions. (Compare the proof 
of the last part of the corollary). 
This unsolvability result seems rather paradoxical, since we seem 
to have little, if any, trouble with consistency, when forming 
generalisations either in ordinary or scientific life. Furthermore, 
there can no longer be any hope of a general method. Everything may be 
reconciled, however, by postulating that our set of generalisation 
problems is too inclusive; we have not succeeded in restricting ourselves 
to "ordinary" generalisation problems. We will not try to formulate 
restrictions which give exactly the ordinary problems and no others. 
To show that some proposed solution captures the generalisation problems 
faced by any human being could no doubt involve us in uninviting 
problems of psychology. Similarly, to capture ordinary scientific 
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classificatory generalisation problems may involve comparisons with., say, 
19th century zoological practise, another uninviting task. 
What we will do is indicate the kind of restrictions that may be 
formulated, with a view to giving some that are potentially useful for 
work in A.I. 
One could make restrictions on the vocabulary used. Restrictions 
on the possible predicate symbols and function symbols, could rule out 
the type of unsolvability proof used above. One extreme possibility is 
to require that the only function symbols are constant ones. Then every 
problem where "3 is - 3cpg and Th and Irr are arbitrary sets of clauses 
(with no function symbols, other than constant ones) is solvable, by the 
discussion after theorem 1. We would like to single out one 
particularly simple subcase. Suppose Th is empty and every member of 
n 
the (finite) Herbrand base of Th A Irr A A (e A f or its negation i=1 i n 
is implied by Th A Irr A n1(ei A fi) In other words, 
n 
Th A Irr /1 ^1(ei n f has exactly one Herbrand model. Let 
n 
C = L Th A Irr A "1(ei A fi) implies L and L is in the Herbrand 
base of Th A Irr A n (ei i1 fi) '.'hen, if H C inf H' H' ,C H0, i-1 
H V H A Th /I Irr /l n1 (e. A fi) is consistent iff H Gj . 
In other words., we test H against the unique Herbrand model. 
Another kind of restriction is to fix on a specific Th. We might 
require that Th always contains a "basic" scientific theory, which 
includes some universal assumptions (for example meaning postulates or 
principles of causality). One extreme is to demand that Th A Irr is 
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a decidable theory, or, at any rate, that one can decide the sentences 
produced by the process of taking relative infima. In this case it 
follows from the discussion of theorem 1 that an arbitrary problem is 
decidable if -1 is equal to -'$ 
cpg 
and the vocabulary of (ei A fi) 
is a subset of that of Th A Irr. 
Finally one might place restrictions on the kind of data 
generalised. Most psychological and taxonomic generalisation problems 
(Hunt, Marin and Stone, 1966) form classes from attributes, which are 
maps from objects to finite sets, or to real numbers. 
Suppose, then, that some solvable case has been found, when `1 is 
-4 cpgo We give some properties of solutions, independent of which 
subcase is being considered, but which can be of help when looking for 
solutions. 
First we show that solutions are irredundant. H is said to be 
irredundant iff 
1) If C is in H then Explainset(C) 
U Explainset(D). 
D(H 
2) If C is in H and D is in H0 then either C < D (Th) or 
n 
Th A Irr A VH A VinfTh C,DJ n1 (ei A :f is 
inconsistent. 
Intuitively, H is irredundant if it cannot be improved (in the 
ordering) by removing clauses or generalising clauses, without 
cpg 
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violating one of the first two conditions for it to be a solution. 
Theorem 3 Any solution is irredundant. 
Proof Suppose condition 1 for H to be irredundant fails. Then for 
some C in H, H' = H \ CJ < H0 (Th) iff H < H0 (Th). Then 
Complexity(H) > Complexity(H'). 
Suppose H fails condition 2. Let H' = (H \ C J) V f inf1 C,Djj 
where D is that member of H0 determined by the failure. Then 
Complexity(H') = Complexity(H) but Power(H') > Power(H). 
In both cases H' satisfies the first two conditions for being a 
solution iff H does. So H cannot be a solution. 
It would, evidently, be helpful if one could divide the solution 
of the formal problem into the solution of several "smaller problems, 




the set of generalisations of H0. Our next few lemmas are a step in 
this direction. 
Under some hypotheses, the search space, d Th(H0) can be divided 
into several positive and negative parts. 
Let f fi E. f I fi is positive and has predicate symbol Pi 
f P = fi c f fi is negative and has predicate symbol Pi 
H+ _ Ci E HO fi f+ 0 
H0 _ Ci e HO fi e f-P 
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Let Pj(j=1,m) be the predicate symbols appearing in f. 
We need two lemmas. 
Lemma 1 Let P be a predicate symbol not Loccurring in Th. Suppose 
E < C (Th) and it is not the case that {- V C and P only occurs 
positively (negatively) in C. Then P can only occur positively 
(negatively) in E. 
Proof Suppose P only occurs positively in G. 
Suppose P occurs negatively in E. For some D, E < D and 
IThD 
= C. P must occur negatively in D. 
Let a be a model of Th and V D. Define a to be that structure 
which is identical to a- except that it assigns 0 to P. Then is 
also a model of Th since P does not occur in Th, and of D since P occurs 
negatively in D. Therefore U, is a model of VC as D C 
implies that h VD VC. Let C = C1 U C2 where C2 is the set of 
/a 
literals in C whose predicate symbol is P. As CI assigns 0 to P and 
is a model of VC, a is a model of VC, . Therefore so 1 s a_ and so aZ 
is a model of VC. As a is an arbitrary model of Th, this contradicts 
the fact that bC is not a consequence of Th. 
When P only occurs negatively in C, the proof is similar. 
Lemma 2 Let P be a predicate symbol not occurring in Th. Suppose 
C1 U C2 is a ground clause where C1 contains no positive (negative) 
occurrences of P and every literal in C2 contains a positive (negative) 
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occurrence of P. Suppose, further that C1 (J C2 is not deduceable 
from The If E contains no positive (negative) occurrence of P and 
E < C1 U C2 (Th) then E < C1 (Th). 
Proof We prove only the positive part of the theorem. The negative 
part follows similarly. For some E', and CT , E' -- E C- and 
kTh E' -> (C1 V C2), E' contains no positive occurrence of P. If 
we show that bThE' -> C1, then it will follow at once that 
E < C1 (Th). Let Th' be the set of Skolemisations of members of Th. 
It is well-known that Th' is a conservative extension of Th. Suppose 
that E° -> C1 is not deducible from Th. Then neither is it deducible from 
Th'a Therefore there is a Herbrand model a_ , of Th' and a 
substitution c r' such that (E' -> C1) tT ' is ground and false in a o 
Therefore E' ('S is true in a and. C1 (S 4 = C1 is false. Since 
? -> (C1 U C2), I h9E' -> (C1 U C2)' Therefore 
tT_h'E1 
Y 
-> (C,1(T IVC2 a-') and so C2 0 '(= C2) must be true in a. 
Let fit, be obtained from a- by stipulating 
w/ 1 ) If L e C29 L is false in 
2) If L / C2, L has the same value in alas in a 
Since C2 is a set of positive literals with predicate symbol P and 
the only possible literals in E' a-' with predicate symbol P are 
, if 
negative, E' must also be true in w o If a literal, L, in C1 
changes truth value then L E C2 and so F C1 V C2 which contradicts 
the assumption that C1 U C2 is not deducible from Th. Hence no literal 
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in C1 changes truth value and so C1 is false in l.`. By definition, 
C2 is false in a. Therefore (E' -> C1 U C2) is false in a 
which contradicts the fact that ,E' -> (C1 U C2). Therefore 
E' -> C1 is deducible from Th, which completes the proof. 
We are now in a position to prove two theorems on division of the 
search space. 
Theorem k Suppose that no 
P. 
appears in Th, and that P1..o.Pm, appear 
only positively in the ei if at all (i=1,n) and Pm,+...o.Pm appear only 
negatively in the ei if at all (i=1,n). 
Then any solution, H C Yh(H,) is equal to H+ U H- where 
f 
H+ C Th(H+ J) U 1 
+1 Th(HO 
J) I (HO), say, and 0 (V j =1 
_ Th(H0) say. 
H T'i(HOPJ) U j_mv 1 Y (HOPJ_)' 0 
Proof We consider first the case where all the P. appear positively, 
that is, m = m and then I (H0) = V (H+ J) and similarly for pr Tr(fi). 
J 
It follows from theorem 1 that Cit is only necessary to show that if 
C ` Th(HO) 
\ 
( " Th(H-) U d Th(H0)), then VC A Th A Irr A 
Aei A f.) is inconsistent. 
Such a C is of the form infTh4D,El where there are predicate 
symbols P 
J 
. and Pi, such that D contains a positive occurrence of P 
J 
and 
perhaps negative ones of PJ and P., and E contains a negative occurrence 
of Pi, and perhaps negative ones of P, and P.,. It is possible that, 
j=j'. From lemma 1 and C < D (Th), C contains only negative occurrences 
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of Pj Further, D is of the form ei (J fi} for some i, where fi 
contains a positive occurrence of P. Hence by lemma 2 C < ei (Th) 
for some i and so C is indeed inconsistent with A(ei !\ f_i) A Th. 
The general case may be proved either by a similar detailed 
examination of another three cases or else by renaming the predicate 
symbols Pj(m" < j.< m) as -nQj(m° < j < m) so that the general case 
reduces to the above using the easily proven fact that, with the 
evident definitions, the solutions to the renaming of a formal problem, 
of the class considered, are the renam.ings of the solutions to the 
formal problem. This concludes the proof. 
Under the assumptions of theorem LF, we may consider the predicate 
symbols P. as divided into three classes viz. P1...... Pm , the symbols 
1 
whose occurrences in the ei are all positive and which do have at least 
one such occurrence and Pm +1°°°°Pm , the symbols whose occurrences in 
1 2 
the ei are all negative and which do have at least one such occurrence 
and the Pm 
+1°°°°'m' 
the symbols which have no occurrence in any e,, 
2 
then we see from the argument used in the proof of theorem L. that if D 
is in HO, has an occurrence of Pm,(m2 < m' < m) and m" / m4, and 
E E H+ M" V Hi m" then inf,ihC,DI is inconsistent with Th A A(ei A fi). 
Combining this observation with theorem L. we obtain: 
Corollary 3 If the P. are categorised as above, and no P. appears in 
im 
Th, then any solution H is equal to H+ U H V H+' U U I Pj, j=mtl j ---m2 *1 
where:. 
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H+ c t j' (H J) V 
m 
+1 Th(H -OP` ~) 
1 
H C' V1 c -P 
M2 
+P C +P H J ^ (HJ O ) (m2 c J m)j 
0 Th(HO ` i 
H 
P J C 
Ym (HOPJ) (m2 < j < m) 
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2t- apter 5 Applications and extensions 
1. Some philosophical remarks 
There is a connection between problems of justification and 
discovery. Any hypothesis discovery scheme is, as previously remarked, 
only a part of a total system. It is necessary that hypotheses suggested 
by the scheme be justified (or criticized or whatever). In fact we will 
show that, under suitable conditions, best explanations, as described 
above, with almost arbitrary -3 , are acceptable in the sense of Hinttkka 
and Hilpinen (1966), whose work is in the spirit of Carnap. They wish to 
give an analysis of the concept of probable knowledge. Knowledge of h 
in the light of evidence e, is defined by: 
K(h,e) r Ac(h,e) A h. 
Ac(h,e) is to mean that e gives h enough support to make it acceptable. 
The naive analysis of Ac(h,e) is in terms of high probability: 
Ac(h,e) E P(h,e) > 1 _ e where e > 0.5. 
Unfortunately, the naive definition leads to an inconsistency with 
some generally accepted closure principles. In particular, Hempel (1962) 
has formulated these conditions: 
CA1: If Ac(h1,e) and .... and Ac(hn,e) and if L- (h1 A ... /Ahn) 
then Ac(h,e). 
CA2: The set h I Ac(h,e)J is logically consistent. 
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Condition CAI fails because the multiplication theorem for 
probabilities makes it possible that P(h1,e) > 1 - P and 
P(h 2,e) > I L but P(h1 A h2,e) < 1 m E . 
Condition CA2 fails since one can, for example, find hypotheses 
hi(i=1,n) such that P(hi,e) > 
However h1,....,hn, Y "' his 
1 (i=1 n) and P(' -i hie) > 1 - E 
is inconsistent. These difficulties come 
under the general heading of the lottery paradox of Kvburg (I96 ). 
Hintikka and Hilpinen solve these problems in the context of a 
simple language with exactly k monadic predicate symbols R, some fixed 
number of constant symbols but no other function symbols. The authors 
seem to make a background assumption that different constants denote 
different individuals in the universe. The lack of detail in the 
article makes this unclear. There is also the assumption that every 
universe contains infinitely many individuals. This is however a 
matter of convenience, and can, it appears, be dropped in a more 
detailed account. 
In the context of an infinite universe, it seems that the assumption 
that different constants denote different individuals can be dropped. 
For if a and b are different constants then it seems that, on a prior'i 
grounds, probability(a=b) = 0. 
Using the predicate symbols Pi(i=1 ,k) one can define K 
different kinds of individuals using complex predicates Cti(i I,k) 
which have definitions of the form: 
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k 
Ct .(x) A (±) P (x). 
J i=1 i 
By saying of each Ctj whether or not it is instantiated, different 
world descriptions Cl(1=1,2k) can be given. To give a more exact 
definition we introduce the symbols +, -, O1 and the metalinguisti.c 
variables of and /3 , possibly with suffixes, to range over them. The 
symbols have an ordering C = (< cA , +, >, < 4 , - >J. Pseudo- 
formulae are defined by the conditions that if h is a formula then vk h 
is a pseudo-formula, if h1 and h2 are pseudo-formulae so are -1 h1 h1 4 h2 
and h1 V h2. (The implication sign is regarded as an abbreviation.) 
Pseudo-formulae are abbreviations for certain formulae. It is 
sufficient, for our purpose, to give examples of the use of the symmboisa 
rather than give a detailed definition: 
+P1 (x) A'i +P2(x)/`cP3(x) abbreviates P1 (x) A-' P2(x). 
-1 -P1 (x) V'' J P2(x) denotes P1 (x). 
Roughly - denotes 1 , + should be ignored and eAmeans that the 
immediately following pseudo-formula should be removed. (Think of them 
as being analogous to +1, -1 and 0.) Nasty cases like 
ub IxP1 (x) V CAP2(x) are handled by the rule that the empty conjunction 
abbreviates an arbitrary tautology and the empty disjunction abbreviates 
the negation of an arbitrary tautology. Thus c/ JxP1(x)VdZ P2(x) 
abbreviates -1 (PxP1 (x) V Ax 1 P1 (x)), say. In these terms the 
Ct. have definitions of the form: 
J 
k 
C t (x) ^ O( iPi (x ) (°t i Jb ) 
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They are called attributive constituents. 
Constituents, C 
1 
have definitions of the form: 
K L K 
Cl [^ °<i xCti(x)] A [ Vx v iCti(x)1 (0( -) 
Each constituent is a description of a possible world, in so far 
as this is possible in the monadic calculus. 
Only a certain type of evidence, e, is considered. It is assumed 
that there are n distinct constant symbols ai, such that 
n k 
e = i^ i 1 ii'pi(ai,) (where o< ii, ' ) 
Using a probability function P due to Hintikka, the authors find 
by an effective means a constant n0 = n0 ( k) such that Ac may be 
defined by: 
Ac (h, e) V P (he) e > 1 - P and n > n0, where h is a general 
sentence. This definition satisfies conditions CA1 and CA2 applied to 
general sentences only. That is: 
1) If Ac(h1,e) and ... and Ac(hn,e) and if h1,...,hn and h are 
general sentences and - (h1 A ... A hn) -> h then Ac(h,e). 
2) The set h I Ac(h,e) and h is generals is consistent. 
The function P has an important difference from the probability 
function of Carnap. It assigns non-zero values to generalisations. 
It is in fact one of a whole family of probability functions, 
Hintikka's of -continuum (Hintikka(1965a)), for which the same results 
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can be established. 
n 
In particular, if we write e in the form i ̂  Ctn (aif) and 
le 
n 
consider the unique constituent, C = [ n 
) i, 1( t ( )] a x xC =1 /% e 
QCtni x (x)], then one may show that if n > n0 then Ac(C1(e),e) 
and further that, if n > n0, Ac(h,e) if and only if LC l(e) _> h. 
It is necessary to extend this analysis to other sentences than 
general ones. 
Every general sentence h can be expressed as 
2K 
1V °Z C where o(1 -, 
as is well-known (Hintikka, 1953). 
One can show that every sentence, h, can be expressed as 
2K 
h 11 o(1(C1 A hl) where no a l = -, each hl is singular that is, 
contains no variable whether bound or not. (Singular just means ground.; 
2K 2K 
Suppose that h V of 
(C 
A hl) and h' = O( 1(Gl /\ h) 
where no ot, 1 or 0i is -. Then 
I 
h -> h' if and only if whenever 
01 1 / A , Ot i / U v and ,--C1 A hl h1 . 
Define a partial function of two variables, max, on +, by: 
If oZ, o(' then max (oZ , p( 1) = O( and if OC ' a of , max ( OZ o(' . 
Otherwise max(C , D( ') is undefined. 
Define min similarly, with 2 replaced by 9 . 
39- 
Then h A h' = 
v 
min( O( l) (Cl /t hl A h') 
h /I h' _Vmax(p( 1'o( l) (C1 A (h1 Vhf), 
The right hand sides of these equations are defined. 
h is defined to be an e-sentence iff it is equivalent to a sentence 
of the form V & 
1(C1 





/\ hl) is a representation of h. From the above we see that 
if h and h' are e-sentences, so are h A h' and h V h'. 
Any general sentence h = VCC1 (no 0(1 = -) is an e-sentence, 
since h ` VO(1(C1 A (e V-,e)). If e' is singular and I-e -> e' 
then e' is an e-sentence since e' = V(C1 A e'). 
We are now in a position to define acceptability of e-sentences on 
the grounds of evidence e: 
Let h of 1(C1 A e1) be a representation of h as an e-sentence. 
Then: 
Ac(h,e) = Ac(Vo. 1C1 
The definition is independent of the representation, since if 
vo 
l(C1 A el) is another representation then, as 1V OL 1(C1 e1) ' c' 1(C1 A el), Ot 1 l for all 1. Further the new definition 
of Ac extends the old one. 
If I--e -> e' for some singular e', then Ac(e 
11'' 
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Ac(i(C1 e'),e) ; Ac (VC 1,e) = n > no. If this result is counter- 
intuitive, it is because Ac(YG1,e) = n > n0 is counterintuitive. 
This seems to us to be a slight, but easily corrected, fault of the 
definition of Hintikka and Hilpinen. 
There is an equivalent definition in terms of high probability 
and large enough evidence. Suppose h is an e-sentence with 
representation v 
(C1 
A e1). We have: 
P(h,e) = P(VO ,(Cl A el),e) 
_ P(C1 A el,e) (as n(C1 A C11) if 1 1'). 
_ P(C1,e) (as - a -> el). 
P(\/ 1Clse) (as 1-"i(C1 A Cp) if 1 / 11). 
Therefore Ac(h,e) Ac( V°1 1C1,e) 
P( Vo11C1,e) > 1 - c and n > no. 
P( Vo'1(C1 /\ e1),e) > 1 - £ and n ? n0, 
(by the above). 
P(h,e) > I - and n > n0. 
°1(e) _; +- and n > n0 (by previous remarks). 
Hempel's conditions may now be demonstrated for e-sentences. 
/ Suppose that h1 and h2 are e-sentences with representations 
V- (C1 A hl) and V6t1'(C1 A hi). Then h1 A h2 has a representation 
Vmin(cC 
11 
p( 1)(C1 /A (hl /1 h1)). So if Ac(h1,e) and Ac(h2,e) then 
0(1(e) = d 1(e) = min( o4\ 1(e), C( 1(e)) _ + and n > no. Therefore 
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Ac(h1 A h2,,e).,. Suppose that F- h1 -> h2. Then P(h2,e) > P(h1,e). 
Therefore if Ac(h,,e), Ac(h2,e). This verifies condition CAI. 
If Ac(h,e) then 
1() 
= +, in any representation of h, and 
therefore C /\ e -> h. As C e is consistent so too therefore is 
h I Ac(h,e)}. This verifies condition CA2. 
We are now in a position to link up these results with our 
hypothesis discovery methods. There is one small point. We will 
temporarily use e° rather than e to stand for the phenomena and keep 
e for the uses described above. 
Only certain special e° and f are considered. 
e9 _ px ki'Pk(ai9) it = 1,n} where the aare all different 
constant terms and no Otkiy is 
X Ev( O< ki'Pk (aio a )) =1 ii D( ,Pi (ai, Q) where no dii, is Then 
e and Cl(,) are defined as 
n 
Note that -- e (ea 
above, and the above results are available. 
/\ fit). This e' and f satisfy the conditions 
for providing a discovery problem. 
The next theorem shows that if a certain mild restriction on -3 
holds, then any solution is acceptable. This condition is that if H is 
a solution and C is in H, then for some C0 in HO, C < CO. Thus H must 
not contain any completely unnecessary clause. 
Theorem I Suppose that H < HO9 VH A e is consistent, n > n0 and 
that if C is in H there is a C 0 in H 0 such that C < CO. Then Ac( VH,e). 
m1L2 ® 
t 
Proof Let D be in H. We may write D = U1 Ds U D0 where 
1) If D0 , 0, DO is ground. 
2) U D has no occurrences of constants. 
s s 
3) Ift> s> 0, D/0'. 
4) If s / s', there is no variable common to Ds and Ds, 
5) Each Ds has exactly one variable symbol, xs, say (s > 0). 
t 
Consequently,-V D = (v VxsDs) A D0. As V D is consistent 
with e, so is some VD s (t > s > 0), 
Suppose D0 is consistent with e. Then D0 / 0 and as D subsumes 
some member, Ci,, say, of H0, DO C C. . From the consistency of D0 
with e, it follows that of ki9Pk(a,,) E D0 and so _e -> D0. Therefore 
as n > n0, Ac(D0,e). As V D.-is also-an e-sentence and +-D0 -> VD, Ac( VD,e). 
Suppose that A xsDs is consistent with e(s > 0), As D < Ci,, 
D 
s 
< C i ` -i Ev(o( kiyP k (a, Q)) VO(kiQP k (ai. Q ). For consistency to hold, 
Ot ki,Pk(xs) must be in Ds. Consider some arbitrary phenomenon, 




1 s s 
Suppose, on the other hand that OZ kz' /_ X ki"^ Then, by the 




with e, D 
s I _z Ev( oC k7P k (ai)). Therefore 
ii"Pi(x) is in Ds for some zo So: 
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k A a .. P (x ) -> D. i s s 
Consequently, no matter what i" is, 
k A ii""Pi (xs) -> Ds. 
Therefore, " Vx i\ 1 i=1 P. (x) V xsDs 
So by the definition of Cl(e), - Cl(e) -> VxsDs. 
see that Ac( V xs,Ds,e) and so Ac( VD,e). 
We then 
As D was any member of H, it follows that Ac( VH,e) which 
concludes the proof. 
Corollary 2 Suppose that H satisfies the following conditions, where 
4 is a lexicographic extension of -ic 
1) H<H0 
2) V H A e is consistent. 
3) H is minimal wrt. -"3 amongst those sets of clauses satisfying 
conditions one and two. 
If n > n0 then Ac( VH,e). 
Proof It is immediate that H satisfies all the conditions of theorem 1, 
except perhaps, that if C is in H there is a C0 in H0 such that C < Co. 
Suppose, to the contrary, that C is in H and C I C0 for every C0 in H. 
Then H' = H V JCI satisfies conditions one and two of the hypothesis, 
but H' -- H and H-4H1, which contradicts condition three. Therefore 
-1'1+1-_ 
all conditions are satisfied and the conclusion follows at once. 
It follows from the work of Hintikka and Hilpinen that no is 
calculable from the number of predicate symbols, k and also £ . 
Therefore for sets of clauses satisfying the conditions of theorem 1, 
there is a method of deciding acceptability. We have therefore, 
for a restricted class of cases, answers to questions H1 (on when a 
hypothesis is justified) and H2 (on how to tell if a hypothesis is 
justified) of chapter 1 which satisfy the strong coherence condition 
that generated hypotheses be acceptable. This answer to H2 is 
evidently complete and consistent. 
There are a number of insufficiencies in our analysis. First 
the notion of acceptance is based on just one of Hintikka's inductive 
systems. One would really want to have results not only for the 
o(-continuum but also the whole two-dimensional of - 2 -continuum 
(Hintikka, 1966). Negative results would hold for that part 
corresponding to Carnap's ),-continuum (Carnap 1952), since no 
generalisation, containing variables, is acceptable there. 
It is also natural to try to dispense with the assumption that 
all the individuals are completely observed, that is that every 
01ii' /_ A. 
Both of these insufficiencies could probably be remedied with 
the aid of Hilpinen's (1968) monograph. Only then could we have a 
firm conclusion in the case of monadic logic. It would still remain 
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to extend the results to richer languages and this in turn requires a 
generalisation of the definitions of acceptance not yet attempted. 
Perhaps, however, some use could be made of the work on axioms for 
rules of acceptance (Kemeny 1953, Putnam 1963) but this is a mere 
speculation. 
Important, here, would be acceptance relative to other than 
singular propositions. One would wish to know whether or not 
Ac( V H,Th A e) for example. If Th contained axioms for equality, 
e could contain distinctness information, of the form ai / a1 (when 
1 / i', of course). This would remove a difficulty, alluded to 
above, in the presentation of Hintikka and Hilpinen. 
We turn next to arguments designed to show that although it is 
necessary that explanation is justified, one cannot, without some 
difficulty, formulate conditions sufficient for the rational choice of 
an explanation in terms of justification. These arguments are 
elaborations of those advanced in chapter 2 to provide an opening for 
the use of simplicity. 
A reasonable-seeming Carnapian move would be to set H1 -i' H2 
iff H1 has a greater probability (in some sense) than H2, given the 
knowledge Th /\ Irr and all the phenomena f and their circumstances e. 
However in this case H0 will have a probability of one, and so is a 
best solution. If the notion of probability being used is reasonable 
then a hypothesis H will have unit probability relative to all knowledge 
etc. if and only if it follows from Th and Irr and e and f. Therefore 
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all the solutions will follow from what is given. Thus nothing new could 
ever be hypothesized which is absurd. 
A more sympathetic formulation would require not only that an 
explanation generalise H0 and be consistent with Th and Irr and 
(ei /\ f.), but also that it be general as opposed to ground. In 
view of previously discussed difficulties with the notion of a general 
law and since in this case, we do not wish to allow ground clauses as a 
degenerate case, let us specify that Th and Irr are empty, that no 
function symbols, other than constants, occur in e or f and that H is 
n 
general if it contains no constants. Let e° (e, n f.). 
It seems reasonable to assume that if H1 is general and H1 < H2 
but H2 H1, then probability (H1,e°) < probability(H2,eq). 
In these circumstances the solutions are also maximal with respect 
to <. 
Let H1 be obtained from H0 by replacing distinct constants by 
distinct variables. We may see that if H < HO and H is general, then 
H < H1. As solutions are maximal with respect to < every solution 
must in fact be equivalent to H1. There are therefore two possibilities: 
either H1A A 
(ei 
A f.) is inconsistent and there is no solution or 
else H1 is a solution and any other one is equivalent to it. This seems 
counter-intuitive. For example, suppose that f = Q(ai) I i=1,2nj, 
Ev (Q (a2i) ) P1 (a2i) A p2 (a2i (i=11 n) and Ev (Q (a2i-1) ) P1 (a2i -1 ) /\ 
P3 (a2i-1) (i=1,n). 
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Here, H1 f 4 PI (x) , P2(x) ,, Q(x)),fP1(x) P3(x) , Q(x) ijo- 
For large enough n, one would expect a guess to be made that both 
P2 and P3 are irrelevant to the truth of Q. 
A reasonable Popperian move would be to set H1 -V H2 iff H1 is 
more falsifiable than H2 given Th A Irr and f and eo In this case it 
is quite clear that there can never be a solution. If H2 is proposed 
as a solution, we need merely find an H1 such that V (H1 U H2) is 
consistent with Th A Irr /1i (ei /1 fi), and 
H1 
1 H2) is more 
falsifiable than ''H1. This can always be done, as H1 can contain 
arbitrary assertions as long as it has no vocabulary in common with any 
of H2, Th, Irr or 
/ 
/ l(ei A fi)0 We need a more sympathetic inter- 
pretationo 
H1 is an irredundant generalisation of H2 relative to Th iff 
H1 < H2 (Th) and if H3 S H1 and H3 <.H 
2 
(Th) then H3 - H1 0 (This use 
of the word "irredundant" is distinct from that in chapter 4o) It is 
now required as an extra condition for a solution that H be an 
irredundant generalisation of H 
0 
o This will prevent the above 
absurdities. It seems reasonable to assume that if H1 < H2 (Th) but 
H1 does not follow logically from H2," (ei /1 fTh and Irr then H1 
is more falsifiable than H2 relative to e and f, Any solution will then 
be maximally general relative to Th. In other words, the most 
falsifiable hypotheses satisfy these three conditions (with 4 equal to 
generalisation relative to Th): 
1) H is an irredundant generalisation of H0, relative to The 
n 
2) VH /l Th A n (e /A f,) is consistent. 
i.:.1 i i 
3) H is minimal, with respect to 4, amongst those sets of 
clauses satisfying conditions one and two. 
Unfortunately, we do not know if there are any solutions, even in 
the case where Th and Irr are empty and there are no function symbols, 
other than constants, in e and f. On the other hand if we take-4 to 
be the lexicographic product of the simplicity ordering, -4 
s u 
(the 
number of symbol occurrences) and generalisation relative to Th then 
there is always a finite number of solutions, to within equivalence 
relative to Th. This can be seen using a technique similar to that in 
chapter 6,,section 5. 
It seems worthwhile spending some effort on the problem where -- is 
relative generalisation. If reasonable hypotheses could be produced with 
this niceness ordering, one would have a good argument against the 
necessity of an explicit syntactical simplicity ordering (Goodman,1961). 
Alternatively, one might be able to produce arguments correlating 
simplicity with falsifiability in accordance with the views of Popper. 
Finally, we give an example of a loose connection between 
confirmation theory and hypothesis discovery methods. Sometimes 
arguments are produced that certain evidence confirms certain hypotheses, 
against one's intuitions. These are paradoxes of confirmation. Two 
famous ones are Goodman's (1965) and Hempel's (191.5). It may be 
t+9. 
possible to show that the same hypotheses could be discovered from the 
same evidence and that this too is paradoxical. Such is the case with 
Goodman°s paradox, of which a brief version can easily be stated. 
Suppose many emeralds have been examined and all of them are found to be 
green. This would seem to strongly confirm the hypothesis that all 
emeralds are green. All the emeralds must have been examined before 
some time, say the year 2000. Call a thing grue if and only if it has 
been examined before the year 2000, and found to be green, or if it has 
not been examined before then and is blue. Evidently all the emeralds 
examined are also gru.e. So just as strong confirmation is provided for 
the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue. These two hypotheses are 
contradictory. Although the grue hypothesis seems absurd, the absurdity 
has proved highly resistant to attempts at dissolution. Perhaps the 
best proposal was given by Goodman himself when he proposed the paradox. 
Let us take f = Green(emi) I i=11,n} and 
Ev(Green(emi)) = Emerald(emi) A Examinedby(emi,2000), 
Certainly, -1 Emerald(x), Green(x)H H < H0. 
Now suppose Th contains the definition: 
Grue(x) (Examinedby(x,2000) -> Green(x)) 
A (-i Examinedby(x,2000) -> Blue(x)). 
Then, J--n Emerald(x), Grue(x)HH < H0 (Th). 
Simple syntactical definitions of simplicity will not distinguish 
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the two hypotheses. One might hope to distinguish the Grue hypothesis 
as more complex, if complexity is measured after Grue is replaced by its 
definition. This will not do if Th is regarded as an unstructured set 
of sentences. Let Grue =,6 (Green,Blue) be the form of the definition 
of Grue, Suppose Th contains in addition the statement, 
Bleen = A (Blue,Green). Then both Green = ,6(Grue,Bleen) and 
Blue E A (Bleen,Grue) are logical consequences of Th and so there is 
complete symmetry between Grue and Green. 
It seems therefore that Th must be given some structure and Grue be 
regarded as given by a definition. Even then, the proposal to count 
simplicity after the replacement of Grue by its definition seems to be an 
unwarranted bias in favour of particular predicates as, say, observational 
rather than-theoretical We are being lead, quite quickly, into wider issues. 
Note for example that focussing only on the stage of hypothesis formation 
causes distortion. There must also be a stage of forming definitions 
and theory of how definitions interact with discovery and justification. 
Goodman's proposed solution consisted of proposals involving these 
stages. All in all, the discussion of the paradox of discovery is much the 
same as that of confirmation. To put it briefly, the 
confirmation paradox concerns which predicates should be projected; the 
discovery paradox concerns how to select predicates for projection. 
There is one practical point. The "wrong" predicates should some- 
how be avoided at either the stage of definition or else that of discovery. 
For if any definition is allowed and any of the simplest explanatory 
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hypotheses, there will generally be infinitely many hypotheses still to 
be eliminated at the stage of justification. For example-. consider the 
definition 
Gruet(x,t),_ (Examinedby(x,t) .-> Green(x)),A 
(`'' Examinedby(x,t) -> Blue(x)). 
Now none of the infinitely many hypotheses Emerald(x) - Gruet(x, 
where t0 is a constant greater than 2000 - will be eliminated. 
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2. Two extensions to 
2.1 Sorted languages 
a mor'domplex kind of theor 
The first extension concerns languages with several disjoint sorts. 
It is a matter of folklore that the usual unification procedure 
automatically takes account of the sort restriction. Similarly the 
procedure for generalising two literals works when dealing with sorts, 
provided only that when matching distinct terms, the new variable 
substituted should be of the same sort as the old ones. With this one 
difference, all of the theory goes through without any trouble. Instead 
of putting the sort restrictions in the language we could let Th include 
the usual sort axioms using unary predicate symbols. One could then 
show that this leads to essentially the same results as the somewhat 
neater linguistic procedure. 
2.2 Algorithms for a simple kind of theory: ground clauses 
The second extension concerns algorithms for finding l.g.g's when Th 
is an arbitrary consistent, finite non-empty set of ground literals. We 
will give the essential theorems and algorithms for literals and clauses. 
The first theorem gives the result for literals. 
We define a function infTh by: 
If -Th VM then infThM,NJ = N. Otherwise, if `'Th V N 
then infThM,NJ = M. Otherwise, if M and N have the same predicate 
letter and sign then, infThM,NJ = infM,NJ. Otherwise, infThM,NJ L,, 
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(L1 is some fixed member of Th)0 
Theorem I I L < M (Th) iff -Th 'VLor h VMorforsome 
substitution Cr. L C r- Me 
2 L ""M (Th) iff either Th V M i1 VL or else 
FTh " V ! VL or else L I-v M. 
3 Every pair of literals M and N has a least generalisation 
relative to Th, infTh M, N J. 
Proof I L < M (Th) iff for some ThL 5 -> M 
iff ---ThL 0- -> M 8 (where S = a1 ()/xl , o o o 9 a,,()/xr s 
the x. are the free variables of L -> M and none of the a. occur in Th 
orLO-->M) 
if f 0 e. I ( Li I Lie Th i U L C' S 
There are now three possibilities, as Th is consistent. First,1-1 
for some i, 0 e 6. ( L. , LC-&i). This is equivalent to - Th VL. 
Second, for some i, 0 e Q(Li, M O D. This is equivalent to 
Th V M. 
Lastly, 0 e 1. ( L 6` O, M ) e This is true iff L 6S = M S 
which is equivalent to L Cr- = M. This concludes the proof of the first 
part. 
2 Suppose L " M (Th)a Then as L < M (Th) either F- 
Th 
`4T/ L or 
(-Th V M or, for some a- , L --- = M. 
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Suppose that , °7 VL. As M L (Th) either I-Th-i'VM or 
f-Th V L, for some /A , M = L. The second case is impossible and 
if M/M, = L then, as Th? L, r i"Thn VM. Hence in this case 
--T -1 V L /1, VM. 
Suppose that +Th -VM. As M < L (Th) the possibilities are that 
F'Th "' L or M IA- = L for some tA. Now M//" = L and t-Th P M implies 
J-Th V L. Hence in this case MTh 'VL j VM. 
Suppose that LET' = M. As M < L (Th) either Th ' V M or 
- L or for some t, MA1 = L. In the first case it follows that 
I Th 
'' VL, the second that { Th V M and in the third that L I M. 
Hence in this case hTh V L V V M or ` Th -7 V LA" VM or L'v M. 
This concludes the proof of the second part. 
3 If tTh V M then N < M (Th) and so N = infThM,NJ is a l.g.g. 
of M and N relative to Th. If 
fTh V N, the proof is similar. 
Suppose that M and N have the same predicate letter and sign and 
neither -Th V M nor l""Th VN then infM,Nj is defined and as 
infM,Nj < M,, infM,N} < M (Th). Similarly, infM,N} < N (Th). 
' p L or else Suppose that L < M (Th) and L < N (Th). Either [- h 
there are C, //44 such that L Cr = M and L/t4 = N. In the first case 
L < infM,Nj (Th). In the second, L < infM,N} and so L < infM,N} (Th). 
Thus infThM,N} is a 1.g.g. of M and N relative to Th in this case. 
Suppose that M and N differ in predicate letter or sign and that 
neither 
-Th V M nor "T'h V N. Then if L < M (Th) and L < N (Th), 
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the only possibility is that -- 10j. Then L < L1 (Th). Since 
L1 e Th, t-, h'z V L1 and s o L1 < M (Th) and L1 < N (Th). Therefore 
infThM,N is a l.g.g. of M and N relative to Th in this, the last case. 
This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Let Th be the clause L I L e Thj. It follows from the character- 
isation of relative generalisation given by theorem 3.1.3.1 that 
C < D (Th), iff D is a tautology, C C-E D U Th for some (57 or Th (1 D 
Let L1 be some member of Th. Reduction will be defined relative to 
this choice. A clause C is reduced relative to Th iff C = {L1} or C 
is not a tautology, C n Th = J and for any C' c C, C < C' (Th) implies 
C=C'. 
A clause, E is a reduction of a clause C, relative to Th, iff when 
C /) Th / 0 or C is a tautology, E = L1 and, otherwise E is a reduced 
subset of C equivalent to C. 
We define a function infTh_C,D . If D is a tautology or if 
D f1 Th / 0 then infThC,D = C. Otherwise, if C is a tautology or if 
C f% Th / 0 then inf{C,D = D. Otherwise, inf'ThC,D = infC U Th,D V Th. 
There should be no confusion between the function defined here and 
the function infTh defined above on sets of literals with two elements. 
Notice that infTh{ L,M . J infTh L , { M} } (Th). 
Theorem 2 1 The following algorithm stops. It gives a clause E 
I 
which is a reduction of C, relative to Th! 
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1) Set E2 to C. 
2) If E2 is a tautology or E2 /1 Th f6 then set E1 to L1 and stop. 
3) Set E1 to 0. 
!) If E2 is empty, stop. 
5) Choose a literal, L, in E2. 
6) If there is a substitution, Cr , such that 
E2 CT C 
(EI 
U E2 U Th) \ (Lj and M O = M for every literal M in E 
then change E2 to E2fs \ (E1 U Th). Otherwise remove L from E2 and 
add it to E1. 
1) Go t o 1}. 
2 If C A/ D (Th) and C and D are reduced, then they are alphabetic 
variants. 
3 Every pair of clauses C and D has a l.g.g. relative to Th, 
infTh{C,Dj. 
Proof 1 If C is a tautology or C () Th / 0 then the algorithm outputs 
L1i which is reduced and equivalent, relative to Th, to C. Otherwise, 
the proof that the algorithm works is a slight elaboration of the proof 
of theorem 3.3.1.1. 
2 Suppose that C and D are reduced and equivalent, relative to Th. 
If C = {LI then as C < D (Th) either C a- S D U Th for some t3', D is a 
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tautology or D rl Th , 0. In the first case, L1 = L1 6- E D U Th. 
As L1 E Th and Th is consistent, L1 E D. The other two cases are 
inconsistent with D's being reduced. Therefore the only possibility 
consistent with D's being reduced is that D - L1 J. Similarly, if 
D = L J, C = L11. Therefore when either one of C and D is L1 so 
is the other which proves part 2 in these cases. 
Suppose, then, that there are C-, Gt such that C 6 c D V Th. and 
Du S C U Th, neither C nor D are tautologies and C r1 Th and 
D /I Th = 0. Then C u S T U 
D 
C Th V C. Let C1 = L E C 
L (r/A& E Thj and C2 = C C1 . Since C is reduced, C1 O and C2 = C. 
Therefore as L E C L Cr E Thj S C1 , C 0 £ D. Similarly D,u e C. 
Under the conditions that neither C nor D are tautologies and 
C A Th = D I\ Th = 0. C is reduced relative to Th implies C is 
reduced and similarly for D. Therefore, by theorem 3.3-1.1, C and D 
are alphabetic variants. 
3 If D is a tautology or if D 11 Th / 0 then C < D (Th) and so C 
is a l.g.g. of C and D relative to Th. 
When C is a tautology or if C f Th / 0, the proof is similar. 
Ln the last case, infC U Th, D V Thj is certainly a lower bound 
of C and D, relative to Th. Suppose that E < C (Th) and E < D (Th). 
If E < C V Th and E < D U T h- E < infC L Th, D V Thj. As 
this is the only possible case, the proof is finished. 
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It would indeed be desirable to extend these results to a Th with 
general literals,. However great difficulties arise. There is no 
trouble as regards l.gag's of literals,. Theorem I is true as it stands 
and the proof hardly needs any alteration. One can obtain analogues to 
the first two parts of theorem 2. The trouble comes with part 3. No 
l.g.g. relative to Th can exist. Here is a counterexample, 
Let Th = V x_%' P(g(x),x'), V xx' P(f(x),xi)}, There is no 
l,g.g. of Q_(f(a())) and Q(g(a())) relative to Th. 
Let g1,..,,gi,,... be an infinite sequence of distinct unary 
function symbols each of which is also distinct from f and g. 
Let Cn = NM 11 U P(x,gi(x)) 
Now Cn < JQ(f(a())] (Th). Figure I gives a G.-derivation of 
Q(f(x) )3 . (See chapter 3, section 1.3). 
EQ(x), P(x,g1(x))L , P(x,gn(x))3 P(f(x),x') 
iQ(f(x)), P(f(x),g1(f(x))), P(f(x),gn-1(f(x)))i 




Similarly, Cn < Q(g(a())j(Th). Suppose that D is a l.g.g, of 
IQ(f(a()))3and Q(g(aD must contain a variant of[Q(x) and can 
contain no literal of the form Q(t) where t has an occurrence of a 
function symbol. Since Cn < D (Th) there must be a Cn-derivation of 
a clause subsuming D from C n . 
This clause must contain a literal 
with predicate symbol Q. This literal may not, therefore, contain 
any function symbol. So the occurrence of x in Cn may only be replaced 
by an occurrence of some other variable. Therefore noiP(x,g1(x))) may 
be resolved with a literal from Th. 
Therefore D contains an occurrence of every g z ' 
in C 
n 
. As this 
argument is independent of n, we have arrived at a contradiction. 
ThereforeiQ(f(a())]andfQ(g(a())3can have no l.g.g. relative to Th. 
We might hope that there is, say, an infinite set of non-equivalent, 
relative to Th, generalisations, relative to Th, of C and D with the 
property that if E is a generalisation, relative to Th, of C and D then 
it is a generalisation, relative to Th, of some member of the set. This 
would still allow some kind of computational procedure. However, one 
can show that if E < C (Th) and E < D (Th) there is an E', also a 
generalisation of C and D, relative to Th, such that E < E' (Th), but 
E' I E (Th). Thus there are not even any minimally general general- 
isations of C and D relative to Th. The technique is to choose a 0n 
such that gn does not occur in E. and to let E' = E ) U Cn where 
standardisesE apart from Co nIt is easy to show that E' < C (Th) 
and E' < D (Th). Evidently E < E'., If E' < E (Th), one finds by 
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arguments., similar to those showing that C and D can have no l.g.g. 
relative to Th, that gn must occur in E which is a contradiction. 
One can obtain similar counterexamples by replacing gi(x) by 
h(.... h(x)) where there are i occurrences of h, which avoids the use 
of infinitely many function symbols. 
In general, therefore, there is no solution when Th contains 
general literals and 4 is 4 cpg, since relative least general general- 
isations do not always exist. It is in fact not difficult to produce an 
example, using the above techniques, where, although there is a consistent 
explanation,there is no best one. 
One can do spectacularly better however, when -4 is "a S,. 
(H1 -i s, H2 
iff H1 has no more symbol occurrences than H2). 
Suppose, for the moment, that there are only finitely many function 
and predicate symbols. 
Let x1 , .... be an infinite list of variables. One can find a 
list H1,H2,.... of sets of clauses such that: 
1) If Hi has m variables, they are x1...... xm. 
2) Given any H there is an H. which is an alphabetic variant of H. 
3) If i < j then Hi '' 
s l 
H J . 
Let Th and Irr be arbitrary, take4 to be -s, and choose some 
e and f. Then the first H. in the list, which consistently explains 
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f given e and Th, is a solution to the resulting generalisation problem. 
There always is one, since H0 is a consistent explanation of f given e 
and Th. Let this first explanation be ii As there are finitely many 
sets of clauses in the list with a given number of symbols, there is a 
finite set H. I H. -i 
s, 
Hi and H. is a consistent explanation of f 
1 
given e and Thi. 
Every solution is a variant of some member of this set, and every 
member of the set is a solution. Whether or not the set is effectively 
obtainable depends, as usual, on the decidability of consistency. 
It is possible in principle, therefore, to accept the non-existence 
of least generalisations, if one alters 4 One would wish however to 
use a -9 for which the solutions are easily obtainable. Certainly }'a 
s' 
is of no use if the algorithm which searches an infinite list has to be 
employed. 
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3. A general algorithm using a limited consistency check 
In chapter 4. the unsolvability results were caused by the 
difficulty in checking for consistency. Meltzer (1970) has suggested 
that the requirements of consistency be replaced by the requirement that 
a determined effort has been made, but failed, to prove that 
n 
VH A Th ,4 Irr /A ^(e. A fi)is inconsistent. 
We could still add on at the end a (perhaps computationally very 
expensive) test for consistency. If H passed this test we would have a 
solution. If it did not, we could recycle, mating a more determined 
effort to check consistency. This combination might be quite practical. 
For our problem we decided, following Meltzer to formalize the 
'determined' test as VH A Th /11.\ (e. A f. ) A Irr is 1-consistent, 
where 1-consistent means that a binary resolution theorem prover has not 
found a contradiction at level 1. The theory goes through much as 
before, and theorem x.01 holds when the evidence changes have been made. 
This theory does not parallel the procedure of Meltzer exactly. 
There are great differences in the way generalisations are found. He 
abstracts individual members of H0 rather than combining them to form 
least generalisations. This is partly motivated by his Popperian nice- 
ness relation which prefers more to less general sentences. 
We hand-simulated the method, with 1 set equal to ten, for the 
problem that Meltzer tried. The facts are represented using a binary 
predicate symbol E, for equality, and a binary function symbol f for 
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multiplication. Thus ab = cd is represented by two facts, 
f1 = E(f(a,b),f(c,d)) and f2 = E(f(c,d),f(a,b)) (similarly for ab , cd), 
The corresponding ei are empty. Th was empty, but one took Irr to be 
the axioms for equality. It can be shown that E(t1,t2) is in the 
solution H iff E(t2,t1) is (similarly for E(t1,t2)) so we present the input 
and output in the ordinary notation. 
The facts given were: 
ee=e, 
ae=a, 
(aa)e = a(ae), 
(ea)a = e, 
ea / e, 
as a. 
be = cb, 
(bb )b = e 
(bb ) c ,- c, 
(bc)cb. 
The solution was: 
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k.(ea)a = e/ 
5, xy = Yx, 
6.(bb)c/c', 
7. (bc)c / b, 
8. (bb )b = c 
Thus we found the right-identity and commutative laws. When we 
added 
(ab)b = a(bb) 
the solution was as above except that 3 was replaced by (xy)z = x(yz), 
the associative law. This is as good a result as Meltzer obtained. 
Both methods obtained the right-identity and the commutative laws. 
Meltzer obtained a part of the associative law, viz.: 
(xx)y = w D x(xy). 
If he altered his method so that occurrences of terms were 
abstracted, rather than abstracting on every occurrence at once, he 
would have obtained (xy)z = w 0 x(yz) = w which is equivalent to the 
associative law in the presence of the axioms of equality. 
Rather different laws, true only for the example groups, were 
found by the two methods. 
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What neither method does, however, is to use the equality axioms 
when forming generalisations. Preliminary investigation of 
generalisation relative to these axioms shows that this is not an easy 
problem. 
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Z- Some pilot experiments 
4,01 Description of the program 
To test out our ideas on algorithms for forming generalisations, we 
have programmed a method which works on a case of the general problem, 
generated by the following assumptions:- 
1) The language is sorted and there are no function symbols other 
than constants. 
2) The niceness relation, .-3 , is 
cpg 
3) The knowledge used for generalisation, Th, is empty. 
Irr A 'i A f1)is the conjunction of the literals in some 
Herbrand base of Irr A A(ei /1 fi). 
5) Only one predicate symbol occurs in f. 
From the discussion of the simple solvable case after corollary 2 
in chapter k we see that consistency is easily checked. Indeed, if 
E _ L L is a conjunct of Irr A /i(ei A fi)i then 
n 
VH Irr A ^ (ei ^ f1) is consistent iff H j E. 
The program calculates a heuristic approximation to an 
irredundant explanation, H, rather than looking for a best one. This 
is to save time. The program is written in the POP-2 programming 
language (Burstall, Collins and Popplestone, 1971) and has been run on 
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the ICL 4130 machine. At the moment running times vary between three 
and fifteen minutes. 
The program starts with H, the potentially irredundant explanation, 
set equal to H0. It then continuously chooses a member, D, of H and a 
member Ci of H0 and replaces D by inf*D,Ci. a heuristic approximation 
to the reduced form of infD,CiJ. This stops when any such replacement 
results in VH A Irr fii(ei A fi) being inconsistent. Then H is 
output as the result. 
The flowchart of the program is given in figure 1. 
Set H = HO. 
Choose a clause, D. in H 
which may be replaced. 
* if there is one 
no 
Choose a clause, C., in H such 
that it is not known that D < C. 
and which has not been tried- 
before. 
Find D' = inf* D,Ci 
Does D' pass the consistency 
test? 
t' 
if there is none_X exit 
Figure 1 
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Various heuristic rules are used in making the choices mentioned in 
the flow chart. 
Let Fail(D) = Ci I C i is in Ho and in the course of building up D. 
an attempt to use C. failed},. 
Let Success(D) _ Ci I C i is in H0 and in the course of building up 
D, an attempt to use C. succeededi. 
Initially, Fail(D) _ 0 and Success(D) _ JDJ, for any D in H. The 
clause, D, can only be selected if Fail(D) (f Success(D) / HQ. The 
program chooses a clause D in H with a largest Success(D) and of two 
such clauses prefers the one with the smaller failure set. 
A clause C. in H0 can only be chosen if it is not in Failure(D) 1/ 
Success(D). From these the program chooses a clause Ci for which there 
are minimally many clauses D in H such that C. is in Success(D). This 
reflects our belief that the better-structured the problem the less likely 
it is that any clause in H0 is generalised by more than one clause in a 
good explanation. Consequently we believe that the chance of failing, 
and so wasting a lot of computational effort, grows with the number of 
previous successes in explaining fi given ei. 
Next, D" = infD,Ci is calculated. An approximation to the 
reduced form of D" is found as follows. If D < C. then D" is D. - i 
Otherwise, D" is ordered into a list L1...,Ln,...,Lm where any two 
distinct literals occurring in L1...... Ln have different predicate 
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symbol and sign pairs. Further if some predicate symbol and sign pair 
occurs in D" it occurs in L1,...,L . The literal L. has no more 
variables than any other literal with that predicate symbol and sign 
for i=1,n. For n < i < m, L. has less variables (not in L1'°°°,Li.-1) 
than in any other of the L1,ooe,Lm, The heuristic approximation to the 
reduced form of D" is the reduced version, calculated properly, of 
L. ( I < i < min(l,m) , where 1 is a program parameter, which is set as 
large as possible without inconveniently long running times. We set 1 
to be 11 throughout our experiments, 
The consistency test checks whether D" < E, with E as defined above. 
This is a necessary and sufficient condition for the consistency of H 
with Irr A /(e1 A f1) since the other clauses in H will either already 
have been checked or else are in HO0 
Simplification is performed by continuous application of the 
following operation, until this is no longer possible: 
Remove from H a clause, D,, such that 
Success(D1) C D H anU d D2Success(D2 2r 1 
Notice that D" itself cannot be removed by this process. The 
program takes advantage of this fact. 
When the program terminates, and it must do so, H is reduced. For 
suppose D1 and D2 are distinct clauses in H then and D1 < D2, Suppose 
that D is any clause in H then, Now since the program has terminated, 
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H 0 - Success(D) O Fai.l(D), if C e Success(D) then D < C. Otherwise, 
asVH A IrrA A. n f1) is consistent, D J C. Therefore 
Success(D) {C e HO D < C}. It follows that 
Success(D2) _ {C e H0 D2 < C' C {C e HO I D1 < CJ = Success(DI). 
But then the simplification process would have removed D2. This 
contradicts the fact that the program has terminated and establishes 
the conclusion. 
On the other hand, H need not be irredundant at termination since 
inf* is not inf. If inf* were inf, it would be. 
k.2 Evaluation of ex erimentation 
It is now convenient to discuss why experimentation is helpful. 
First it serves to give more complex examples than can easily be produced 
by hand. Secondly, we can try to evaluate our hypothesis generation 
method. Some ways of evaluation will not be considered. We pay little 
attention to the efficiency of the program, since it has only been 
written to provide answers in a reasonable amount of time which varied, 
as stated above, between three and fifteen minutes for the examples 
described below. Neither will the behaviour of the hypothesis method 
through time be considered; we have only begun to investigate the 
possibilities theoretically (see chapter 6). Finally we do not 
investigate either theoretically or practically how useful the hypothesis 
generation method is to the organism employing it (see chapter 1). 
The method will be judged by the hypotheses it produces. But 
®171m 
this is not too easy; by definition the method must produce the nicest 
explanatory hypothesis possible, in the sense of - Consequently 
experiment will merely confirm theorem 1..1. However we can test 
the correlation of 4 with other niceness relations. For 
illustration we will try 419 (see chapter 1 for a definition) and < 
(this is a Popperian niceness relation, as discussed in section 1 of this 
chapter). 
It would certainly be possible to try to calculate the predictive 
power of a generated hypothesis, when all cases and the correct hypothesis 
are known. However one should also take into account how good the 
information provided to the hypothesis generation machine is. Suppose, 
at one extreme, that no information is given (where f = f)o Then one 
cannot expect any predictive power of a generated hypothesis. At the 
other extreme when all possible cases are given one would expect a 
hypothesis to possess total predictive power, as a simple consequence of its 
being an explanation. 
More generally, one can only expect the hypothesis generated to do 
well in cases similar to those it is given information about. This 
would require what we do not possess: a method of giving a sense to the 
word "similar" induced by the correct hypothesis. 
A partial way around this problem would be to compare with respect 
to predictive power one hypothesis generated by the generation method 
with another either generated by a different method or else by humans, 
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when both hypotheses are generated from the same information. This 
would require rather more than a pilot experiment. 
What we shall do is award good marks according to how well the 
predictions of the generated hypothesis match those of the correct one. 
If the agreement is, intuitively, rather small and we can show, 
intuitively, that a "fair sample" of cases have been supplied then we 
shall award a bad mark. 
One should compare our difficulties with those which arise when 
evaluating Evans' Analogy program (Evans, 1968). As long as his 
program gives the "correct" answers, it is certainly doing well. If 
it gives no answer, it is certainly doing badly. But suppose it gives 
the "wrong" answer. Then whether it is doing well or not seems to 
depend on what its reasons for giving that answer were. Two comparisons 
are in order. First consider a program which simply always selects the 
first allowable answer figure. It will certainly never have any reason 
for making its choice. Next consider a clever person who knows the 
correct answer and deliberately tries to find good reasons for choosing 
some wrong answer. It is well known that most I.Q. tests can be so 
treated by an intelligent person! Perhaps therefore an analogy program 
should try to find as large a number of answers as possible and try to 
convince us that each was "correct". 
1+3 An experiment using the win predicate of noughts and crosses 
The aim of the experiment is to discover a sufficient set of 
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conditions for a position to be a win. The board is considered to be a 
three by three matrix. We use a language with two sorts: numbers and 
positions. There are three predicate symbols, XX, 00 and Win. 
XX(i,j,p) is true iff position p has an X in square (i,j). The 
predicate 00 is defined similarly. We can formulate a set 
Hcorrect E1,E2,E3,E), cf four clauses expressing sufficient conditions 
for a win: 
E1 = {XX(i,1909 XX(i,2,p), XX(i,3,p), Win(P)i, 
E2 = XX(9i,p), XX(29i9P)9 XX(39i9P)9 Wir.CP)i 
E3 {xi(1919P)9 3E(2,2,p), XXC39390, Win(P)I., 
Ek = X-(1933'p)' XX(2929P)9 Xg(3919P), Win(p) . 
These state, respectively, that a row, a column, a forward diagonal 
or a backward diagonal of X's is a sufficient condition for a win. 








Certainly the fact, f1 , to be explained is 
f1 = Win(P1 ()). 
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There are two possibilities for Ev(f1), If we give the exact 
reasons why f1 is a win then 
Ev(f1) = XX(1,2,P1 O) A XX(2,2,P1 O) A XX(3,2,P1 O) 
If we decide that the win depends on where the marks X and 0 are 
then 
Ev(f1) = XX(1,2,p1 ()) It XX(2,2,p1 ()) 
A XX(3,2,p1 ()) A 00(1,3,p1()) 
A 00(2,1 ,p1 ()) A 00(3,3,p1 ()) 
We shall try both. There are certainly others in which, for 
instance we might include in Ev(f1) the literal 00(1,1,p1()) or even 
00(1,2,plO). 
The choice of Ev is not prescribed by our theory and is but one of 
many omissions (see chapter 1). 
Next, consider a loss, such as the position, p2 O , displayed in 
figure 2. 
Figure 2 
In this case we simply include a complete description of the 
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figure in Irr, So Irr will contain the conjunction: 
3 
A 00(1Ij,P2(A 00(3,j,P2()) 
/3 A : 1 X_(2,j p2(1A 3ff(3,2 33 
A A 00(2, jIP2()) AA 
A XX(3,1,P2Q) A XX(3,3,P2()) A an P2()) 
So given a set of won or lost positions, we have shown how f, 
Ev and Irr are obtained. However the resulting problem will not 
satisfy assumption 3, given in the description of the program, since 
we have not included a complete description of every won position in 
, Irr.
n 
Let E = L L is a conjunct of Irr A (ei A fi)J as defined 
there; let Irr° be Irr together with a complete description of every win 
n 
and let E' L ` L is a conjunct of Irr' A A (ei A fi)}, Now If 
only a single position variable occurs in a clause C which contains only 
positive occurrences of the Win predicate, then the reader should verify 
that C < E iff C < El. Now every clause in * H0) has this character 
and so we conclude that we may safely use the program with Irr as defined. 
This represents a useful computational saving. 
The first result is in a case where Ev gave the exact reasons and 
the positive wins were as displayed in table 1 o We took all possible 
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non-wins to form Irr. The calculation was performed by hand, since it 
is easy in this case to generate all solutions, rather than just one 
heuristic approximation to an irredundant set of clauses. 
0 0 0 0 X 0 
X X X 0 X 0 
0 X X X X 0 
X X 0 0 X 
0' 0 X 0 X 0 0 X 0 
0 X X X 
X 0 0 X 
0 X 0 X 
X X 0 0 
Table I 
There is exactly one solution, Hsoln 
= D1,D2,D3,D4} 
where 
D1 = 135(i,1,p), XX(i,2,p), XX(i,3,p), 
XX(i,i,p), Win(p)J,, 
D2 = 13X(1,i,p), XX(2,i,p), XX(3,i,p), 
R(i,i,p), Win(p)}9 
D3 = 7X(1,1,p), 11(2,2,p), 77(3,3,p), 
Win(p) }, 
-177- 
D 4 = 71(1,3,p), XX(2,2,p), 3H(3,1,p), 
Win(p) 




has good predictive power. It is 
not maximally nice with respect to either -il, or < since the literal 
XX(i,i,p) occurring in the clauses D1 and D2 is superfluous. 
The next two examples use an Ev of the second sort, where we record 
all occurrences of 0's and X's in each Ev(fi.) (i=1,n) For the first 
example, the win and non-win positions are displayed in tables 2 and 3 



























The program found a set of clauses 
Hsoln 
= D1,D21, where 
D1 = (i,39P/9 Cm,i,p), (m,i,p) 
XX(i,m,p), Win(p)j 
and D2 = 7X(3,d,p), XX(d,d,p), 3a(2,g,p)9 
X(g,g9P)9 XX(1,±,p)9 XX(19i,p)9 Win(p)j. 
The clause D1 has as a consequence that any position containing a 
column of X's or a backward diagonal of X's is a win. The clause D2 
does the same for rows and the forward diagonal. In fact Hsoln < 
Hcorrect' 
Therefore if Hcorrect predicts that a position is a win, so will Hsoln* 
However 
Hsoln 
makes some wrong predictions. For example, according to 
D1 any position containing an X in (1,3) and in (3,1) is a win. 
We cannot say if this is because we do not have examples of all the 
"ways" in which a position can fail to be a win since we do not have a 
good concept of such a "way". Hsoln is not maximally nice with respect 
to either -41, or < since one can remove XX(i,m,p) from D1 without 
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affecting consistency with Irr N n(ei A f1). 
The win and non-win positions for the second example are displayed in 












































D _ JXX(2,2,p), XX(k,k,p), XX(n,k,p), 00(g,n,p), 
Win(p) . 
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As we inadvertently did not put a 0 in any of the non-wins, it is 
possible to find an explanation with only one clause. This invalidates 
any comparison with 
Hsoln° 
The solution is not maximally nice with 
respect to either -;l, or < since the clause 
00'(g,n,p), Win(p)J 
would do just as well. 
To sum up, generated hypotheses compare well with Hsoln' but do not 
have maximal niceness with respect to either -4l, or <. 
1,.k Learning the patrilineal ancestor relationship 
The binary relation, patrilineal ancestor, is recursively defined 
by 
Anc(x,y) = Father(x,y) V 3z(Father(x,z) A Anc(z,y)). 
We are using a language with one sort. There are three binary 
predicate symbols, Father, Daughter and Anc with evident meanings. The 
hypothesis generation machine is required to find sufficient conditions 
for one individual to be the patrilineal ancestor of another. The 
definition of Anc gives the set, Hcor E1,E21, of sufficient 
conditions where 
E = Father(x,y), Anc(x,y)} 
and E2 = Father(x,z), Ane(z,y), Anc(x,y) . 
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A typical member of f has the form Anc(a,b). There are, again, 
at least two ways of choosing Ev(anc(a,b)). One is to give exact 
reasons. Another is to choose a reasonably small set of literals 
which establish a link between a and b. A link is a set of literals 
Lk I k=1,li where each Lk is of the form Pk(ak,bk) or Pk(bk,ak) 
where a=a1 , bk-ak+1 (1<k<l-1) and bl=b. In general we let 
Ev(Anc(a,b)) be a few of the smallest links between a and b. 
Irr is simply a conjunction of all the true literals in the 
example under consideration. 
In the examples, we were concerned with two families whose trees 








In order to define the Irr used in the various examples, without 
repetition, we define three sets of clauses Irr1, Irr2 and Irr3, 
using 
some auxiliary sets. 
Let Irr1 A= UAnc(a,b)} 
I e 
Adam,Reg}, b e Bill,Terry,Rod,Kaija,Viivi}} 
9 
U Anc (Adam,Reg)f l 
UAnc(Rod,b)} I b e Kaija,Viivi}} 
Irr2 A = Anc(Isa,Manuel)}, 1Anc(Isa,Karen)}, Anc(Manuel,Karen)., 
9 
Irr1 F = Father(Reg,b)}, I b e jBill,Terry,Rod}H 
U JFather(Rod,Kaija)}, Father(Rod,Viivi)}} 
Irr2,F = Father(Isa,Manuel)}, jFather(Manuel,Karen) ,, 
Irr19D = Daughter(Kaija,Rod)i, Daughter(Viivi,Rod)Hj 
Irr2,D = Daughter(Karen,Manuel)jj1) 
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Irr1 = Irr1 
A U Irr1 
F 1J Irr1 D UP(a,b)j I P E Anc,Father, 
9 ! 
Daughters, a, b e Adam,Reg,Bill,Terry,Rod,Kaija,Viivii, 
P(a,b) / Irr1!A U Irr19F U Irr1!Dij 
Irr2 = Irr2 A U Irr2 F V 
Irr2 D U BP(a,b) I P E Anc,Father, 
! ! 9 
Daughters, a,b e Isa,Manuel,Karenj, P(a,b) 
Irr29A U Irr2!F U Irr2!Di 
Irr3 = JP(alb) I P E Anc,Father,Daughteri, 
a f Adam,Reg,Bill,Terry,Rod,Kaija,Viivii, 
b e Isa,Manuel,KarenH 
UJP(b,a) I P E Anc,Father,Daughter J, 
a e Isa,Manuel,Karenj, 
b e Adam,Reg,Bill,Terry,Rod,Kaija,Viiviii. 
In the first example, we used an Ev of the first kind. Ev and f 
are described in table 1; Irr was taken to be Irr1 (J Irr2 1f Irr3. 
The program output the set of clauses Hcor! described above. It 





= Ano(Rod,KaLja) e1 = Father(Rod,Kaija) 
f2 
= An3(Reg,Terry) e2 W Father(Reg,Terry) 
f = Ano(Reg,Kaija) e3 = Anc(Reg,Rod) 3 
A Father(Rod,Kaija) 
f An3(Reg,Viivi) e = Anc(Reg,Rod) 
A Father(Rod,Viivi) 
15 = Ano(Isa,Karen) e5 = Anc(Isa,Manuel) 
A Father(Manuei,Karen) 
Table 1 
In the second example, we used an Ev of the second kind. Ev and 
f are described in table 2; Irr was taken to be Irr1. 
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f e 
Anc(Rod,Kaija) e,1 = Daughter(Kai ja,Rod) ,' 
Father(Rod,Kaija), 
f2 
- Anc(Reg,Terry) e2 = Father(Reg,Terry), 





f Anc(Adam,Kaija) e = Anc(Adam,Reg) A 
Anc(Reg,Kai,ja) A 
Anc (Ro a, Kai j a) A 
Father(Reg,Rod) A 
Fat} er(Rod,Kai ja) 
Table 2 
The program output a set of clauses, H = D1,D2J where 
DI = jFarher(x,y), Ano(x,y)j,j 
D2 = Anc(x,y), Father(x,y), Anc(Reg,y), 
Father(Reg,Rod), Father(Rod,Kaija), Anc(Rod,Kaija), 
Ano(z,r), Anc(r,Kaija), Anc(z,Kaija)j 




example H I Anc(Reg,Vii.vi} E Anc(Reg,Rod AArc(Rod,Vi1Vi)). 
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Further H is obviously not optimal according to either 1, or < 
since, for example, one could remove Father(x,y) from D2 retaining 
consistency. It is not optimal with respect to < for another important 
reason: one could replace every occurrence of Kaija in D2 by one of the 
variable w. 
It is interesting to notice that D2 is equivalent, relative to 
Irr, to the clause, 
Anc(x,y), Anc(y,Kaija), Anc(x,Kaija)i 
This suggests that it would be interesting to extend the program so 
that it handles the simple kind of Th discussed in section 2.2 of this 
chapter, 
The next example uses a little less biased evidence. Ev and f are 







f1 = Anc(Rod,Kaija) e1 = Daughter(Kaija,Rod) 
AFather(Rod,Kaija). 
f2 = Anc(Reg,Terry) e2 = Father(Reg,Terry), 
f3 = Anc(Reg,Kaija) e3 = Father(Reg,Rod) 
ADaughter(Kaija,Rod) 
^Father(Rod,Kaija) 
AAnc(Rod,Kaija) A Anc(Reg,Rod), 
f4 = Anc(Reg,Viivi) e4- = Father(Reg,Rod) ̂  Daughter(Viivi,Rod) 
A Father(Rod,Viiv.i) A An^(Rod,Viivi) 
/\Anc(Reg,Rod) 
f5 = Anc(Isa,Karen) e5 = Anc(Isa,Manuel) 
A Anc(Manuel,Karen)/\ Father(Isa,Manuel 
A Father(Manuel,Karen) 
A Daughter (Karen,Manuel) 
f6 = Anc(Adam,Kaija) e6 = Anc(Adam,Reg)/\ Anc(Reg,Kaija) 
* Anc(Rod,Kaija) A Father(Reg,Rod) 
n Father(Rod,Kaija). 
Table 3 
The program output a set of clauses, H = D1D2j where 
D1 = Father(x,y), Anc(x,y)j, 
D2 = Father(w,u), Father(u,z), Anc(u,z), 
Anc(x,y), Anc(y,z), Anc(x,z)j. 
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In fact H and Hcor have the same predictive power: in any family 
tree they will both predict the patrilineal ancestors correctly given 
all the information about Father. More can be said. Suppose Th is a 
theory, expressing the tree-like structure of family trees, whose only 
predicate symbol is Father and look at the following definition obtained 
by changing the proposed sufficient condition into a necessary and 
sufficient one: 
Anc(x,z) = Father(x,z)"j 3 w,u,y(Father(w,u) 
A Father(u,z)/\ Anc(u,z)A Anc(x,y) 
A Anc(y,z)). 
Then, assuming Th, this definition is equivalent to the original 
one. 
However, one can easily see that H is not optimal with regard to 
either 4 l' or < o 
In conclusion, we see that although we obtain formulae with good 
predictive power, they are not, in general, optimal with regard to either 
-i1' or <. This accords with our experience in the case of O's and X's. 
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Chapter 6 Hypothesis learning then 
1. Introduction 
Hypothesis learning theory was studied first, as a language learning 
theory, by E. Mark Gold (1967) and subsequently, in more mathematical 
detail by Jerome Feldman (1970). The importance of this theory is that 
it deals with the progression of a hypothesis discovery method through 
time. While it appears on the surface to deal exclusively with language 
guessing, the theory may be adapted for other purposes. Our 
presentation tries to bring this out by developing part of it on an 
abstract level. One can continue the abstract theory to cover the rest 
of Feldman'stheory, but enough will be developed to give a good ground 
for application, criticism and indication of possible future trends. 
All this work is essentially an elaboration of a simple but 
surprising theorem of Gold. 
A complete information sequence for a context-free grammar, G, is an 
infinite list, I of the form +y1 +y2 .... where: 
(1) +y appears in the list iff the string y is in the language 
determined by G. 
(2) -y appears in the list iff the string y is not in the language 
determined by G. 
Suppose that at time t one is presented with the signed string +yt. 
To what, extent can one succeed in "eventually" guessing G? It turns 
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out that there is a method, defined independently of G and I, which 
will identify G in the limit. That is.,there is a time 1 at which 
it will guess and ever thereafter continue to guess, a grammar G' 
whose language is the same as that of G. 
Let G1,.... be an enumeration of all context-free grammars. The 
method chooses, at time t, the first grammar, G' say, such that if +y 
has appeared in the list by time t then y is in the language of G', 
and if -y has appeared in the list, by time t, then y is not in the 
language of G'. Evidently one can always find such a G', if only 
because G appears in the list. If G" is a grammar in the list whose 
language differs from that of G, then either there is a y in G but not 
in G", or vice versa. At some time, t', say +y (whichever is 
appropriate) will appear in the list and thereafter G" will not be 
lt chosen by our method. Hence after some time, say, every G 
occurring before the first grammar in the list whose language is the 
same as that of G, G' say, will never be chosen. At this time G' 
will be chosen and will continue to be chosen. 
This theorem shows that, at least in this case, it is eventually 
possible to "learn" the truth. However it is never possible to I'knoryn 
the truth, since any guess G can be forced to change by some +y or 
other. 
2. Abstract theory 
The theory is presented as an informal mathematical theory. 
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The domains are the hypothesis space, H= and the phenomenon space, 
Phen. 
Axiom I Hyp is a recursive, infinite set of integers. 
The variables ranging over Hyp are h, h' etc. 
Examples 1) Hyp is the set of GBdel numbers of first-order lawlike 
universal sentences. GBdel numbers give a way of coding sentences as 
integers. This possibility of coding allows us to consider the theory 
a general one. 
2) Hyp is the set of GtSdel numbers of context-free grammars. 
Hyp is required to be infinite in order to avoid trivial 
exceptional cases in later theorems. We will asume some fixed 
enumeration, h1,h2,.... of Hyp. 
Axiom 2 Phen is an infinite recursive set. 
The variables ranging over Phen. are f,f1 etc. We use, F,F+,F 
etc. to range over finite subsets of Phen. °(Phen) is the set of 
finite subsets of Phen. The fact that Phen is infinite forces 
attention on the harder problems. Generally, our theory becomes 
trivial when Phen is finite. 
We will let.9 S Phen be a variable ranging over the recursive 
subsets of Phen. . is to be understood as a subject domain 
separated out from Phen, the class of all possible phenomena. 
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Examples 1) (G8del numbers of) strings of letters. 
2) (The G8del numbers of) the set of all ground clauses, C 
which do not follow from Th, an arbitrary consistent set of sentences, 
but are consistent with it and Irr, another set of sentences 
consistent with Th. 
The predicates are: Accountsfor is of sort Hyv x Phenj 
MA is of sort Hyp x Phen x Integers 
Consistent is of sort Hyp x p (Phen) x ?(Phen) 
MC is of sort Hyp x l'(Phen) x ''(Phen) 
x Integers. 
Axiom 3 Accountsfor is partial recursive, MA is primitive recursive 
and Accountsfor(h,f) = 3m MA(h,f,m). 
We extend Accountsfor to a partial recursive predicate of type 
Hyp x (Phen) by: 
Accountsfor(h,F) = def V f c F Accountsfor(h,f). 
Similarly MA is extended to a primitive recursive predicate of 
type Hyp x '(Phen) x Integers by: 
MA(h,F,m) = def IV f E IF .1 m' < m MA(h,f,m' 
Evidently, Accountsfor(h,F) = 3 m MA(h,F,m). 
Accountsfor is the type of implication being used to explain the 
phenomena. 
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Examples 1) Accountsfor(h,C) M h -> C. 
2) Accountsfor(h,C) E h < CJ (Th). 
3) Accountsfor(h,f) f is a string in the language 
given by the grammar h. 
MA corresponds to a program for Accountsfor. 
Axiom Consistent is partial recursive, MC is primitive recursive 
and '1 Consistent(h,F+,F )e 3m MC(h,F+,F ,m). 
Consistent(h,F+,F'') means that h is consistent with the occurrence 
of the phenomena in F+ (hence the plus sign) and with the non-occurrence 
of those in F . 
If Accountsfor were a logical implication such that a completeness 
theorem held and one had sufficient logical symbolism, one could define 
Consistent in terms of Accountsfor by: 
Consistent (h,F+,F ) = I f -, Accountsfor(h n F+A - F ,-f 
However we do not want such a strong implication in general, since 
it may be easier or more relevant to look for hypotheses bearing 
implications of a weaker sort, such as generalisation. 
MC corresponds to a program for 'ro Consistent. 
Examples 1) When F+ = Ci I i=1,n} and F = D. j=1,m}, 
n m 
Consistent(h,F+$F-) =V(h A 1Ci ^ A1Dj) A Th A Irr is consistent. 
2) h is a grammar and F+ and F are sets of strings. 
Consistent(h,F+,F ) (F+ C L(h)) ,/1 (L(h) (I F- = 0). 
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The other axioms give some of the logical properties of the 
predicates. They are meant to be a small set which allows Feldman's 
theorems to be proved in a general form. 
Axiom 5 Consistent(h,F+,F) -> Y f -E F' ~i Accountsfor(h,f ). 
Accountsfor is a consistent deduction principle. 
Axiom 6 F+1 F2 ^ 
F1 
F2 A Consistent (h,F',,F1) -> Consistent (h,F2+.,F2-) 
Consistency is hereditary downwards (preserved by ally operation which 
produces subsets). 
Axiom 7 Consistent(h,F+,F-) -> F+ (f1 1F 
The phenomena in F are effectively negated. 
The next axioms use a special hypothesis, T, which functions as a 
tautology. 
Axiom 8 Vf Consistent(T,f,O) A Consistent(T,O,f). 
No phenomenon is necessary but every one is possible. 
Axiom 9 Consistent(h,F+,F-) -> Consistent(h,F+ U fj,F ) V 
Consistent(h,F+,F U fD). 
This is a partial version of the law of the excluded middle. 
Axiom 10 It is decidable whether or not Consistent(T,F+,,F-'). 
Axiom 11 Consistent(T,F+,F ) -> 7 h(Consistent(h,F+,F ) A Accountsfor(h,F+)) 
Every consistent finite set has a consistent explanation. 
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Information sequences 
Information sequences are sequences of observations of the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of certain phenomena. 
Formally, an information sequence is an infinite sequence in 
( 0,1 j x Phen) 00 or else a finite one in 000i x Phen)*. We will 
display <1 ,f> as +f and <0,f> as -f. 
We will use the variables I,I1, to range over information 
sequences. III is the length of I. Note that 0 < III < 00. If 
0 < t < III, I(t) is the tih component of I. 
is that information 
I1 is finite then n 
If I1 is finite, I1 + T2 
sequence consisting of I1 followed by I2 If 
I1 = I1 + ..n.-.> + I where n > 0. 
n times 
0 I1 = the empty informationsequence., 
(n+1)I1 
= nI1 + I1 
More formally, 
If I1 = 1 
2 
+ 13, where 11 
31 
> 0 then I1 extends I.2. This is 
written as I1 > 12. 
If t < III, then It = <I(1 ),....,I(t)>. If t > III, then It = I. 
The positive information in I is defined to be S+(I) = if I + f occurs 
in Ij. Similarly, we define S _(j) = if I - f occurs in I. I 1 a 
with 1 
2 
iff S+(I1) = S+(I2) and S_(I1) = S (I2) . 
I is complete iff S+(I) U S _(J) = Phen. If I is complete it is 
infinite. I is consistent iff for all t, Consistent(T,S+(It),S (Zt). 
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A hypothesis explains an information sequence I, for the subject 
a iff 
Vt Accountsfor(h,S+(r )fl )A Consistent (h,S+(It),S (It)). 
When QJ = Phen we suppress, both here and elsewhere, any reference 
to it. 
Induction machines 
An induction machine, Tt , is a recursive function from the set 
of finite information sequences to Hyp. 
identifies h in the limit on I iff -3' Vt > 't 71(It) = h. 
matches an explanation of I for the subject A in the limit 
iff ' Vt > 'r M(It) explains I for 'J . 
I approaches an explanation of I for the subject :2'/ if f 
1 ) V f e S+(I)(1 JZ VVVt > 1' Account sfor(X(It),f). 
2) V h not explaining I for the subject J , T Vt > (It) / h. 
The approach is strong iff, in addition: 
3) 3 h explaining I for; such that I -C V t> G I finite 
I' extendinE It and agreeing with It such that /,(I')= h. 
This condition is slightly stronger than Feldman's for a strong 
approach. 
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3. Inferring hypotheses 
Our first induction machine X 1 is essentially due to Gold. It 
is defined under the assumption that Accountsfor is recursive, and 
relative to a subject, JJ . 
( h1 (if 
't Consistent(T,S+(I),S-(I))) 
the first h. such that Accountsfor(h.,S+(I)/) J ) and 
S+(I),F C S-(I) V m< III 1 MC(hi,F{,F ,III) 
(Otherwise). 
is total recursive follows from the assumption that That 
1/t 1 
Accountsfor is recursive and axioms 10 and 11. 
Theorem I If h explains a consistent, complete I for J then X 1 
identifies a hypothesis, h', in the limit on I which explains I for i 
Proof First we show that if ht, does not explain I for lU then 
3 V > f Al (It) / ht, . 
There are two possibilities. Either -I Accountsfor(ht ft ) for 
1 
some ft E S+(I) / or else "i Consistent(ht,S+(It1),S_(It1 )) for some 
1 
t1 . In the first case we can take l = t1. 
In the second, there is an m such that MC(h,S+(jt1),Sm(It1),m). 
As Phen is infinite and I is complete, there is a V such that II T, > m. 
This 'r has the necessary properties in this case. 
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Suppose that h' is the first hypothesis which explains I forJ 
Then there is a time 2' such that if t > T, l11(It) is not a hypothesis 
occurring before h'. Now, V t Accountsfor(h' ,S+(T t)", and since 
V t Consistent(h',S+(It), S-(It)), V m MG(h,S +(It), S-(It), m) by axioms 
and 6. Hence V t > t A (It) = h'. This concludes the proof. 
If in addition, Consistent is recursive, then we assert, leaving 
the proof to the reader, that one can choose a simpler machine, 2. 
(if "' Consistent(T,S+(I),S-(I))) 
U2(I) = 
the first hi such that Accountsfor(hi,S+(I)( e ) 
and Consistent(hi,S+(I),S-(I)). 
(Otherwise)- 
We cannot extend the result to the case where Accountsfor is not 
recursive. In fact under the assumption: 
V F+F*' Consistent(T,F+,F-) -> [ o f Consistent(T,F+ U fj,F ) 
A Consistent(T,F+,F- U fI)], 
we can show that no machine can identify an explanatory hypothesis in the 
limit when -@7 = Phen. The assumptions hold when Hyp is the set of 
general rewriting systems (Feldman, 1970) and Phen the corre-sponding set 
of strings. 
Theorem 2 Suppose that the assumptions hold. For every machine, m , 
there is a consistent, complete and recursive information sequence on 
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which t does not identify an explanatory hypothesis in the limit. 
Proof Let f1 , P. o . be an enumeration of Phen. We will find an I 
satisfying the conditions of the theorem such that I(t) = + ft Let us 
say that a sequence, I' is suitable iff when. I' (t) is defined, I' (t) = + ft$ 
or else II(t) = -f ti 
Suppose first-that: 
finite suitable I'(Consistent(T,S+(I'),S (IQ)) A 
V finite suitable I" > I'[ Consistent(T,S+(I"),S(I")) -> 
(2l(I') = "MI""))]. 
In this case we choose I' as guaranteed by the supposition. Let 
ft be the first phenomenon such that Consistent(T,S+(I') (f ft},S-(I')) 
and Consistent(T,S+(I'), S-(I') u iftJ). The existence of ft is guaranteed by 
the assumption and axiom 7. Let I" be a finite suitable extension of I° 
such that I"(t) = + ft=-"Accountsfor(m(I' ),ft). The existence of I" 
is guaranteed by axiom 9. As I" is finite, it is recursive. Axioms 
9 and 10 guarantee that I" has an extension I which is a complete, 
consistent and suitable information sequence. Now identifies 
'M(II) in the limit, by the supposition. If -nAccountsfor('h1(I' ),ft) 
then I(t) = + ft. If Accountsfor(M(I' ),ft) then I(t) = -ft, and so, by 
axioms 5 and 6, -1 Consistent(14(I'),S+(I't),S (I°t)). 
Therefore under the supposition, M does not identify, in the limit, 
a hypothesis explaining I. 
Let us assume, to the contrary that: 
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finite suitable I'(Consistent(T,S+(I'),S-(I')) 
-> 3 finite suitable I" > I'(Consistent(T,S+(I"),S (I")) 
A M(I') / M(I")) 
In this case, I" may be obtained recursively from I' since 9 is 
recursive and by axiom 10, given I" one can tell by a recursive procedure 
whether or not Consistent(T,S+(I"),S (I'")).. Therefore there is a 
recursive function g such that V I'(Consistent(T,S+(I'),S (I')) -> (g(I') 
is a finite suitable sequence extending I' such that 
Consistent (T,S+(I"),S (I"))A(I') / /&(I"))- 
Let 1 
0 
= <+ f1>. By axiom 8, Consistent(T,f1,O). Then 
I0<g(I0)<.... <g 
t 
(I0)<,,..,. and so there is a unique, recursive I > g 
t 
(I0) 




Therefore by the properties of g and axiom 6, Consistent(h,St(I),St(I)). 
Therefore I is consistent and is certainly complete. Now M (gt(Is)) 
// (gt+1(IO)) (t 
> 0). Therefore 71 cannot identify any hypothesis 
in the limit. 
This eatablishes the theorem. 
If Hyp includes every recursive predicate of Phen, then although 
will not identify a hypothesis explaining I in the limit, there is one. 
Notice also that the I described in the theorem, although recursive, 
is not obtained recursively from 111. We conjecture that there is 
no such recursive map when Hyp includes every recursive predicate of Phen. 
This is not the case if we are guaranteed that for every finite I', 
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2f Accountsfor(///(I'),f) is always a recursive predicate on Phen. 
There is a unique recursive complete and consistent suitable information 
sequence recursively specified by: 
1 ) I(1) = +f1 
2) Consistent (T,Si(I),St(I) U ift+1 ) -> I(t+1) +f t+1 
3) 1 Consistent(T,St(I) U ft+1 i's-W) -> I(t+1) _ -f t+1* 
la) C onsistent (T,St(I),S-(I) U ft+1J)A 
Consistent(T,S+(I) U 
f t+1 i'st(I)) -> (I(t+1) = +ft+1 <-> -1 Accountsfor(l1((It),ft+1) )' 
Of course we are still using the assumption behind theorem 2. 
(The definition of I is very close to the familiar proof that there can 
be no recursive enumeration of the recursive functions.) In this case 
we can actually find an 9711 which will do as well as )Won any I' / I 
and will identify a hypothesis, in the limit, which explains I (provided 
Hyp contains all the recursive functions). Putnam (1967) has made 
similar observations. 
Although it is not possible to devise a machine which will identify 
an explanation in the limit, it is possible to strongly approach one, 
using a machine 3. 
To calculate 'm3(I) proceed as follows: 
1) If --I Consistent(T,S+(I),S (I)) then '}3(I) = h1. 
2) Otherwise, find, by some fixed effective means, an h and an m 
such that MA(h,S+(I)f 
d 
m) and V m' < m + III V F+ S S+(I),F C S _(I) 
( + 
`1 M h,F F ,m'). Then 
3 
(I) is the first h. such that 
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MA(hi,S+(I) /). m + III) and V F+ C S+(I),F C S -(I) V ml < m +III 
-7MC(h,F+,F ,m'). 
Theorem 3 'M 3 strongly approaches an explanation in the limit on I 
for 14 , if there is one. 
Proof Suppose that there is an explanation of I for Then I is 
consistent and so Accountsfor( 43(It),S+(It),1J ) and so condition I 
for approaching a strong explanation is verified. Suppose hi does not 
explain I. Then either -1 Accountsfor(hi,ft ) for some ft in S+(I) 
1 1 
or else '1 Consistent(hiS+(It1 ),S-(It1)) for some t1 . In the first 
case, if ? > t 1 , A3( 1 " ) / h1. In the second case there is a t2 
such that MC(hi,S+(It1),S-(I t 1)). Therefore if t > max(t1 ,t2), 3(It) , hi. 
This verifies condition 2. 
Let hi be the first hypothesis explaining I for d . For some 
3(I ") is not any h occurring before hi. Suppose t > 'r and 
choose an n such that MA(hi,S+(It) n I ,n). If I' = It + nI(t) then 
3(I') = hi. This verifies condition 3 and concludes the proof. 
These theorems have all been concerned with good behaviour in the 
limit. It is worth noting their local behaviour. 
Suppose I is consistent. The Accountsfor( li(It),S+(It)n J ) for 
i=1,3 and all t. Further Consistent( Z1(It),S+(It),S-(It)) for all ti 
although we only have, for i=2,3, MC( i(It),S+(It),S(It),m) where m 
depends on t and m -> 00 as t -> 00 . 
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4. Inferring good hypotheses 
By incorporating a complexity measure one can obtain better 
standards of good local behaviour. 
We require that the standard ordering of the hypotheses, h1,h2,.,,. 
is according to their simplicity. For example if the hypotheses are 
context-free grammars then, perhaps, if j>i,hj has no less symbols than 
hi. The number of symbols will also order sets of clauses in this 
linear way. 
The derivational complexity d(F+,h) of F+ from h is defined when 
Accountsfor(h,F+) and then, 
d(F+,h) = the smallest integer m such that MA(h,F+,m). 
In other words, using a standard notation, d is that partial 
function defined by d(F+,h) = A m MA(h,F+,m). 
The complexity function is a partial recursive function from 
(Phen) x Hyp to Ik , the set of the rationals. It combines the 
simplicity of a hypothesis with the derivational complexity. 
There is a total recursive function W ': N 
2 
-> R increasing 
unboundedly with each of its arguments such that: 
-6(F+,hi) -X1(i,d(F+,h0 ) 
The machines 
2 
and m 3 could all be specified, using a 
recursive (under the appropriate conditions) predicate, 
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PJ(1<J<3) on Hyp x (0,1 1 x Phen)*, by: 
k 
J 
.(I) = the first h i . such that P J .(hi ,I) 
For example: 
Pk(hi,I) . (-i Consistent(T,S+(I),S (I)) -> hi = h1 ) 
(Consistent(T,S+(I),S (I)) 
-> (MA(hi,S+(I) A J ,m + III) 
A VF + C S+(I), F C S-(I) '-7 MC(hi,F*,F ,m + 
where m is obtained recursively from I. 
I II)))., 
In each case for every finite information sequence I there is an h 
such that Pi (h,I). Further, if I is consistent then Pi (h,I) implies that 
Accountsfor(h,S+(I) I . ). 
We will define corresponding machines rn(1<j<3) with the 
properties: 
1) Pi(7A!(I),I) 
2) Suppose that I is consistent. If Pi (h,I) then 
V(S+(I) 11 J,h) W(S+(I) n 9, 2 (I))- 
That is 'Mt will choose a best machine rather than a first one. 
To compute 27 (I) one proceeds as follows: 
1) If I is not consistent, then 2?l (I) _ (I). 
2) Otherwise, compute M. Let k be the least integer such 
that 7f'(k,0) > )-(S +(I) /) ' , '; i (I)). 
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(I) is that first hypothesis minimising T (S+(I) 0 J h) amongst 
those h1(1<l<max(k,j)) such that Pj(h1,I). 
To see that ')77 (I) is well-defined and effectively obtainable, 
note that -X' is computable and increases unboundedly with its first 
argument, thus ensuring the existence and computability of k, that 
is recursive and that ifpP.(h1,I) and I is consistent then 
Accountsfor(h1,S+(I)/) J ) and so (S+(I)/1 J hl) is defined. 
P. 
Evidently 'm (I) has property one. Suppose I is consistent and 
that P.(hi,I). If i < k then T (S+(I)(I j hi) > (S+(I)n , yj(I)). 
Otherwise T(S+(I)/1 .Qp hi) > (i,0) > (k, 0) > (S+(I)(1 
> '(S+(I)r Therefore A !(I) also has property two. 
Theorem I Suppose that Accountsfor is recursive. m 2 matches an 
explanation of I for A in the limit, if I has one. If -(S+(It)nj ,h) 
converges for all h explaining I for .9 , then 2 2 will eventually guess 
only hypotheses, h, which minimise lim (S+(It)(1 - ,h). 
yy,, 
t -> 00 
Proof From theorem 3.1 M 2 identifies some explanatory hypothesis h in 
the limit. So there is a 2 such that if t rn2(It) = h. Hence, 
when t > '' , the k calculated by yIj2 will be independent of t and only 
a finite number of hypotheses will be considered by 72. From the 
properties of P2 developed in the proof of theorem 3.1, if hi does not 
explain I for then eventually P2(hi,It) will always be false. There- 
fore in the limit A2 will choose only hypotheses explaining I for 87 
That is, m 
2 
matches an explanation of I for J in the limit. The 
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The second part of the theorem is obvious. This concludes the proof. 
When both accountsfor and consistent are recursive, has the 
same limiting behaviour as 2 although, of course, its local behaviour 
is better. 
Theorem 2 Suppose I has an explanation, hi for .j . 'hj3 approaches 
an explanation. If (S+(It) 1 4 hi) is bounded as t -> 00 , then 
3 will only consider finitely many hypotheses and will match an 
explanation of I for.J in the limit. If ' (S+(It) n J ,h') converges 
for all h° explaining I for J , then 3 will eventually guess only 
hypotheses, h°, which minimise lim Y(S+(It) (1j ,h'). 
t ->o 
developed in the proof of theorem 3.3 show Proof The properties of P 3 
at once that *3 approaches an explanation. 
is bounded, so is d(S+(It)/J.g ,hi). 
Then MA(hi,S+(It) (1j ,t1 ). 
the properties of Y we see 
If T (S+(It) A 4 -,hi ) 
Suppose t > max d(S+(It)(l.d ,h.). 
O<t< A 
Therefore, if t > t1,P4(hi,It). 
that for some k, 1 > k implies that 
T (S+(It) n J hl) > (S+(It) n-1 ,hi). Consequently 
From 
only 
considers finitely many hypotheses. Since in general, it approaches an 
explanation, it must, in this case match one. The last part of the 
theorem is obvious and this concludes the proof. 
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5. Generalisation and hypothesis learning theory 
The algorithms and theory developed in the previous chapters 
provide a class of induction machines each of which chooses a nicest 
explanatory hypothesis generalising a given H0 and consistent with its 
knowledge. We will take a brief look at the behaviour in the limit 
of one such machine in a decidable case. 
The hypothesis space, Hyp, is the set of finite sets of clauses 
containing no function symbols, other than constants. 
Phen is the set of ground non-tautologous clauses containing no 
function symbols other than constants. 
Accountsfor(H,HO) iff H <H0. 
Consistent(H,H+,H0) iff v H A 
CE 
H+ C AA_ D is consistent. 
0 Dc H 0 
Since Accountsfor and Consistent are both recursive there is an 
algorithm which identifies an explanation in the limit. However, we 
will see that if we take- = '4 cpg, any algorithm which chooses a 
nicest explanation need not match an explanation in the limit even on 
natural information sequences which arise from repeated presentations 
of the formal problem. 
Suppose that fi (i>0) is a sequence of ground literals and Ev is a 
map from {fi I i>O to conjunctions of ground li.terals such that 
Ev f. U f.3is in Phen and {f. A Ev(f.) i=1,n is consistent. Let 
Ev(fi) = ei1 A .... A eij(i) where the eij are ground literals and we 
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let .Q9 = Ev fi v ifi I i>0}; a natural complete and consistent 
information sequence for the f. 
i 
and Ev is one such that 
S+(I) 2. V i e i j I i>O, 1< j< j (i) j and if i°>i, +C U ifi3)occurs., 
doing so before +CEv7 U fi 
1N, 
in I. 
Recollect the D2j of chapter 3, section 3.3.2 which prodded an 
example of an infinite strictly decreasing chain and the "f 1 of the 
representation theorem, theorem 3.3.3.2.4. and their properties. 
One can find f. 
1 
and an Ev satisfying the necessary conditions 
outlined above such that: 
f2i = Q(x[ 12i]) n(i) 
= ( ) f 
2 
Q x[192i] 2i-1 n(i) 
Ev f2i - D2 n(i) 
2 
Ev f 2i-1 ._ D21 n(i) 
for suitably large n(i) and all I > 1. 
Now such an fi and Ev has a natural information sequence explained 
by Q(x)j. Yet by the properties of the D 
2 
j and the representation 
theorem 3.3.3.2.4E the nicest hypothesis, in the sense of "i , 
cpg 
explaining Ev fi U ifl1I, 1<i<2ni and consistent with S+(I) and the 
set of negations of members of S-(I), is D2n U Q(xE1 2n])1 En say. 
9 




will be chosen. As this is a strictly decreasing 
sequence no member of which explains I, our machine will not even match 
an explanation in the limit. 
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One might object that .97 does not contain enough instances of the 
explanation. If it contains all instances, we will see that choosing 
the nicest will match an explanation in the limit. 
For, suppose H is an explanation of a natural, complete and 
consistent information sequence I and that .J? HO = U J H 1 I i, j>1 } 
Then for some to, H is equivalent to a subset of ,6(3+(ItO) nl ) by 
the representation theorem. Therefore if t > tO, the nicest explanatory 
hypothesis will have complexity less than or equal to that of H. Let 
C be in H. The set { C Zf 
I 
i, j>1 , C 7t' is ground and if 
1<j°<jlaij4 does not occur in C} is infinite. Therefore it must 
eventually be the case since the complexity of the nicest explanatory 
hypothesis is bounded that any nicest explanatory hypothesis must 
contain a clause subsuming at least two members of this set, and so 
subsuming C itself, by the representation theorem. Therefore after 
some time t1 > to any nicest explanatory hypothesis must generalise H. 
Further, after t1 no clause can occur in such a hypothesis which does 
not subsume some clause of H, as H is an explanation. Therefore by 
the minimality, with respect to --Iacpg requirement, such a hypothesis 
will be equivalent to a subset of Y,(H), generalising H. There is a 
fixed collection of such subsets of Y(H) of equal cardinality any 
member of which is consistent with S+(I) and the set of negations of 
members of S-(I) such that eventually the nicest explanation will 
always be equivalent to one of this set, the choice being determined 
solely by power. Which has the greatest power depends on, amongst 
other things, the order of occurrence of the C (C e H) and so, 
in general, any machine which 
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chooses a nicest explanation will match rather than identify an 
explanation in the limit. 
These results are critically dependent on -i cpg. Let us look 




H' iff H has a smaller number of symbol 
occurrences than H or, if they have the same number of symbols, then 
H' < H. 
There is now a machine which will identify a nicest explanation 
in the limit. Let x1,.>>>,xi,o>oo be an infinite list of distinct 
variables. Let _ H I If H contains n variables these are precisely 
x1,>>..,xn Notice that any H has an alphabetic variant in *_ . 
Now there are only finitely many members of with a fixed number of 
symbols, and < is a quasi-ordering. Hence 7/ can be enumerated as 




symbols and so on, and where if Hj and Hj, have the same number of 
symbols then if Hj < HP either j < j' or H., < H.. This follows 
easily from the fact that any finite partial ordering can be enlarged 
to a linear one. Consequently, if j < j', H. -1 , H.,. Since 
every H nas an alphabetic variant in H; if there is an explanation of 
some given I there will be one in the enumeration. Consequently that 
machine which picks the first explanation in the enumeration which 
consistently explains the phenomena will identify an explanation in the 
limit and will always pick the nicest. 




We have presented a generalisation of Feldman's (1970) work, 
Feldman remarks that one of the more interesting theoretical problems 
was the inference of systems with semantics. In so far as our general 
theory covers systems using the predicate calculus which has a semantics, 
we have covered this problem. Here however we see that the notion of 
complexity seems inadequate to apply to some of the niceness relations 
developed earlier. 
The various machines used and developed do not behave at all in 
accordance with any hypothesis discovery procedure employed by 
practising scientists. One could look for reasons in two general 
directions. A better description of normal scientific practice, 
including the discovery methods used would lead to more realistic 
machines. For example one might study how old theories are modified 
to obtain new ones. This is a descriptive approach. 
On the other hand, it may be that the machines do not behave in 
the way they ought to. There is no formulation of any notions of 
justification of criticism of hypotheses. This is a normative approach. 
Leaving these general points aside, the machines all have one 
deficiency, they are extremely inefficient. Each one would take so 
long to operate that the process of hypothesis discovery would lag 
irretrievably far behind the process of information acquisition. We 
believe therefore that it would be illuminating to formalise and prove 
-212- 
the conjecture: 
Suppose Accountsfor and Consistent are recursive. Then there 
is a "natural" model of the axioms and choice of A7 such that no 
machine can efficiently identify an explanation in the limit on every 
(or almost every) explainable information sequence I. 
Such a proof would show that it is necessary to consider special 
cases and methods, even from this simple point of view. 
-213- 
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